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ART. I.—MODERN PHILOSOPHY PANTHEISTIC.

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OUR organs of sense in some way become affected, and we perceive outer objects by means of these organic affections. By affections in the eye we apprehend colors, in the ear sounds, in the mere touch temperatures and the muscular touch solids, in the mouth tastes, and in the nose odors. The perceptions are the modes in which whatever may be without us reveals itself to us in our consciousness. For the inner sense we have no organs, but our own agency gives inner affections, and in these we perceive the modes of our inner activity.

We call the perceived objects *phenomena*, because in the outer sense we have the world and in the inner sense ourselves as *appearance* and not as *existence*. We hereby attain the qualities of an outer world and not its essential matter, and the exercises of an inner world but not its essential spirit. Each one apprehends his affections as modes of appearance

philosophers call perceived objects phenomena.
Common people are right, we perceive things existing

True in
our sense
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in himself and has the phenomena of the material and spiritual worlds as apprehended in his consciousness, but whether these phenomenal worlds are the same to one as to another, we have no capability of deciding. Each man is to himself the measure of truth for his own phenomena.

The phenomena are, in the sense, singly and separately apprehended, and by the connecting judgment referred as qualities and exercises to their respective things and agents, and we thus know the world as made up of distinct things and agents perpetually undergoing successive changes.

The animal has organs of sense in common with man, and apprehends phenomena and groups qualities and events together in a judgment of experience, and thereby to man and animal there is a phenomenal world in common. But to man there is the higher endowment of reason, and this so interpenetrates and illumines the sense and the judgment that the perceptions of the man are thereby modified to become something other than the perceptions of the animal. A spontaneous insight perpetually yet often unconsciously goes along with the perceiving and judging, and space and time, and substance and cause, and adaptation and design, etc., are seen by man in an intelligible world to which the irrational brute can have no access. An untaught peasant cognizes forces and ends and rights and claims in nature which the animal, though passing through the full experience of nature, can never attain. It thus occurs, that even when man has not yet found his reason as a distinct function of his intellect, and knows not specifically what reason is, yet he abundantly manifests the unconscious possession of his high prerogative above the animal, in the incipient apprehension of physical laws and ethical rights and religious claims with which no animal can come in communion with him.

By this spontaneous working of the rational within us, we may be asking questions and seeking answers from nature, that shall lead us a long distance in the attainment of knowledge beyond where any animal can follow, while as yet we have not at all discriminated the function we are using and which separates us so widely from the brutes. The facts both

how then
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of matter and of mind may be gathered, and these may be analysed and generalised and classified in systematic arrangement, and the general made to include the particular through all the kingdoms and orders of nature, till we have built up widely extended and varied sciences, and in the study of such facts and their relations we may attain to much physical, ethical, and even theological learning. There is here no insight to any principle which has determined the facts, and therefore no facts nor combination of facts can be comprehended or expounded, but taken as they have been given in the sense, they have been classified and embodied in systems of much practical use and convenience. We do not read and intelligently apprehend the documents, but we diligently gather and arrange them in what we deem their appropriate pigeon-holes, and put our technical labels upon them.

Here is no philosophy which has reached to the laws of their being and working, and determined the facts to be as they are and not otherwise, but taking them just as they are we have named and classified them. It is not, however, at all uncommon that this is mistaken for philosophy, nor that some, who may have given much of this but no higher cultivation to their minds, may deem themselves quite competent to pronounce with authority upon the labors of such as have been profoundly philosophical. We have frequent snatches of criticism, and flippant strictures, and sometimes long and sapient reviews giving oracular decisions concerning philosophical speculations, and in which it is most painfully and pitifully manifest that their authors were utterly incompetent to enter into the method or the meaning of the works they were so trenchantly overhauling. Fondly deeming that they have a mission to detect and scourge philosophical delusions and errors, they strike valorously and unhesitatingly at what to them appears to be some monster absurdity, but their hardest hits and cleverest cuts are seen by the discerning to be but sorry blunders of their own ignorance, and all the humor of the matter turns wholly to their own expense.

Occasion may be here taken to refer to the first article in the last October number of the *Princeton Review*, which was

doubtless intended to be a final refutation of the revised edition of the *Rational Psychology*. There has all along been in that periodical a perpetual pattering of offensive allusions at what has been taken as the radicalism, rationalism, and Germanism of this same author of the *Rational Psychology*, and which have been directed with about equal perspicacity as the strictures in the above-named article. The distinguished Editor of the *Princeton Review* is understood as asserting that the world needs a more Christian Philosophy than that which is given to us by Sir William Hamilton, and certainly, therefore, a higher philosophy is necessary than any thing reached by the authors of these allusions and strictures.

The article above named manifests throughout that the writer of it has an entire want of discernment of the philosophical distinctions between phenomena and things in themselves, the becoming and the being, the nominal and the real, the natural and the supernatural, the relative and the absolute, etc., and in this indiscrimination is the full evidence that he has not yet taken the first step in that long path which philosophy has for so many ages been travelling. To him all objects are just what and just as the senses give to us, and all investigation of them can attain to nothing other than that which the analyses and deductions of the logical faculty can make out of them. The speculation pursued in the *Psychology* is often misconceived, more often entirely beyond his apprehension, and the only answer to the *Review* that is practicable would be that for which there is not found a sufficient inducement, viz., the pointing out item by item the perpetual failures to attain the rational meaning of the work which the Reviewer has taken in hand. This may be charged by him to be the fault of the work itself in its obscure thinking and expression, but surely if it were too obscure for his apprehension he was not bound to study it, nor to review it; certainly was bound not to review it till he had intelligently studied it.

The ends designed in the *Psychology*, and believed to be fairly reached in the estimation of those who comprehend the matter, are such as the Reviewer would himself, doubtless, desire might be attained, viz., the philosophical validity of

our knowledge of an outer substantial world, and of an Absolute, Personal Deity. This desired result is sought in the only practicable method of attainment, by an *à priori* process; and the natural consequence induced by his dogmatic assertions of error and emptiness through the whole speculation, to such as put any faith in his sayings, will be to foster a conviction that all valid knowledge of an outer world and a Personal God is a philosophic impossibility. The ground is left completely open to such as are perpetually insisting that Reason and Religion, Philosophy and Faith, must stand to each other in lasting hostility. The only way to keep our religion and our faith will be to disparage and discard our Reason and Philosophy. The Oxford Essayists and Westminster Reviewers may have all things their own way, in all cases where any honest and independent thinking is allowed.

And now, such uninstructed criticism, however innocent and honest the critic, can only help the scepticism which he deems himself disposed to deny, and weaken the forces on the good side which he thinks he would desire to uphold. In his blindness he is striking at a friend, and not an enemy, and holding up to misguided derision and reproach the very defences and support of his creed, and without which his adoption of it can be nothing but unreasoning credulity. The true spirit with which such misjudging assailants are to be met, is with our suffering Lord to say, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do". They will become both more amiable and more comfortable when they shall have grown wiser. Their present position comes from their adoption of the foul logic both of an *Argumentum ad ignorantiam* and of an *Argumentum ab ignorantia*. The most lamentable part of the matter is, that very extensively the ductile minds of coming laborers are passing on to their responsible life-mission under the like negative instructions and positive perversions.

But we turn from such reflections to the theme immediately in hand, viz., The Pantheistic tendencies of Modern Philosophy. We shall pursue the track of philosophical speculation so far only as necessary to apprehend its modern bearing. The able article in the last number of the THEOLOGICAL RE-

VIEW, on the Two Schools of Philosophy, precludes all necessity for dwelling upon the leading distinctions of an *à priori* and *à posteriori* method. We shall find as the result of our search, that the whole drift of modern speculative teaching is towards some one modified form of Pantheism.

A careful reflection upon the phenomena of the sense finds them fleeting and transitory, constantly coming and departing. The color or the sound of one instant is not that of the next, but a continual repetition of impressions is made upon the organs, and also a perpetual variation of phenomena occurs. To such as contemplate nothing but the phenomenal, it must appear that "all things flow". The instant of the arising in sense is also the instant of evanishing, and we cannot say at any time this is, but only it is coming into manifestation. Nothing is in one stay, and hence we know the phenomenal only as *the becoming*.

But the logical understanding cannot be satisfied with merely a phenomenal becoming, and cannot form a judgment of connected things without some permanent to give unity to the diversity. As the phenomenal in congelation passes to a liquid, and thence to a vapor, there has been in the judgment a permanent which has neither come nor gone with the alterations of the phenomena, and hence all the phenomena are judged to inhere in that one thing that has perdured through all the coming and departing. This permanent has had *real being* continually, and to such as contemplate intellectually only the permanent real being, it must be apprehended that "all things stand". The permanent real being in the judgment changes its modes of appearance in the sense.

And just here, between the flowing and the standing, is the point in which all philosophy has had its origin. Here two ways open, and the Ionic philosophy exhausted itself in striving to determine the becoming, and the Eleatic philosophy spent itself in the effort to determine the being.

In this old conflict where Greek met Greek, it was not competent to relieve the antagonism by the defeat of either party. They each had opposite sides of the same truth, and philosophy could not afford that either one should be lost. Both

must be retained and become harmonized in a philosophy which has attained a higher stand-point. Ionicism and Eleaticism both survive and become reconciled in Platonism. The permanent being in the judgment determines the phenomenal becoming in the sense, and thus while the intellectually apprehended being "stands", the sensibly perceived becoming "flows". One is object for one function of knowing, and the other is object for another function; and the permanent being as known intellectually can appear no otherwise than fleeting, when perceived sensibly.

PLATO, from his original peculiarity of intellectual endowment, was specially inclined to investigate the truths which related to the permanent being, and had little interest in any speculations terminating only in the becoming. To his penetrating reason, the phenomenal was only as the passing shadow of a deeper reality; and this deeper real, itself permanent and essential, determined all the phases of the fleeting phenomenal. His striking illustration of the wide distinction between objects in the sense and objects in the reason is presented under the analogy of men imprisoned in a cave, with their backs toward the entrance, the real objects are behind, and determine all the shadowy forms which are perceived on the back side of the cave before them. The insight of the reason is directly at the real objects in their full light, and knows these objects in themselves and not their shadows, and knows also how the real objects determine the passing shadows which the imprisoned senses can have as their only objects. The imprisoned men of sense deem the phenomenal objects to be all that can be known, and they busy themselves in registering and classifying their appearing and relations; the rational man knows the phenomenal to be shadow, and that the only real is away from the directions of the sense, and that the phenomenal can be truly known only by being taught of the reason how the real determines the phenomenal. The reason-objects are the real being, and yet as never coming into sense, they are solely existent in an intellectual world, and are therefore properly ideal. They alone have true being; they determine all appearance in the sense; they can be known only by the reason

itself; they are thus "Ideas", not "Images"; and stand as the basis of that which constitutes the grand peculiarity of the Platonic philosophy.

The Ideas are all distinct, and yet are so mutually connected, that from a cognition of one all may be attained. The wheat-corn truly is, in the inner vital force which is its purely intellectual idea, and which also determines all the sensible appearances it may manifest in its germination and growth; and so also the earth, the water, the sun, etc., have their inherent forces as purely intellectual ideas; and yet all these ideas of the wheat-corn, the earth, the water, the sun, etc., have their mutual affinities and connection, and so all through the universe, one idea may draw after it all other ideas in its connections.

The world is a complete organism of all the single ideas, and this has its grand source and comprehension in the Absolute Good, the truly living, personal Idea which is the Source and Sovereign of all. In the Philosophy of Plato, the idea is always the true reality, more perfect in the absolute than in us the human, but everywhere that, by the intellectual apprehension of which and its determinations, we can alone attain to any true science. We may study phenomenal shadows as we will, yet can we comprehend and expound them only as we have apprehended intellectually and clearly their determining ideas. In their ensouling of all phenomenal becoming the Universe is, and in their original being in the Absolute Good, a personal God is. All truth and all being is in him, and the eternal ideas direct the eternal purpose and secure eternal wisdom and righteousness, and thus a pure Theism, excluding all forms of Pantheism, is attained and held in Platonism.

But as in most cases, so with Plato, the philosophic impulse, becoming enthusiastic in its progress and success, pushes its speculations inordinately and extravagantly. As the determining ideas alone could bring anything of experience within true science, so they were sought to be extended to all that was desirable should be truly known; and as the original archetypes and paradigms of all things were true and original

being in the Absolute Good, so the ideals constructed by the human mind were put among the ideas that had a true and real being. Yea, as the many phenomenal attributes and qualities in the becoming were determined in the one permanent idea, so the particulars and individuals were sought to be determined and produced from the one generic conception. The generic man, tree, etc. contained and determined all particular men, trees, etc. In this way the ideas came to be applied to all that was sought to be known, and as phenomenal qualities must have that which in the general holds the truth that belongs to the particular, so there were ideas of color, heat and cold, etc.; and also the more abstract general conception became an Eternal Idea, having true being; as even Plato himself says, the idea may be applied wherever a multiplicity can be indicated by one and the same name, thus opening the field for the endless dispute of the Nominalist and the Realist.

This excessive and extravagant application of the ideas made a restraining and correcting criticism necessary, and the Aristotelian method became a philosophical demand. The Platonic ideas, if retained at all, must be remanded to the real being and excluded from the phenomenal becoming, and also from merely mental constructions and abstract general conceptions.

ARISTOTLE has a First Philosophy, and which refers only to true being, as really as Plato, and complete science can be attained only in this first philosophy. But from a native peculiarity of mind he was fitted to investigate the phenomenal, and had little interest or success in speculations relative to the purely intellectual. Experience, he held, must guide in all human investigation, and that which transcends experience, though necessary for true science, is mainly above the reach of human attainment. Completeness of knowledge for man would demand a complete and universal experience. Particulars are first given, and from these we must rise toward the universal and eternal. The Aristotelian method is thus an inversion of the Platonic, and deals with the being through the suggestions and analogies of the becoming.

The ideas of Plato are controverted by Aristotle with earnestness, not to say sometimes with rival bitterness. He attacks them and seems only to apprehend them as they had been extravagantly carried into the phenomenal, and applied to abstract general conceptions. He ridicules the Ideas as made of these general abstractions by only adding the expression, thing *in itself*, to the general notion. Thus man, tree, etc. is made an eternal idea, really including all men, and all trees, etc., by only saying, man *per se*, tree *per se*, etc. In this way the generic is held really to contain the particular, and the immortal ideas are only made from the abstractions of the dead things of sense. And even when thus assuming the abstract man or tree to be thing *in itself*, he shows that it would be impossible by any intelligible process to determine the particular man or tree from such idea. By this criticism, the ideas were fairly excluded from the phenomenal and its abstractions where they had wandered beyond their domain, but with no prejudice to their occupying the purely intellectual field of true being, where alone Plato should have attempted any recognition of them.

In connection with what may comprehensively be known as the Logic of Aristotle, we have his First Philosophy in reference to true being, and which we give in its most general method, as having a bearing on our present purpose. In all our experience of the becoming, there is the *Matter* and the *Form*. Matter is passive, without qualities or attributes, and distinguishable from blank nothingness no otherwise than as somewhat that may come into sensible manifestation. It can be known and spoken of only as the possible. Form is that which particularizes and gives peculiar manifestation to matter, and in which the passive possible becomes actual. In order that the possible, eternally existing as wholly unqualified matter, may take on its peculiar forms, it is necessary that there be *Motion*, or some process of actually taking on its qualities. But in order that any motion may be, it is necessary that there be a *Moving Cause* and a *Final End* to be attained. Motion, which involves this moving cause and final end, belongs thus to form rather than to matter. The form, possessing

moving power and final end, and therein competent to give manifestation to the passive possible, considered as standing ready to qualify matter, is *Essence*; and such essence, in the process of actually qualifying the matter, is the phenomenal becoming as a perpetually flowing experience in the sense.

But motion, which cannot originate in the passive matter, and must first be in the form, has, as a condition for its origin, the necessity that there be first a movable and a possibility of setting in motion; and yet a generation of such movable and possibility of setting in motion would itself be motion, and on this account motion cannot have had a beginning, but has been eternal. Such eternal motion must have a mover, himself unmoved, and this conception of an unmoved Mover holds the secret of the Deity. In order to the elucidation of the divine mystery, we must apprehend that the lovable or desirable moves to choice without being moved, and also that the knowable moves to knowledge without being moved. God is eternally desirable and eternally knowable, and herein he is eternally unmoved mover.

As desirable, the unmoved mover gives motion to somewhat that is out of himself; but as knowable, he gives movement to himself, for it is reason only which can be known by reason, and which thus, in knowing itself, moves itself in intelligence. The eternal reason as knowable, and in this unmoved, is also eternal reason knowing itself, and in this is eternally moving. Thus Aristotle made the Deity to consist in speculative and not practical reason; an eternal movement in thought, and not in moral purpose; and on this account we have his famed sententious announcement, that the Activity of God is the Thought of Thought. The object of movement and the subject of movement are one, and thus Aristotelianism attained and held the very life-germ of the Schellingian and Hegelian identity-schemes, wherein the object thought and the subject thinking are identical. If Aristotle could have renounced his eternally passive matter, and made all things to consist in the logical process of his active form, the very flower of modern German philosophy would have bloomed in Athens more than three centuries before the Christian era.

In this method of carrying up his *prima philosophia* from experience, in its highest generalized abstractions of matter and form, Aristotle had attained to the recognition of a Deity; but when we carefully scrutinize the conception, we shall be obliged to admit that it can but poorly satisfy the claims of either philosophy or piety. The Deity moves the world only as he is desirable to the world, and therefore, beside that the eternal matter is passive, even if it could be moved to desire by the desirableness of God, the activity must in this way be wholly in the world and not at all in the Deity, and we must make up our Intellectual System of the Universe wholly through the connections of such craving desires, and out of which process there could not be a consistent philosophy. On the other hand, the movement of God being only as both knowable and knowing, the intellectual movement of thought, he can go out only in necessitated logical processes and never in free moral purposes. He can be conscious thinker and knower, but never Moral Personality and Sovereign Ruler. Absolute thought is not at all Absolute Will in Liberty, and can never become Author and Governor of a moral realm. There must be Plato's Absolute Good, as having in himself the law of Liberty, a self-law in the conscious end of his own dignity and glory; and without this last, all religious love and worship are impossible.

The post-Aristotelian philosophy has little for our present purpose. The Stoics combined the matter and the form, and made both to be in God, the matter as the passive, and the form as the active side of the Deity. Hence, inasmuch as the active side had nothing to condition and determine its activity in the passive side, all was held in a blind fate; a cause ever working, with nothing in that on which it worked to determine what the product should be. Jove himself was subjected to this blind Fate, that was beyond his removing. The Epicurean left his assumed gods to indolence and careless repose, absorbed wholly in their own pleasure, and thus taught man to make the most of this life for himself, for there was none to care for him here, or to secure for him any hereafter. The revived Aristotelianism of the scholastic age had little freedom

and independence, but was held in ecclesiastical domination and subserviency to the decrees of Popes and Councils, or was tolerated in empty speculations which could have no bearing upon any imposed articles of faith. The Scholastic Logic became thus a reproach and a burden, and ultimately was lost to the world in universal contempt and neglect, and in this the ancient philosophy died out.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY begins with Des Cartes. Aristotle had generalized *matter* to the unqualified possible and *form* to the thought of thought, and both inconceivable except as cor-relatives of each other; matter without form could have no attributes and form without matter could be only an intellectual notion; so that matter and form, body and spirit, must eternally exist for each other, or they could have no manifestation or expression. But Des Cartes assumed the essence of body to be extension, and that of spirit to be thought, and held these to be separate and distinct beings, so unlike to each other that there can be no communion between them. Body cannot act upon nor react against spirit, and spirit cannot propagate its agency over into body. Body and Spirit cannot come into unity, but must be conceived as wholly and eternally disparate beings. The machine of nature can never move except as the crank is turned by some hand on the outside; and hence the Cartesian doctrine of "occasional causes", viz., that on occasion for the interactions of body and spirit, God directly interposes and makes the efficient communion. All natural philosophy was in this way resolved into the immediate agency of the Deity, and the Deity was assumed to be, from the consideration that a most Perfect Being was a necessary conception. This assumed most perfect Being was made to work in and on body, while the foundation principle of the philosophy was, that from the necessities of the case, the distinctions of spirit and body were such they could not interact with or upon each other.

Spinoza gave logical unity to Cartesianism by making thought as the essence of spirit and extension as the essence of matter to be the different attributes of one common Sub-

stance, and this one Substance was the sole and infinite Being. This Infinite Substance alone is, and all spiritual and bodily phenomena are but different modes in which this one infinite Substance is manifested. Both physical and logical consistency was herein given to Cartesianism, but only by involving it wholly in Pantheism. The one Substance is the All, and spirit and body its different forms in appearance. The Infinite Substance has no Personality, and is used only to give unity to the varied spiritual and bodily phenomena.

Where the infinite Substance of Spinoza has failed to satisfy, the incommunicable distinction of body and spirit has forced to one of two methods of philosophizing, viz., either to begin with body and produce the facts of spiritual appearances from it, or to begin with spirit and thence produce the facts of bodily phenomena. Locke had at large answered the enquiry, what can man know? by limiting the human Understanding to perception and reflection. Experience is our sole teacher, and this comes only through the senses. What we perceive furnishes all the elements of our knowledge, and reflection upon these can abstract and give parts, can compare and give relations, can combine and arrange in classes, but nothing can be embraced in our knowledge that has not first come through the sense. This theory was widely accepted, and philosophy was made to work within its limitations in striving either to get spirit from body or body from spirit.

On one side, Materialism began with body, and conceiving outer things to induce affections in the bodily organs by impressions upon them, it was assumed that these impressions of body upon body could not be carried out beyond the bodily organs. All the results in our inner conscious exercises of feeling, thought, and choice, are wholly to be accounted for from bodily impressions upon the nicely arranged bodily organs. Thus all we can know is matter; spirit is wholly incognizable by man. On the other hand, Sensationalism begins with spirit, and as all our sensations in the organs are spiritual, and we can never go beyond the sensation, so all our knowledge is of spiritual, and cannot take hold of material being. Limited by Locke, the French Materialist derives all

the supposed spiritual perceptions from body, and the Berkeleyan Sensationalist derives all the supposed material perceptions from spirit.

If now we take the phenomena, whether supposed to be bodily or spiritual, as perceptions of sense singly and separately apprehended, and keep ourselves rigidly within the limits of Locke's Theory, we shall have in our knowledge only single exercises or single qualities, and shall be able to know nothing of any substances or causes in which they may be connected. What is extensively known as Dr. Emmons's Exercise Scheme, true to these limits of Locke, allows to us only these single exercises in the spiritual world; and President Edwards in his argument for the identity of all men in Adam, in his Treatise on Original Sin, gives the same separations of phenomena in both the spiritual and bodily experience. The flow of these separate phenomena in our experience can have no known connections, and there can be no unity or identity of object except through the immediate agency of God. The Deity only gives such connections to mind and matter by an immediate efficiency that holds the exercises and qualities in a divine constitution. Phenomena have no substantial connections; successive events have no causal adhesion; what are deemed second causes are merely sequences with no efficiency, the antecedent being wholly disjoined from the consequent and utterly gone when the consequent comes. The direct act of God in constituting the sequences is that alone which perpetuates the successions.

The philosophy of Emmons and of Edwards here is the same with that of Hume and of Comte. The first two have also a theology with the philosophy, and assume a God in their faith, which they then use to account for the connections of the separate phenomena, as having by direct efficiency bound them together in a divine constitution. But the theology is wholly above the philosophy, for that limits all human knowledge to the phenomenal. The theology is moreover directly against the philosophy, for that must deny to this assumed Deity any other being but separate exercises and attributes. We cannot know any unity and identity in the

divine exercises, and can thus have no source for combining in unity and identity the human exercises. The last two names, with the same philosophy, discard all theology, the one sceptically and the other positively, and therefore leave nature without any divine constitution to no other relations than the appearances in experience. We may by frequent repetition come to the belief that the sequences have some necessary connection, but the philosopher knows that such a belief is mere credulity.

The Atheist is here more consistent than the Theist, for he steadfastly follows the light of his philosophy, and stops where that ceases to shine. The Theist takes a Deity in his faith, but gives to him a personality and an efficiency, and goes on to make connections in phenomena by him, altogether in contradiction to the philosophy. The philosophy is indeed thoroughly Atheistic, and the assumed theology rests only in a faith which the philosophy subverts. This philosophy is in fact retained only by the Atheist, for scarcely any Theist can now be found standing on the Exercise scheme of Dr. Emons, and President Edwards did not habitually and consistently deny efficiency and connection to second causes. The faith in a God that such a philosophy allowed, would be an interminable succession of exercises, and then its connections in nature would be wholly Pantheistic.

A *modified form* of the philosophy of Experience is now quite general among such as still assume to maintain the limits of human knowledge prescribed by Locke. The readiness with which the reason spontaneously supplies the judgment with the notions of substances and causes, has induced the assumption that substance and cause are given in experience. Sometimes it is said that our own experience of acts of will has in it a consciousness of causality, and that this is transferred to all causality, and thus the notion of cause is really made to be a phenomenon of the sense. All this at once carries with it its own refutation, when it is apprehended that it can thus only make phenomena to be connected by other phenomena, but without refuting we wish here only to state the philosophy. Locke had himself admitted the great

convenience of the notion of substance, and he made the grouping of qualities by the sense to be almost a judgment of substance in which was given a permanent thing, and now both for substances and causes it is widely assumed that they come into our cognition somehow through experience. Second causes are allowed to possess efficiency, and the antecedents among consecutive events have that which goes over into and produces and remains in the successors.

In this assumption of substances and causes the material world is recognised as passing on through its changes in the physical connections of cause and effect, the preceding determining the succeeding and the whole series fixed in its order with no alternative. The spiritual world also passes on in its events with the like unbroken order. The exercises of thought and feeling arise from the conditions given in nature, and with such conditions the thought and the feeling could be no otherwise. These thoughts and sensations introduce the motives to executive action, and choices and volitions result accordingly. The choices and volitions are known as moral acts because they belong to a moral agent, but their connections are of the same kind and equally necessary in their conditions as the connections of cause and effect in matter. God determines the causes and supplies the motives, and thus governs material and moral worlds at his pleasure.

In the fullest meaning and closest application this is now the prevalent philosophy. The morality and theology of the persons may very considerably differ, and they may very diversely speculate about freedom and responsibility, and belong to fiercely contending different schools and opposing creeds in religion, but when driven to the last exposition of their freedom or their faith, they all have this one and the same philosophy. Notwithstanding the apparently wide difference in expression between the control of an innate taste and the possession of power to the opposite, in all cases it is ultimately assumed that the moral act is as the last dictate of the judgment in reference to the highest happiness, and this will disclose the prevalent strength of motive and the execu-

tive will follow in its gratification without an *alterum*. The will always is as the last judgment of what the highest happiness is.

There can be but one issue, in reference to the acknowledgment of a Deity, to this method of philosophizing, whether applied to matter or to mind. The changes in material nature may be followed upwards towards their source, and this source may be assumed to have been reached in some highest cause. But such so-called highest cause will have nothing but priority to distinguish it from any other. It has already in it that which must come from it, and it and all its effects stand fully conditioned in the constitution or nature that it already possesses. This assumed First Cause has now all the substantiality and efficiency of the whole that shall come from it, and is the all, and thus the only Deity; and yet it is but nature in its source, and has no more there any personality than in any of its future products.

If this natural Pantheism, which is but Pancosmism, is sought to be evaded by assuming for this First Cause a sentient agency, then the philosophy must proceed after this method. This assumed First Agent, knowing his own sentient craving and what will best gratify the desire, has the impulse from what he finds within to go out in action and attain the objective means of highest gratification. As the animal and the man in their common sentient constitution seek what is agreeable and thus act as they *please*, while this pleasing is conditioned in the sentient constitution, so the only God which this philosophy can recognise has freedom to follow the craving for gratification which he finds his sentient being experiences. If his better judgment more discriminatingly and correctly determines that which shall best gratify the sentient want on the whole, this makes no distinction in kind, for the Animal, the Man, and the God, go out after that which the last dictate of the judgment determines to promise the highest happiness. This is the highest freedom the philosophy knows; it is the highest it affirms that can be conceived, to do as the being pleases. And yet this pleasing is conditioned in the sentient constitution. The Deity finds within himself such cravings

for gratification ; they are, and from his sentient being they can be no otherwise, and he must follow the judgment that decides what best may gratify, or be miserable. The constitutional craving with the experimental judging of what best may please is the All, and is the Deity, and yet is only sentient nature still and can have no personality. It is wholly Animalism, but as it is the highest and only acting power, it is Pantheism.

The prompting of their reason may spontaneously induce the assumption of a personal God, and they may have in their faith, unconscious from whence it comes, the acknowledgment of quite another Deity than their philosophy admits, and such assumed personal God may be held as the Author of the substances and causes in nature and the sentient constitution in humanity, but this assumption is both wholly beyond and entirely against the philosophy. If the substance have its beginning, then that from which it is produced is the substantial ; and if the cause have its producer, then is it only event and the producer is the causal ; and if the sentient in humanity was made, then the sentient in the Maker is the determining constitutional craving ; and all runs up and finds its lodgment in this source of all substances and causes and sentient desires ; but when we assume to have reached this source, the philosophy allows us to recognise in it nothing, at the furthest, but an impulse that has produced substances and causes and sentient desires from a constitutional want, which must have been so gratified or have endured its inward unalleviated misery. The faith assumes, from the working of the reason, a personal God ; the philosophy denies the possibility of such conception, and makes its highest point the impulse of the sentient craving and the empirical judging, and will allow no shrine more sacred than Pantheism.

The CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY of Germany reverses wholly the old method. The objects do not determine their forms of appearing as the seal determines the impressions on the wax, but the regulative forms are already in the mind as in the seed or the egg, and these primitive mental forms determine the objects. The matter for the object is assumed to be given

in sensation, but our human mind is constituted for knowing this matter only in the peculiar forms of its own ordering. This readily soon extended itself to the doctrine, that the sensation as the matter of the object was as truly ordered by the mind as the forms and connections in which the object appeared. A living movement, with an inherent logical law, was held to develop itself into all the objects of nature and humanity. At length it was taught, that an absolute thought-movement developed itself unconsciously into nature, and reflectively coming into consciousness as mind and organizing itself in individual thought-processes in humanity, ultimately attains full self-consciousness in knowing itself as the subject of the thinking and the object in all the thoughts, and herein is perfect Deity.

From the method of following the *Ego*, or thought-movement, through all this logical process, the philosophy has been known as Egoism, Egoistic Idealism, German Transcendentalism, etc. It uses many Platonic terms, but its method is wholly Aristotelian, in that it generalizes facts and knows no ultimate principles determining the facts. It uses the logical faculty as connecting judgment only, and not the insight as comprehending reason. It only differs in that it goes further for its facts, and assumes to find them in a thought-process antecedently to their coming out in conscious experience. But these transcendental facts are wholly inexplicable by any rational principles that guided in their making.

The only possible issue of this philosophy is a Pantheism of the most sublimated conception. Creation is a logical process of thinking, and the Cosmos is the successive positing of logical results. The thinking movement is the All, and in its development it states its own results as already conditioned, with no purpose directed to its own End, and thus with no Personality. An Absolute Deity may here be assumed as source and guide for the evolving thought-process, but this is above the philosophy not only, it is directly against it. The absolute itself is taken to be wholly a logical movement, and any assumption of an originating personality, to begin and guide the movement, must be remanded back to the logical process it assumes

to originate and govern. The philosophy allows no other devotion than to an *idealistic or transcendental* Pantheism.

Once more only; without at all mastering, or indeed using any of the profound processes of the transcendental Logic, there is a philosophy pretty widely spread and of much present persistency, which simply assumes the fact of development, and applies the naked unsolved fact to nature, humanity, and history. Matter and mind are in parallel harmonious development, and all the single facts in each are but the successive outcoming from this perpetual ongoing. The whole must receive connection and form from the secret resistless power which is evermore silently and steadily and spontaneously working out its issues. All seeming evil in any part is but unmixed good in the whole, and the events, each in its place, have no alternative of being or circumstance. This inner power which so mysteriously develops itself in the particular is the God of the whole, and the fact developed is but an expression of the power developing. If a Deity be assumed as opening the evolution and personally determining the process, the philosophy must exclude the Theism, for the developing power in parallel lines is the All, and necessarily evolves itself in its one order of working. It is Pantheism as a development of the One in the many, but it does not go up in its philosophy to its germ, that we may characterize it as being a *realistic* or an *idealistic* Pantheism.

In some one of the above forms of pantheism will very nearly the whole of all modern methods of speculation terminate. Fully carried out, few will be found to escape this issue. The logical understanding is set to the work of expounding the problems prompted by the reason, and this function can work only amid the connections of nature, and can have no dealings with the supernatural. Many, perhaps most of these modern speculators, have a personal God in their creed, and many of them doubtless worship him in spirit and in truth, but their philosophy more than ignores, it positively excludes a personal Deity. The Theism cannot be in the creed but at the expense of the philosophy. The most intelligent and active supporters of the radical scepticism of the

age well know that their philosophy is identical with the great mass of the theologic world, and they are resting their persistent objections to all the claims of spiritual piety and worship, upon processes of speculation completely in common with those processes which sustain the philosophy of the multitude of religious Theists. They limit human knowledge to sensation or to the logical faculty judging according to sense, and then let the methods of speculation be what they may, it must issue in their favor and against all Theism which adopts the same limitations for the human mind. It is becoming more and more manifest that Theism must attain to some higher philosophy, or the Pantheist has the whole field of speculation to himself, and can carry all matters in it his own way and for his own conclusions. The spontaneous working of the reason and the teaching of revelation may suffice for faith in a personal God while it is left wholly unquestioned, but when the man's philosophy is radically pantheistic and he is driven to examine his faith in the light of his philosophy, one or the other must necessarily be renounced.

The truly pious theist will doubtless sacrifice his philosophy and keep his theology, but how halting and hesitating must he often be in directing his onward footsteps! And as it relates to the world at large, can a stable Theism be maintained and propagated, when it has been forced to admit that it can live only by choking and smothering all philosophical thinking? The sufficiently significant forewarning is already given in the estimate made of such Theologians as habitually decry reason and denounce all philosophical discussion. And more specially is the admonition startling to every pious mind, when it comes to be admitted that with these assumed necessary limitations of human thought, the very terms and the only terms in which we can give expression to our Theism will involve self-contradiction and absurdity. If the experimental Christian be retained in spite of the logical contradiction, little ground is there for hope that the logical Sceptic will be won over to embrace or respect the faith which cannot fairly clear itself from such encumbrances. If wiser and more comprehensive theological thinkers come not to the rescue, the hold of re-

vealed religion upon independent minds will surely grow weaker and weaker.

There is thus the most urgent need of a philosophy in harmony with a Theistic Creed, and directly concurring with the teachings of revelation. Theology cannot triumph in the adoption of a philosophy which gainsays it. There will necessarily to us be mysteries beyond reason; even mysteries still remaining while the Bible may have brought some within reason; but never will a truly divine revelation enjoin faith upon any man in that which is against reason. Those calm and thoughtful men, therefore, who are earnestly and prayerfully laboring for a philosophy sufficiently comprehensive to accord with and stand by their Christian Faith, while they may awaken the needless fears of the timid and encounter the mistaken reproaches of the ignorant, will nevertheless be sure of the encouragement of all enlightened minds, and may piously expect the approbation of God.

And now, the philosophy which the Bible recognises is clearly the product of a rational insight, and not a mere logical deduction from naked experience. All formal and technical and philosophical terms and statements are excluded, and yet everywhere it is assumed that principles are prior to facts and have determined the facts to be, and to be just as they are. The facts disclose the divine wisdom and goodness and righteousness, not because they are the mere products of Omnipotence, but because the power which made them conformed itself in the making to the rule of eternal principle. The old Patriarchs and Prophets knew little of modern science, but they did clearly see that the order and harmony of nature was the result of power regulated by eternal Law. Hence Job says of the God of the Universe, "He maketh peace in his high places". And David says, "Thou hast established the earth and it abideth. They continue this day according to thy ordinances". David never apprehended the particular mathematics of the heavenly movements, but he did have a most lively apprehension that the hand of their Creator was moved in the beginning by immutable truth when he said, "The heavens declare the glory

of God, and the firmament showeth his handy work". Solomon had given himself to a broad examination of nature, and a wide observation of vegetable and animal life, and though he knew little of the modern application of statics and dynamics, or the technics of modern physiology, yet how sublimely did he rise above experience, and go back of all the epochs in creation and stand alone with God before a fact yet was, and apprehend the eternal principles personified in the Wisdom which was to determine all facts yet to come, and say, "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When he prepared the heavens I was there; when he set a compass upon the face of the depth". There must be truth older than the facts, and guiding the hand that makes the facts, or we can recognise no wisdom from the facts. We may admit the being of substances and causes, and that they give efficient connections to sensible qualities and events, and in such connections we may have a philosophy which gives unity and consistency to nature, but if the substances are barely apprehended as standing under and holding the qualities, and the causes as merely standing between and linking the events, but we have no insight there of the eternal principles determining and expounding these connections, it will be but a very vague and unsatisfactory philosophy. There will be a notional connecting the phenomenal, but how and why thus and not otherwise will all be left in darkness.

But when we attain a clear conception of Force, and how equilibrating activities become static, we in this apprehend the intrinsic being of Substance itself, and the eternal law for its determination of the qualities; and when in the conception of Force we also see how countervailing activities become dynamic, we in this apprehend the intrinsic being of Cause and the eternal laws for all motion and change. Nature is thus made luminous in its substantial being and efficient working, and every cause becomes an intelligible Idea; a living, acting, real being in the Platonic acceptation, and in itself clearly

revealing how it must determine the phenomenal becoming. A true Platonic philosophy with an intelligible cosmology is given, and in full harmony with the Bible representation; a revealing of the true "Idea" and a restriction of it to its legitimate being, and thus a revived Platonism which no future Aristotle may controvert or discard.

And still further, the Theism of the Bible is in an important and most sublime sense a Pantheism. In the Scriptures God is made to be "All in all". "By him all things consist." We "live and move and have our being in God". He is the All in such a sense that all things come from and stand in him, and a withdrawal of his energy in anything must be followed by its instant annihilation. But the distinction between the Bible and all heretical Pantheism is broadly marked in this; the Bible starts with an absolute will in Liberty, and thus with a proper personality, and this personal God "in the beginning creates the heavens and the earth". With creative power wholly at his own disposal, and exerting and guiding it entirely by what in himself he sees is due to himself, he speaks the word and the worlds stand forth. They come from him in such a meaning that his constant act sustains them and when that activity is withdrawn they are no more. "These wait all upon thee,—Thou takest away their breath, they die and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created and thou renewest the face of the earth." All heretical Pantheism starts with an impersonality, a germ of physical or logical energy, which is the same in its being at the beginning as at its close and merely changes its modes of manifestation. All its changes run their course from no ethical rule, but completely in an already conditioned necessity which admits no alternative. The last is always and everywhere nature; the first is wholly supernatural, above time and irrespective of space, and both nature and nature's space and time are the products of his originating activity. "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honor and power, for thou hast created all things and for thy pleasure they are, and were created."

The turning point for a philosophy of Pantheism or of a

Bible Theism is in the clear conception of a Will in Liberty, in the recognition of which only can any proper personality be apprehended. Nature has no Liberty, but in its first cause and last effect the whole is throughout a conditioned necessity. This is as truly so in sentient life as in material forces. The constitutional craving determines the happiness and the act to gain it, in the animal, as necessarily in the conditions as does the force of gravity in its conditions determine the motion of matter. Nor is mere spontaneity, as with Coleridge, sufficient for the conception of a personal will, for even the thought-movement of the German Idealist is a pure spontaneity, and assumed to be carried up to absolute spontaneity, but its going forth of its own accord in logical development is quite another matter than a going forth for its own excellency's sake in an ethical purpose. No spontaneous thinking is a free willing, and no free thought is a moral purpose. The spontaneity of will in Liberty is no blind act, but has the insight of a rational spirit knowing what is due to itself to direct it. The spirit is neither senseless matter, nor sentient animal, nor logical thinking, but other and more excellent than them all. This spirit in knowing itself knows that all the former should be held in subserviency to its own end, and that it will debase itself to put itself subservient to them. It must be its own end and not means to any foreign end. In this knowing what is due to itself in its own right, the spirit is a law to itself and finds in itself a rule for directing its entire executive action. It may in this keep itself free from all foreign coercion whatsoever. It is the high prerogative of a rational spirit that it may and should direct all its agency to the end of its own worthiness or proper dignity. Nature has its control imposed upon itself from without, spirit is supernatural and has its control from within, and in its consciousness of its own behests can exclude or deny all the solicitations or threatenings of nature. Not mere consciousness, but this consciousness of self-claim, and thus the power of self-control, gives a proper will and constitutes personality.

This prerogative of will in Liberty admits of an accurate discrimination through various peculiarities in a short compass,

and this is so important to our ultimate design that it may hardly with justice be omitted.

The executive function for attaining any end of an agent and thereby doing his pleasure we will here include under the term Will in its most comprehensive acceptation (*Arbitrium*). The end which the executive action is to gain in sentient nature is happiness. There may be prudential considerations coming within the judgment from experience, that shall determine between immediate passionate gratification and the greater happiness upon the whole, yet in each case the end is the same, and the last dictate of the judgment wherein is the greater happiness carries the will without an alternative. This is very generally put as the only conception of will, and the highest freedom that can be known is assumed to be the doing as one pleases. But this pleasing is in the sentient constitution itself, and thus as wholly within nature and as little in liberty as the movement of the tides or the changing of the seasons. It is merely the executing of sentient craving desire and is only animal will (*brutum arbitrium*). But the consciousness of the rational spirit, revealing what is due to itself in the right of its intrinsic excellency of being and the claims of its highest worthiness, sets at once an ethical rule over against the sentient gratification and gives the agent freedom from the domination of appetite. In this only have we a free executive that can at all be known as a responsible will (*liberum arbitrium*).*

The animal will is solely in execution of the sentient pleasing, but can possibly have no ethical end for its execution. We here leave this as of no further use than that we should clearly discriminate it, and take into consideration only the proper ethical will as having alone any liberty and true responsibility. The rational spirit with its end in worthiness and not in happiness, and by which there is self-law and therefore liberty, may be incarnate and the ethical and sentient ends stand together in one being, in which compound ends of agency we have the human will (*lib. arbitrium humanum*). The rational spirit may also be apprehended as standing out in purely incorporeal being and separate from all that is sen-

tient, and here we have the purely spiritual will (*lib. arbitrium angelicum*).

The human will should hold all sentient appetite subordinate to worthiness of moral character, and it may be so conceived as holding happiness strictly and constantly in subjection to the end of worthiness; and so also the purely spiritual will may be supposed to restrain from all inordinate spiritual promptings; and here, in both man and angel, we have the controlling good will (*lib. arbitrium regnans*). On the other hand, the human will may fall in with the sentient desire, and discarding its own end, may set itself to work for the ends of the sentient, although in thus subjecting itself to the animal it does by no means lose itself in and become the animal; and the angel also may admit discontent within the spirit and seek to usurp some higher station and execute the impulses of spiritual pride and envy and hatred; and in each case we have the evil will which has sold itself in bondage (*lib. arbitrium serviens*).

Both the man and angel may have their period of probation in which it is designed that the good will shall be exercised, tried, and strengthened, and yet, however steadily and firmly it may endure and hold itself in sovereignty, it is perpetually in an enemy's country and must maintain a constant watch and warfare (*lib. arbitrium militans*). But when the probation has been passed and the man and the angel enter their state of reward and confirmation, justified on the ground of a gracious substitution or of personal merit, the good will is henceforth in the position of a crowned conqueror (*lib. arbitrium triumphans*). In himself, the crowned victor is still open to temptation and liable to lapse into bondage, yet has he passed into such a region of divine influences that a way of escape is ever made, and the triumphant spirit holds on his eternal course with a perpetually justifying conscience (*lib. arbitrium approbans*).

We lastly, conceive this rational spirit as standing above all, supreme and independent. There is to it in possession all archetypal principles, and in the end of its majesty and dignity all ethical rules, and there is in this a personal will

wholly absolved from all outer conditions and all foreign determinations (*lib. arbitrium absolutum*). The perfection of being and station possessed by the Absolute Spirit places him beyond all possible proposing of any end that can collide with that of his own worthiness and glory. "God cannot be tempted of evil." Nothing can come in conflict with the end of his glory; "he cannot deny himself". There is not merely a justifying conscience as with the finite good will that holds a vanquished foe continually under, but the serenity and tranquillity which never knew an inward conflict. The blessedness of undisturbed holiness (*lib. arbitrium complacens*).

And here, in this thoroughly completed conception of a Will in Liberty carried up to Absolute Personality, we have a truly rational Psychology in which is the only door of escape from Pantheism and a philosophical entrance upon a pure Theism. Here is a true, holy, personal Deity in full conformity with the revealed God of the Bible. He can originate being from himself and intelligibly be Creator of universal nature, and not, as in all heretical Pantheism, a cause caused, necessarily evolving itself as already nature. He executes, not at all from sentient impulses toward happiness, but solely from the reason-claim of his own dignity, or what is the same thing, for his own glory.

In his own agency he can set activities over against and balancing each other, and herein create real static being which is a substantial world. He can combine the static forces with such excess of energy in given directions as shall induce motion and give inherent dynamic efficiency. The stable world is thus also a changing world of causes and events passing on orderly and intelligibly under his providential government and guided to the consummation of his purposes. The unseen spiritual activities constitute the substantial forces, and these determine the organic impressions which induce all the sensible appearances. "The worlds were formed by the word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of things which do appear."

ART. II.—RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN COLLEGES.

By DANIEL R. GOODWIN, D.D., Provost of the University of Pennsylvania.

I. *Reasons for Religious Instruction in Colleges.*

1. It belongs to the *original idea of the College*, as a matter of *fact*. The European Universities, the English, and the American Colleges were founded more especially for religious purposes. In Europe this idea has been very much lost; in England and America, to a good degree, retained. The difference in *character* and *aim* between a German University and an English or American College is now so great that there is scarcely any room for an analogy between them. And the different *results* of the two systems upon the prevailing style of thought and speculation, upon national character and development, upon morals and religion, are scarcely less marked and diverse.

2. It belongs to the *proper idea* of the College, in *theory*. Colleges are intended, not to teach young men some one definite art, or trade, or science, or several such, but to lay the foundation for an honorable and useful life, in a generous culture of the whole mind and character.

3. Moral and Religious training is an *essential part* of this work—quite as essential as classical, or mathematical, or scientific training; and the Religious is not less essential than the Moral, for, among other reasons, no moral training can be complete in itself, or have any safe or solid basis, without religion.

4. The experiment of banishing religion from College was tried, under Jefferson's influence, in the University of Virginia, and failed. The proscribed Chapel it was found absolutely necessary to restore.

5. Religious Instruction is *necessary* in our Colleges. Without it they would be very unsafe places for the four years' residence of large classes of young men. The College has peculiar *dangers*, arising among other causes, from the assemblage of a large number of young men freed from the wholesome restraints and sweet influences of home. It should, therefore, furnish in its bosom, it *must* furnish, peculiar *safeguards*; and these are best found in religious influence and instruction. Of course we here have in view the New England idea of a College, i. e., an institution which takes the *whole* charge of its pupils for the time being, and stands toward them *in loco parentis*.

6. Religious Instruction in Colleges is highly *useful*. The benefits to be derived from it by the pupils with reference to their highest interests and *future* happiness are incalculable, and therefore I do not propose to estimate them or dwell upon them. There are also *present* advantages to the *pupils* derivable from religious instruction as furnishing the highest and most powerful motives to all that is good, and the strongest restraints from evil, and to the *Faculty*, not only as men but as teachers and moral governors.

7. Religious Instruction in Colleges is the dictate of general *policy*. If religious training were banished from our Colleges, Christian men must lose much of their interest in them, and they would cast about for some new institutions—call them what you may—where religious and intellectual culture might be combined. Colleges without religious instruction might not be useless,—might not be productive of positive mischief,—but they would certainly fail to accomplish the full measure of good, and especially that particular kind of good, with which a Christian could not, without absolute necessity, consent to dispense. But our Colleges have been and still are, for the most part, under the special control of certain religious denominations, and they are accustomed to appeal for their support to the religious community. There cannot, therefore, be any *necessity* for their dispensing with religious instruction.

II. *The nature and extent of the Religious Instruction to be given.*

1. This is not easily defined with precision, and I shall not undertake any complete or detailed statement. In general, however, it should be sufficient to produce the impression upon the students' minds, that religion is the genius, the pervading and controlling influence, of the place.

2. It should be free from cant, but distinctively, thoroughly, and boldly *Christian*. We should not be ashamed or afraid, as Christian Instructors, in Christian Colleges, to speak of Christ and his Gospel, his authority, his precepts, his example, his Spirit, his Cross, and his Salvation.

3. It should be connected with a recognition of *Christian Institutions*. The Lord's day and other religious ordinances should be treated with due observance. The College routine should involve a recognition of the supreme and constant claims of religion in daily hours of common prayer.

4. I do not say that it should be rational or liberal, because those terms have been abused both by claimants and opponents; but it should be *intelligent*. It should set forth the great *principles* of Christian truth and morals. It should be particularly characterized by a thorough dealing with *principles*.

5. It should contain a patient and philosophical *apology* and *defence* of the Christian System, its Evidences, the grounds of Faith, its harmony with reason and science, with nature and experience.

6. It should be *plain* and *direct*, *practical* and *personal*, applied to the daily habits and character, and to the peculiar duties and temptations of a College life. Students need to learn that the College does not release them from the claims of humanity, morality, and religion. It annuls no old duties, but adds new ones. The responsibilities of students are only greater—not less—than those of other men.

7. Above all, it should be supported and confirmed by the force of *Christian example*. There should be preserved among the Teachers in a College a prevailing tone of Christian ear-

nestness, devout feeling and practical piety. Example is the most potent instructor. The general spirit makes a far deeper impression than the particular lesson.

III. *Obstacles and Objections.*

The analogy of classical training may be appealed to as a means of obviating many of the objections that are made to Religious instruction in Colleges—as when it is decried as *unpopular*, as *antiquated*, as out of harmony with the spirit of the age, etc., etc. The simple answer in both cases is, that *Colleges* should be *Colleges*. But it will be necessary to answer some objections more in detail.

1. "*Irreligious Teachers.*—*Our Colleges are not (and ought not to be) so constituted that Christian piety is a necessary qualification for their Professors; and therefore it is inconsistent to require them to give religious instruction.*" None of the Teachers in a Christian College should be atheists or infidels—none such should be employed. *Some* of the Teachers, at least, should be *religious* men, and charged with the special office of religious instruction. For the rest, a wise discretion may be used in securing the highest talent and the best men in the several departments of instruction.

2. "*An irreligious Age.*—*Religious instruction in Colleges may have been very well in earlier and more religious times, but in an irreligious age like this, as it is uncalled for by the public mind, it is out of place, and must be comparatively useless.*" Perhaps the present age is no more irreligious than former ages. It probably is not so irreligious as the age immediately subsequent to the American Revolution, when President Dwight gave religious instruction in Yale College. But if the present age is distinguished as peculiarly irreligious, Colleges should resist and check the downward current instead of falling in with it. This is their proper office and their imperative duty. It is the true *policy*, too, as well as the bounden *duty*, of Colleges, not to throw away the ægis of religion. The highest science and the greatest learning are certainly compatible with religion—nay more, are elevated, and pro-

moted and vitalized by its influence upon the mind and character.

3. "*Sectarianism.*" We need only pronounce the word; the objection will develop itself. But there certainly is no *need*, in order to have religious instruction in College, of *Sectarian* teaching in any offensive sense of the word. And if there were, it would be better that each sect should have its College, than that Colleges should have no religion. I certainly regard the religious tenets of some Christian denominations as very erroneous and defective. But after all, the general positive teaching of any denomination, when the teachers are men of liberal culture, will, for the most part, be good, true, and wholesome. I do not believe that there is, in our Colleges, on the whole, any undue disposition, under cover of religious instruction, to make proselytes. This is done in a more private and insinuating way, if at all. *Policy*, if not *principle*, is here a sufficient safeguard. In fact, the objection of *Sectarianism* is rather plausible than pertinent. There is far more danger of too little religion in Colleges, than of too much *Sectarianism*. Parents may prefer the college of their own denomination; and so, if they are earnest and true Christian men, they should; but, if they are wise, they will prefer the College of any Christian denomination to a College without any religion.

4. "*Peculiar character and mental habits of students,—rendering them especially insusceptible to religious impressions.*"

If this be true, it is an argument instead of an objection. For in this case, college students require that special care and pains should be devoted to their religious training. If to be neglected is dangerous to others, it must be doubly dangerous, it must be absolutely ruinous, *to them*. Besides, it is of the last consequence that they who are to have so great an influence in shaping the opinions and character of their own and of the next generation should not be left to sink into the gulf of indifference, irreligion, scepticism, and infidelity. The objection only reveals the peculiar and vast importance of special religious instruction in Colleges.

5. "*Some of the Funds of our Colleges were not designed for this purpose.*"

This is very true. But none of the funds of our Colleges were designed by their donors to prohibit or exclude from these institutions this department of instruction. I trust that the offer of funds, however large, on such conditions, would be indignantly refused by any College in the land; certainly it would be so refused by any College in New England. The offer of such funds would be an insult to the Christian religion, and such a foundation ought to be voided in law. Even in Girard College,—and I do not forget the peculiar sense in which it is called a *College*,—it has been found advisable and necessary, on all practical grounds, to introduce a thorough system of religious instruction,—only without the intervention of clergymen, but none the less sectarian, none the more effective for all that. It may not, indeed, be honestly consistent with the intentions of the founders of some particular professorships that those who are to occupy such chairs should be required to be men of Christian piety or of a strictly religious character. But that is a very different thing from excluding religion and religious instruction wholly from every department in such Colleges. And, on the other hand, it is a serious question whether there is any College—at least in New England—where it would not be a gross perversion of some, and perhaps, of a greater part, of the funds, to exclude religious instruction entirely. But reason and honesty both require that, if any religious instruction is given or attempted, it should not be a mere pretence, or a mockery; and that it must be, unless a serious effort is made to render it thorough and effective. No religious instruction at all is better than a mere heartless formality or a hypocritical make-believe, or a mere slurring it over to save appearances.

6. "*Religious Instruction had better be left to other independent and purely ecclesiastical agencies, while the College organization should take care of the Literary, Scientific, and (perhaps) the Moral, training of the Students.*"

If other and independent agencies will do this work for Colleges, and so far as they can and will do it,—well. But unless they do it, and so far as they fail to do it, it still remains the bounden duty of each College to do it for itself. If Col-

lege students can conveniently attend public worship in the parish churches on Sunday, it is well; indeed, it is, in my opinion, *better*, in many important respects, than that they should attend such worship by themselves in a College Chapel;—though the Chapel and the Church may, perhaps, in some cases, be advantageously *combined*. But after all, College students need a great deal of peculiar religious and moral instruction, and a great deal of constant religious training and influence which the parish churches will not afford. They are committed to the parental care of the College, and the Christian College is bound, *in loco parentis*, to provide and secure for them all that religious instruction and influence, training, care, and discipline, which a Christian parent is bound to seek and secure for his children.

7. "*Religious Worship and Instruction may be very well in Colleges, as voluntary exercises; but they should be forced upon nobody; attendance upon religious worship or instruction should not be compulsory, but should be free to those who choose it, or, perhaps, required of those—but only of those—whose parents or guardians may desire it.*"

This objection proposes, in its *animus*, entirely to ignore the fact that College students are, for the most part, *minors*, are all in a state of *pupilage*, and are, therefore, not to be left to themselves to judge what they will attend to and what they will not attend to, but are "under tutors and governors", are to learn obedience, learn to submit to restraint, guidance, instruction, and not to be followed with mere persuasions and entreaties. And thus this objection loses unwittingly more than half its logical force when, at last, it admits that parents and guardians may prescribe what their sons and wards may be required in College to attend. If *they* may so prescribe, then the College may prescribe what *all* its students shall be required to attend. And if it is suggested that, at least, those students whom their parents or guardians may desire to be excused altogether from attending religious exercises and receiving religious instruction, should be accordingly excused, I answer that, even if this suggestion were admitted, the cases which would call for its application would—I think and trust

—be very few and rare. But it involves a false *principle*, and is not to be admitted. For the Christian College does not undertake to represent each individual parent with all his peculiar opinions and tastes and whims and prejudices, in regard either to the course of study to be pursued or to the style of instruction, or to the methods of discipline, or to the rules of morality, or to the doctrines of philosophy or religion, that are to be taught. The phrase, *in loco parentis*, does not mean, in place of *the* parent, of *each* parent, but, in place of *a* parent.

The College stands, to every one of its students alike, in the place and relation of a wise and judicious Christian parent. It may not reject even Infidel, Jewish, or Mohammedan pupils, but it must receive them only on condition that they will submit, with the rest, to a Christian education. In justice to itself and to its Christian pupils, it cannot do otherwise. And if *they* do not choose to receive a Christian education, they must go elsewhere. Such persons, or their friends and co-religionists, have, with us, the same liberty which every denomination of Christians also has, to establish appropriate schools or colleges of their own.

8. "*It is inconsistent to demand religious instruction in Colleges and to dispense with it in the Common Schools.*"

Perhaps it is. And certainly religious instruction is very desirable in the Common Schools. I wish with all my heart it could be secured. But, after all, their case and that of Colleges are different. The Common Schools are State Institutions, supported from the common taxes and the common treasury; and in them all classes and denominations of the community have an equal right and claim. Colleges, on the other hand, have, indeed, certain rights and immunities secured to them by the State—and so have churches—and sometimes receive a certain degree of patronage or aid from the State, as a free gift; but they are essentially *eleemosynary foundations*, private institutions, are under the charge of private corporations (with more or less of oversight, it may be, from the State), and are controlled, in almost every instance, by some one or more bodies or denominations of men, professing—in connection with the special peculiarities of each—

the *common Christian faith*. The State allows, or should allow, every sect or denomination of religionists to have and endow its own College, if it will; and endeavors, or should endeavor, to treat them all with impartiality. None, therefore, has any right to complain that he is compelled either to forego a collegiate education, or to receive it together with a sort of religious instruction which he repudiates. If there are any Colleges which are as properly *State Institutions* as the Common Schools are, there is then, doubtless, much the same objection to special religious instruction in one case as in the other. Still there is, even then, one further difference in the two cases. The Common Schools are, and must be, so arranged that the children attend them day by day from their homes, and while under the domestic charge of their parents and friends; so that the Common Schools are not under the same responsibility in regard to the thorough moral and religious training of their pupils as the College is under; which, as we have said, assumes, *in loco parentis*, the entire charge, for the time being, of the guidance and training of its pupils, of the formation and development of their whole character.

9. "*Informal, individual, general, spontaneous, religious influence in Colleges is to be preferred as more effective than an established, organized, official, and formal routine and method.*"

This may be true. But why especially said of *Colleges*? This secret, quiet, invisible, yet all-pervading spontaneous, personal influence is of the greatest importance in Colleges; and without it no machinery, no organizations, no perfunctory instruction, no formal routine will produce any considerable good effect. It must give life and soul to the whole body of means. But the same is true everywhere else as well as in College. Nevertheless, it has not yet been generally thought advisable to abolish the Christian Church and all its institutions, all regular external and formal religious instruction and worship. Indeed, it is equally true that, without these, those invisible influences would not produce half their effect, and—what is more—in the course of time, would inevitably and utterly die out of the world. The soul without the body

is no more fit to perform its functions, in the present state, than the body without the soul.

10. "*But finally, as matters are, this routine of formal religious service and instruction in Colleges is productive of very little practical good effect.*"

If this were simply denied, it would not be easy for the objector to prove his point. But I am ready, with regret indeed, yet freely and fully, to admit, that religious instruction in Colleges, like many other parts of the College curriculum, is felt by too many of the students to be irksome, stupid, *a bore*; and that, on the whole, it is much less effective than were to be desired—I may even add—almost discouragingly ineffectual. But the same may be said of preaching in general, and of formal religious instruction everywhere. Yet who would venture to say how much worse the world would be, and how much worse our Colleges would be, if all established routine of religious service and all formal religious instruction were abolished? The adage applies here, as in so many other cases: "The duty is ours, the result is with God".

But, after all, I am confident it will be found, on a fair and impartial examination of the facts, that religious instruction in Colleges is not without manifest and most important results. I believe it is, on the whole and on an average, more successful there than any where else in the world. Not only does it lead, in cases not a few, to the formation of a thorough religious character, accompanied with an open profession of Christian piety; but it is, in fact, one of the most effective agencies by which large numbers of young men are rescued from immoral courses, from the scepticism that so naturally besets their age and circumstances, from infidel tendencies and opinions, from open hostility to Christianity, from religious indifference, and from the sway of merely worldly motives; and are annually sent forth into the world as defenders and bulwarks of that religion to which otherwise they might have proved the most persistent and dangerous foes.

I believe that multitudes of the graduates of our Colleges look back with thankfulness to the religious instruction there received, as having been among the most important and effect-

ual means of quickening, deepening, and steadying their religious convictions; that comparatively few will refer to it as having had no good influence upon their minds; and that a very small number indeed will charge it with having produced upon them—even by their own perversion—any injurious consequences.

I believe that, where the services of the *College Chapel* have been conducted and attended with that degree of propriety which ought to be, and may easily be, observed and maintained in them, those services will be remembered and referred to by the great mass of graduates with a hearty gush of reverence and gratitude and delight.

MORE *religious instruction*, and *not less*, is the reform that is needed. This, at least, is my profound conviction. Our Colleges require it. The Christian community demands it. As Christian men, we who have the immediate charge of Colleges, cannot allow ourselves to become parties to any combination or movement to refuse it. We must gladly and heartily bestir ourselves to secure it.

ART. III.—SWEDENBORG'S THEORY OF THE DIVINE-HUMAN.

By EDWARD A. LAWRENCE, D.D., Professor in East Windsor, Ct.

EVERY system claiming to be Christian must be judged of by the view which it gives of Christ. He is central in Christianity, not simply as its great teacher, but as its substance and author. The human and the divine are in him. Any philosophical rendering of the facts of Christian history must admit these two elements as fundamental, and give some intelligible and consistent account of their nature and relations. Are they one substance merely, or two? Are they identical, or distinct? If the latter, in what do they differ, and in what agree; if the former, what constitutes their unity? Upon

these questions, the great majority of the followers of Christ have ever been in substantial harmony. A few in almost every generation have dissented from the common faith. Some have elaborated new systems with more or less constructive skill, and claimed the merit of originality and the reputation of philosophers. Others, with like ingenuity, have wrought the same nebulous materials into different forms and asked for their work the authority of revelations, and for themselves the character of seers.

Of this latter class is Emanuel Swedenborg. He claims that God appeared to him in person, and commissioned him to unfold the hitherto concealed truths of his Word, and that he promised to *dictate* to him what he should write. He affirms that in this capacity of a revelator of the spiritual sense of the Word, he was Christ's vicar, and came in his stead as the predicted second advent. Passing by his extraordinary pretensions as an infallible exegete and revelator, we wish to examine his doctrine of the Divine-Human. We have the greater interest in ascertaining what this doctrine is, because it is central in his system. It is held by his followers as "the master-mystery", the chief of the "disclosures vouchsafed by the Lord to his servant Swedenborg". It involves some of those fundamental doctrines on which, what claims to be the New church differs from the Old, which the Swedish seer, a hundred years ago, pronounced corrupt and dead or dying. "Not a single truth", he says, "remains in it". "It knows nothing of eternal life." "The whole Christian world hath acknowledged three Gods." The faith of the New church and the Old "do not agree in a single point or particular". They are "diametrically opposite to each other in their nature and quality." And he supposed that the old doctrine might be entirely discredited in the church in about eighty years, chiefly by means of his writings, especially his "Brief Exposition."

"I do not recollect", says John Mill, "that I ever saw a passage in Swedenborg's writings that indicates anything about reforming the churches. . . their utter *annihilation* is taken for granted. Yes, Swedenborg, we must have a New church, for the Old one is dead—dead as a door-nail".

This belligerent attitude excites our curiosity. Its boldness of proscription surprises us, and its radical destructionism, coming from such earnest men, claiming to be "the Christians", almost startles us. It is well to examine the standpoint of these accusers with carefulness and candor; well to know exactly what the Apostle of this New church teaches on the vital points of the Christian religion. He must, therefore, be allowed to speak for himself. And if there shall be mystery as to his meaning who claims a divine commission to make *plain* the meaning of the inspired writers, his most intelligent followers must be his interpreters.

Any full view of the teachings of this school upon the subject before us, brings under inspection the two elements—the Divine and human, God and man, Theology and anthropology. The Swedenborgian idea of the Divine will unfold itself as the one Substance or Unity, the Trinity, and Personality.*

1st. The one Substance. "God is Substance or Being Itself, the first and the only Substance," or, what is the same, "the one only Substance is God." This is the original, absolute divine, and in the strictest sense, the divine Unity.†

"God is also Form itself, the first and the only real Form." Thus the Unity passed into a Dualism. The Substance and Form are distinct in conception, yet absolutely inseparable. "Substance which is not also form is a non-entity." God can no more exist without Form than a man, or a tree, or a stone.‡

These two, Substance and Form, stand related as primitive and derivative; yet their oneness is called *marriage*. This is the conjugal in God, and is a fundamental element by which the system may be distinguished as the Conjugal theology. The first marriage was not between two *persons*, but between Substance and Form, two abstract principles in the divine

* The writings of Swedenborg, to which reference is made in this article, are indicated by the initials, the numbers denoting the sections. The following are the works: *Arcana Celestia*, *True Christian Religion*, *Divine Love and Wisdom*, *Apocalypse Revealed*, *Apocalypse Explained*, *Doctrine of the Lord*, *Brief Exposition*, *The Last Judgment*, *Doctrine of Life*, *Heaven and Hell*, *Athanasian Creed*, *Canons*, *Divine Providence*, *Conjugal Love*.

† T. C. R. 18, 76.

‡ T. C. R. 21, 28, 49.

nature. All marriage is essentially the same. Love and wisdom are synonymes for these conjugal partners in the divine. So are Esse and Existere, Will and Understanding, Good and Truth, Affection and Thought, Charity and Faith, Man and Woman, Heat and Light, Soul and Body. All these are only different terms for the dualism of the Divine Nature, — Substance and Form.

The result of this ideal marriage in the Divine is outbirth—called creation. It is the emanation of the One Substance into the universe, the formation or modification of God—the finiting of the Infinite, the limiting of the Limitless, the conditioning of the Unconditioned. Thus the universe and God are the same Substance. Creation is only *evolution*, expansion, or the formation of God. The universe, as substance, always was; and theology, by this philosophy, runs itself into cosmology, and cosmology into Pantheism.*

2d. The Trinity. The idea of operation, Proceeding, or modification of the one Substance, brings out the Swedenborgian Trinity—the Esse, Existere, and Procedere. In the Christian garb of this philosophical formula, the Esse or Substance, is called the Father-principle; the Existere or Form, is called the Son-principle, and the Procedere the Holy Spirit-principle. Thus the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost become the three essentials of one God, which make one like the soul, body, and operation. This trinity exists in the Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, born into the world, and is the trinity of the New church.

Although this is called a trinity of essentials, yet Swedenborg expressly teaches that it was not before the world was created, but after. "That God was triune before the world was created, the Sacred Scripture does not teach, nor does reason, thence illuminated, see." "When God became incarnate, the trinity was provided and made, and came into being in the Lord Jesus Christ. Previously there was neither Unity in Trinity, nor Trinity in Unity, for these are in the Lord Jesus Christ only."†

* T. C. R. 33. † T. C. R. 166, 188, 170, C. on Trinity, chapters 1-5.

This, we believe, is a correct view of the New Church Trinity. It denies all personal distinctions in the Godhead, and rests its claim on a trinity of essentials. Yet, it ignores, virtually, this trinity of essentials, as unscriptural and unreasonable, and thus seems to deny exactly what it affirms. An essential of God is something which is necessary to his Being, and hence eternal, without which he would not be God, but something else. If, therefore, the trinity was not from eternity—not until creation, then God, the Divine did not exist from eternity, but became God at the creation. Swedenborg allows a potentiality or capacity in the One Substance of evolving a trinity of essentials, but this before creation was not a real trinity, but only a possible, an ideal one. In reality, there was neither Unity in Trinity before the world was created, nor Trinity in Unity.

3d. The doctrine of the divine Personality is as peculiar as that of the Trinity. God is declared to be one *in* Person. The Triune is one because it is *of* one person. The divine and the human in the Lord *are* one person.* But as the trinity is not from eternity, but was brought into being in the Lord Jesus Christ, it is evident that the personality was produced in the same way. God was in person, after the world was created, in the Lord Jesus Christ. Was he a person, or in person before? The system, if we understand it, says, No. As there was no trinity in essence from eternity, so there was no Personality of substance. Personality is no more proper to the divine Esse by this philosophy than is the trinity. Each, from eternity, is only ideal. Neither trinity nor personality is intrinsic or substantial, but both circumstantial and extrinsic. God, as Spirit or Substance, is not a person. The Father is not a person, nor the Son, nor the Spirit. But He operates into and in Jesus Christ as *in* a person. The personality is in the sphere of nature and not of spirit, the finite, and not the infinite. It is a product, of which time and space are the factors. It fades away where these are not, in the realm of spirits, and there turns into the idea of *thing*.

* D. L. W. 146; D. L. 34; A. C. 13.

That this is a just rendering of the system, is evident from its general treatment of the idea of person.

1st. It allows no personal Satan. By this term is meant only evil in the abstract, or the complex hells.*

2d. It excludes the idea of person from the spiritual sense of the divine Word. It is allowed to be in the *letter* or natural sense, but perishes and turns into the idea of *thing* in the spiritual.†

3d. It excludes the distinctions of person from the spirits in heaven. The soul in its essence and origin is spirit—pure substance, and non-personal. Hence nothing is known in heaven concerning a single person spoken of in the Word—not who Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are, but *what* only. “Hence the angels always remove ideas of person, and remain in ideas of things.”‡

4th. The idea of person is excluded from the distinctions in the divine nature.§ Swedenborg admits that “the Christians of the first ages, who read the word according to the sense of the letter, distinguished the divinity into three persons,” that “the Lord prayed unto the Father as to one different from himself”, and that “he spoke of the Father as of a different person”. But this was only an *apparent* truth, the representation of the letter. The Rev. Mr. Hayden also admits that the language of the New Testament conveys the idea of a personal Trinity, and that the whole scheme of salvation employs the apparent persons as instruments to an end, but holds, with Swedenborg, that this representation is illusory, and has led the church to Tritheism. “These representations of the letter of the Word, though in accordance with much of the thinking still prevalent”, he says, “are not the actualities of our subjective experience, as they reveal themselves to a higher reflection. They stand out in a certain marked contrast to that calm compactness of order, and that serene and passive solidity of sequence with which the God of nature, as he stands before our modern reason, goes forward to the accomplishment of his purposes”. The Rev. Mr. Barrett also concedes that, according to the lit-

* A. R. 550.

† A. C. 5253, 5434; A. E. 625.

‡ A. C. 5225, 8343.

§ T. C. R. 170.

eral sense of Scripture, the Trinity *appears* to be a Trinity of persons. But this literal sense of Scripture he thinks gives out an unscriptural doctrine, which the spiritual sense breaks down. The apparent truth is a real falsehood, not only "unreasonable, but most unfriendly to the growth of pure religion". Nay, it is "downright Tritheism."

Thus the system appeals for support from the natural and plain import of the Word, to an occult, so called spiritual, or correspondential sense. It adjusts the contents of Revelation to the "subjective experience", the "higher reflection" of the reader, the "modern reason" of a few, who set aside the experience, reflection and reason of the great majority of Christian thinkers from the first ages to the present.

5th. The exclusion of personality is carried, finally to the very substance and *being* of God. This is necessitated by Swedenborg's general doctrine of personality. But he teaches explicitly that the substitution of the idea of *thing* for that of person is the only way in which men or angels can commune with God, or even conceive of him. The idea of *person* contracts and limits thought to time and space, to nature and the finite, whereas things do not limit and concentrate, but extend it to the infinite *and thus to the Lord*. The idea of *thing* makes thought and discourse universal, and enables the angels to express things ineffable. "Hence, everything of their discourse flows into the infinite and into the eternal, consequently into the divine of the Lord." Hence, Swedenborg says those who think of God from the idea of person only, or who, from person think of his essence, think not spiritually, but materially.* Such is the Swedenborgian doctrine of personality in general, and the fate of the Divine Personality in particular. The idea is completely banished from the province of pure spirit, essence — from the Divine. This is infinite, and hence impersonal, universal and therefore abstract. Man is not a person as to his soul, which is the only real man, but he becomes personal when the one Substance is expanded into humanitarian forms of stratified and fixed substance. God,

* A. C. 5225, 5253, 8985, A. R. 611.

as Divine and One, is not a person more than the ocean is a person. He became Personal as he became Triune, in the natural *form* of the Lord Jesus, only as the ocean becomes personal when distributed into waves, or poured into casks. Thus he was *in* person, and *of* a person, according to the formula, yet really and essentially abstract and impersonal. And, by the same philosophy, there are as many divine persons as there are humanitarian forms, which are the receptacles of the divine (or into which it is distributed). Every son of man is therefore as really the person of God as was Jesus the Son of Mary.

The accredited expositors of the system cast some light on this view. According to Wilkinson, Jesus Christ is that divinely human form in which God is a personal God. Mr. Noble speaks of this person as a something produced. Mr. Hayden says "person—per and sona is a thing that is sounded through—the mask worn by actors in the old amphitheatres, with a speaking trumpet for a mouth-piece." So he says "the Son is the per-sona of God the Father". This glorified form, the love and wisdom in it, "are not the supreme divinity but only the mask or mouth-piece of the divinity—a natural form assumed for bringing divinity into the world, far enough inferior to and below the Father, and as subordinate to the divinity as a man's body and outward manner are to his soul." This is the doctrine, by one of its clearest and coolest expounders. Jesus Christ, the Son, the very per-sonus of God, in which is the Trinity, is not God. He is only a "natural form", "a humanitarian garment", a mask and mouth-piece of the divinity, as far inferior to the Father as the body is to the soul.

Thus from the three points of Unity, Trinity, and Personality in the Divine, the system steadily returns to its point of departure—the One Substance-doctrine—the *proton pseudos* of the Swedish seer's philosophy, and of all schemes of Pantheism.

Turn now to the New church doctrine of the *Human*. If we do not mistake, it makes this *identical* with the Divine. The Divine is the Human, and the Human the Divine. The one substance which is "very God", is also "very man", all things of whom are infinite. This identity of the Divine and

Human is absolute, and constitutes the divine unity,—the one substance, which is God.

God is also “in the human form and *is* that form”. Thus as to the dualism in him, substance and form, the Human and the Divine are the same. God has a human body and everything belonging to it, head and hands, heart and lungs, tongue, teeth, face, breast, loins, legs and feet. All things external and internal, essential and substantial, organs of articulation, locomotion, and generation,—all things which make a man to be a man belong to God. Thus he is the Infinite, uncreated, absolute God-man.*

This Divine-Human the system represents also as a derivative human, as form is a derivative from substance, the *existere* from the *esse*. The divine *existere* is the divine-human. But this human is as essentially divine as human. It is the humanity which the Lord derived from the Father, and therefore *is* the Father. The *esse* and *existere*, this Human and Divine, are “the very essential Divine”, “the all-begetting Divinity”—and therefore identical.†

Another phase of this human is the “Natural Human”, or “the third degree” of the Divine Nature. This was assumed, or rather developed at the Incarnation. “When the Lord came into the world, he superinduced over his former Human another Natural-Human, that was like the human of another man, in the world, except that both were Divine”.‡ Thus there are three degrees in the Human as in the Divine,—a Trinity of essentials in the Very Man, the same as in the Very God. Each essential in both is “infinite and increate”. No one part of this “Very Man who is God” is any more man than God. No degree serves a purpose, in the flux and reflux of the common substance, so peculiarly human as not to be, by the same peculiarity equally divine. As to substance and essence—as to *being*, Divine is a perfect synonym for Human, and Human for Divine, as God is for Man, and Man for God.

* D. L. W. 18, 19, 22.

† Ath. Creed, 17. Doct. Lord. 46. T. C. R. 20, 23.

‡ D. L. W. 221.

Further, God is not only infinite and essential Man, but "the only man". "No one is man but Jehovah alone". What are called created men, are only finite parts or abridgments of the Uncreated Man—the forms and organs, coolings or contractions, grosser or finer, fixed and fluent of the one only God-man. Thus, what the Word of God explicitly denies—"God is not a Man"—this system as explicitly affirms.*

The merely "material human" which the Lord derived from the Mother, was not man. It was not the human soul or essence, but a mere "dead form", a temporary "covering" which a man puts on at birth, and off at death. The soul, all that is spiritual and intellectual in man, by this philosophy, is from the father:—the material an animal from the mother.† The conscious spirit of Jesus of Nazareth was the living God—was *from* the Father, and *was* the Father.

But the identity of the Human and Divine is maintained in respect to the external human form. Was the body of Christ a natural form organized out of the One Substance in a "fixed state" which, Swedenborg says, is called "matter"? So is the body of every other man. But since the First and only substance is God, and since it is immutable and cannot cease to be God, the very bodies of men are as essentially one with God as was the soul of Christ. They are in the human form, and God is not only *in*, but "*is* that Form". This identity reaches even to the inmost and essence of man. "The soul of man is his *life*."‡ Yet there "*is but one life*", and that life is uncreated and God. "God only lives" and acts, and "God is in man, and *is* his life".§ Therefore God is as really the only living and acting spirit of every man, as of the Lord Jesus. Hence "the term man signifies in its genuine sense, that *Esse* from which man originates". This is evident because "no one is man but Jehovah alone"; and further, because "whatsoever exists *from* an *Esse*, makes one with the *Esse*", and "what proceeds from God himself *is* himself". Thus is made out the identification of man with God, both as to what is called the external and the internal man—the form and the very substance. As an

* A. C. 299, 1894.

† T. C. R. 92.

‡ A. E. 26.

§ D. L. W. 359.

illustration Swedenborg says, "It is not the eye that sees, but the spirit by the eye. . . . This also does not see of itself, but from a vision still more interior, which is that of the rational principle; nay, even this does not see of itself, but there is a sight still more interior, which is that of the *internal man*. . . . But we must advance still further, for neither does the internal man see of itself, *but it is the Lord*, by means of the internal man, who *alone* sees, because he *alone lives*, and he gives to man the faculty of seeing and with it the *appearance* as if he saw himself".* Thus man's agency, as well as his existence, in the last analysis, is resolved into God's. As it is God who alone lives, so it is he alone who sees, hears, speaks, thinks, wills, and acts. Man thinks that he lives and acts, or appears to himself to think so, and God gives him this appearance as if he really did. But it is an illusion, a fallacy, and a falsity. Man is simply God's organ, not an agent, but an instrument. In respect to the faculty of sight, he is an optical instrument.

In harmony with this rendering, Mr. Hayden holds that "All life, Infinite and finite, is in substance and essence one and the same". Mr. Barrett says, "We have only to conceive the Trinity existing in every regenerate man, to be infinitely *expanded*, and we have the Divine Trinity". God is therefore only an *expanded* man, and man a contracted God. One writer of this school is a little more open and says, "God is an infinite Man and man a finite God". Mr. Henry James, an eloquent and philosophic expositor of the New Church doctrines, says outright that the soul is "infinite and eternal". "Viewed spiritually it is uncreated, is in simple verity, God". Upon the problem of the soul's "becoming a creature", or subject to time, space, and person, Mr. James thinks Swedenborg sheds a flood of light, by showing that this does not take place "really as to its own apprehension, but only *apparently*". It is in this way that the doctrine of appearances is made to render such important service to the system. There *seems* to be a difference between Infinite and finite life, but they are

* A. C. 1954.

in reality "one and the same". Man *appears* to be a creature and man, but this is an illusion. He is God. We are conscious of living and seeing, but our consciousness deceives us. All our senses deceive us, and that in regard to the very essence and substance of things.

But does not this denial of a real, finite being to man, also deny it to everything else? Swedenborg's doctrine of creation is that it is a *finiting of the Infinite*,—so modifying the One Substance by an apparent pressing the Divine out of it, and a distribution, that it shall seem to be manifold, and "fixed substance or matter". But this must be only an apparent process. The idea that God, who, according to the philosophy cannot *create* another substance, should so *alter* a part of his own unchangeable Being that it should really pass from mind into matter, so *divide* his indivisible nature, that, from One it should become many,—that the Eternal Living Spirit should so *recede* from Itself in concentric atmospheres, as, by cooling and coagulation, to be "the Divine out of Itself", and finally to expire in the "ends of the atmospheres" into dead matter—that all this, which is the great *apparent* truth of the system, should be eschewed in its inmost reckonings, as only an appearance, is a compliment to that strong common sense which sometimes rebels against the oppressive vagaries of the speculative reason. But the escape from these absurdities is just where the spiritualistic type of Pantheism, ancient and modern, always escapes—through a *cosmism*—a phenomenal creation—the phantomic finite.

But the Lord is called "The Divine Natural". Is not this from his *identity* also with Nature? If all life in God, man, and matter, "in substance and essence, is one and the same", because life is uncreatable, all substance in them must be one and the same, for substance is also uncreatable.

Swedenborg's doctrine of Correspondence, if we do not mistake, rests on this substantial *oneness* of God and nature. Prof. Bush exhibits it as "a law of creation", and the key to the New Church Theology. Mr. Clissold calls it a relation "between a spiritual cause and a natural effect". Mr. Wilkinson tells us what *kind* of a relation it is when he says that the emanative

ray, and the *forms* which it leaves in its creative passage, "are all one in soul". Mr. James repeats the same in saying that there "is no essential discrimination or discrepancy between the Creator and the creature", because "the Creator constitutes the *sole* and *total* being of creation". This collateral teaching falls back for support upon the dicta of the "illuminated author"—Nature and all things in it exist from God as the *Esse* Itself, and "whatever exists from an *Esse* makes *one with* the *Esse*, because it *is one from* the *Esse*".* This one is not only *in* every thing of the other, but "it is *all* in all of the other as *in itself*", and thus makes it not *another*, but the *same*. The cause *is* the effect, and the effect the cause. The Creator is the creature, and the creature, the Creator—God, nature, and nature, God. Thus "the Divine Natural" comes into the system, as the Divine Human does, by the law of correspondence, or essential identity. Things which are thus one,—the spiritual world and the natural, mind and matter,—"*act* as one by correspondence", for the plain reason that, in substance and life, they are one.

Nor do Discrete Degrees, on which the system relies to save itself from Pantheism, bring any relief. Theoretically, they distinguish the one substance into what are called end, cause, and effect, which is only another mode of stating the doctrine of correspondence. In this ideal discrimination, God is the end, the Spiritual Sun which emanates from him and in which he resides, with its three atmospheres, is the Cause, and the natural sun, emanating from the spiritual, with its atmospheres, is the effect. In what is called "successive order", these proceed from each other, as Love, Wisdom, and Use; First, Prior, and Ultimate; Simple, Congregates, and Composites. In what is termed "*simultaneous* order", they proceed as Inmost, Interior, and Exterior. The doctrine of Degrees, as a means of working the system, strictly speaking, is the science of *mensuration*. It is the method of computing heights and distances—the dimensions of the One Substance. "That dimension", says Swedenborg, "which consists of discrete de-

* D. L. W. 15.

degrees, is called *altitude*, and that which consists of continuous degrees, is called *latitude*".* This discloses the law of correspondence or mensuration, and gives its use.

But do these imaginary distinctions or distances disturb the essential *oneness* of the things distinguished? Are they not all contained within the One Substance, as solids are in their superficies? They are all predicated of the Divine Itself, and distinguish the One indivisible Jehovah into three essentials of the one God, as they do God and the universe into End, Cause, and Effect, or First, Prior, and Postremes. But Swedenborg makes this doctrine of the identity of God and nature perfectly evident by explicitly teaching that these degrees, "taken together always make one"†—that the things which they distinguish are "homogeneous, that is, of the same genius and nature", and that they cannot be of a different nature.‡ The first is not only in the subsequent degrees, but "it is the *sole* in them, and being so, it is the *all* in them". This dogma is put into the most compact philosophical formula. God is not simply in everything of the universe; "he *is all* in all in the universe", "the Infinite All". We cannot account this a rhetorical exaggeration, as in some mystical writers; it is the guarded postulate and central position of the whole system. It is the result of the author's profoundest speculative reason—the ultimate abstraction and law of all his dialectic processes. It is the key to his doctrine of Discrete and Continuous Degrees, of his doctrine of Order, successive and simultaneous. It gives him his three senses of Scripture, his new doctrine of the Sacred Canon, and his allegorical principles of interpretation. In short, it harmonizes his system, as much as any central principle can harmonize a system containing so many confused and contradictory statements.

In its æsthetic dressings, it has seemed to some a profoundly religious philosophy. It enables one to see God in everything, because it apotheosizes man and the universe by making God the sole substance of everything. It is thought to give a deeply spiritual religion. We question if it is not just the reverse. It debases our ideas of God, the sole object of wor-

* D. L. W. 135.

† D. L. W. 184.

‡ D. L. W. 197, 198.

ship, by confounding his nature with man's. Mind and matter, God and a stone, are *homoousian* in the New Church system, as the Father and Son are in the Old. Spirit is only invisible nature, and nature visible and stratified spirit. Everything is God, and everything is man, and the God-Man is everything. "This external world", says the *Monthly Religious Magazine*, "has no fixity, it is only the *form* of man's soul—the soul brought down into the plane of the senses. All that we can draw from the universe is man. All that it proves is man. *It is man*". And since "Jehovah alone is man", we have an averment of the purest Pantheism. And the *Review*, in its neophytic admiration of the Swedenborgian philosophy, thinks that "the time of forty thousand pulpits in America could be profitably employed for the next ten years in simply repeating and *reïterating* the thought of the Humanity of God—that God is a man, that the difference between him and us is . . . *simply the difference between the greater and the less*".*

Whoever will take the trouble to compare this system with the various phases of the Pantheistic philosophy, as exhibited in the history of human opinion, will see their essential agreement. On the one-substance doctrine, the root of all Pantheism and of some Mysticism,—on the substitution of emanation for creation, the substantial *identity* of the Divine and Human—God and the Universe, the impersonality of God and of man, as pure substance, and their antagonism to the Christian Church,—the Neo-Platonists, Spinoza, Swedenborg, and Strauss are only successors in the same tutorial chair.

Strauss, the living teacher of this school, defines the Divine-Human as the "Infinite manifesting itself in the finite"; The incarnation of God in the whole race of mankind, he holds is a truer one than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time and to one person. Feuerbach exults over this idea as a marvellous achievement of modern illumination. He says, "We have reduced the supermundane, supernatural, superhuman nature of God to the elements of human nature. Our process of analysis has brought us again to the

* Vol. 21, pp. 52, 53.

position with which we set out. The beginning, the middle, and the end of religion is *man*". He explains the rejection of this view by the church of all ages, in the same way that Swedenborg does—from its ignorance respecting God and man. The church is natural, and its ideas sensuous. "So long as man knows not that he is a spirit, he cannot know that *God is man*." Our own nebulistic Emerson, in his aeronautic gyrations, departs from and returns to the same "One stuff with its two ends". "Star, sand, fire, water, tree, man—it is still one stuff." "The act of seeing and thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object are *one*." "In all conversation between two parties, tacit reference is made to a third party, to a *common nature*. That third party or common nature is not social, it is *impersonal*,—it is *God*." "I am divine. Through me God acts, through me speaks."

Thus clearly and closely, in its parentage and progeny, does this New Church doctrine of the Divine-Human ally itself with the Pantheistic family of speculators. And in this we find the ground of that diametrical opposition in which the Swedish seer places the doctrines of the New Church to those of the Old. They stand opposed as Theism and Pantheism do, and have always done. And Armand Saintes, the biographer of Spinoza, gave the animus of the school when he said, "The ultimate struggle will be, not between Christianity and philosophy, but between Christianity and Spinozeism, its strongest and most inveterate antagonist."

The bearing of this philosophy of the Divine-Human on the doctrines of the Christian system is so important as to require a fuller examination.

In the Incarnation of the Lord, Swedenborg's theory says, that he did not assume from the mother a rational soul, but only a material, animal organism.* "Man is distinguished from a mere animal", according to Swedenborg, "by his rational, spiritual mind", by virtue of which he is immortal.† Hence, as Christ received no such mind from the human parent, he assumed at the Incarnation, not the humanity, but

* T. C. R. 82.

† Doct. of Life, 86.

a mere *animality*. With the fallen human *soul*, which was all that needed to be redeemed, God came into no kind of sympathy or connection in the person of Christ. The pneumatic element on the human side was wholly wanting.

Yet this, so called human, which the Lord derived from the mother, is made the subject of hereditary *evils*, *iniquities*, and *falsities*. "For the Lord to bear, or take upon himself, iniquities and evils, except in an hereditary way, from the mother, was impossible."* From these iniquities and evils, Christ is represented as praying in the 51st Psalm to be purified, and as declaring that when this should be accomplished, he should be "pure" and "holy". For it was not king David that made such confession of sin in the Psalm, but, according to the internal sense, the Lord, who was the real David. Swedenborg does indeed state that the Lord, as to the inner man, which is the Divine, and Jehovah, had no "sin or evil which was his own". But *everything* in him which was not Jehovah, call it "natural mind," "human essence", or "Son of Mary"—all was "polluted with hereditary evils from the mother, and falsities thence derived". These evils in him were not either inoperative, or confined to a brief period antecedent to moral action. "Hereditary evil consists in *willing*, and thence *thinking* evil." It is in the *will* itself, and the thought thence.† The evil in the will-principle could not produce its legitimate falsity in the intellectual principle "before man is initiated into scientifics and knowledges". "It may be matter of surprise to many", Swedenborg says, "to hear speak of hereditary evil from the mother belonging to the Lord. But as it is here declared so manifestly, and the subject treated of in the internal sense is concerning the Lord, there can be no reason at all to doubt its being so". The passage referred to, the internal sense of which makes this dogma so plain to the seer, is Gen. xiii, 7, in the exegesis of which, Canaanite "denotes hereditary evil from the mother", and Perizzite "falsity thence derived". And as these were "in the land", there is "no reason at all to doubt" that hereditary evil and falsity were in the Lord.‡

Some of the collateral writers veil a little this dogma of

* A. C. 1573.

† A. C. 4317.

‡ A. C. 1573.

their author, but the drift of the system carries others to its fullest expression. Mr. Barrett teaches that the human nature of Christ was "full of impure and unhallowed principles", some of them of such "a subtle and interior nature as appertain to spirits and angels", and which were not wholly "put off till the resurrection or after". "The death of Christ", says the *Religious Monthly Magazine*, "does not mean the mere rending away of the fleshly body, but the putting away of the whole *selfish* and earthly nature". Mr. Hayden says, "There existed in his person from the first, two organic, living forces, acting in *opposite* directions,—the one humanly derived and acting *towards evil*, the other divinely derived and acting towards good". "The human nature from the virgin mother was no whit more pure or immaculate than the constitutional inheritance of Peter, or John, or Paul, or Silas." "For thirty years was the old, hereditary man being off, and the new, divine man being put on."

This is a dark picture of Him whom, for eighteen hundred years, the entire Church has clasped to its bosom as of stainless purity. It is scarcely surpassed by those modern leaders of the infidel forces, who cry "Havoc" upon the Church, and "let slip the dogs of war". Mr. Theodore Parker says of Christ, "He is not without errors, not without the stains of his times, and I presume, of course, not without sins,—for men without sins exist in the dreams of girls, not in real fact". Strauss is only hypothetical. "If Christ was entirely free from inward conflict, from all vacillation of the spiritual between good and evil, he could not be a man of like nature with us." He, whose affirmation of himself was—"The Prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in me"—of whom one apostle says, "he was holy, harmless and undefiled", and another, that he "did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth",—this man, Christ Jesus the Lord, is affirmed to have been "full of impure and unhallowed principles". To sustain this impeachment, there is not, we believe, one reputable philosophical theory which is not anti-Christian and Pagan in its parentage. Not a single fact in the life of Christ lends it support. His whole history confronts it and says, "I find no fault in him".

Further, what is called our Lord's Regeneration or Glorification proceeds on the same view of his human nature. "He was willing to be born as another man, and instructed as another man, and, as another man, to be *re-born*, with this difference, that man is re-born of the Lord, but that the Lord regenerated and glorified himself, that is, made himself divine."* During the regenerative process, which continued till his death, and was effected by means of temptation, Christ put off all the human which he had from the mother, and so separated it from himself, that he was no longer her son. But at the same time he put on a human from the Father, and made it divine. Thus "he became God",—"one with the Father and himself Jehovah". Thus were "the divinity and humanity united together in one person", and "God is man, and man God in Christ".†

On this construction of the person and character of Christ, we must impugn the apostle's statement that "he was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin". Other men are tempted through the spiritual nature,—the soul. God's law is spiritual, and it is only the rational spirit that can feel either its obligations, or a temptation to transgress it. But *such* a human mind Christ did not possess. How then could he be tempted *as we are*? Further, all his merely human instincts, appetites, and affections were *depraved* and *polluted*, and in his temptations, were excited towards evil and against good, and thus cannot have been "without sin".

Again, if all that was not Jehovah in Christ, was only what he derived from the mother—a soulless, material form, was he capable of temptations, or of anything but mere, unfree, animal suffering? The Divine,—Jehovah, was the only rational mind in him. But Swedenborg says, "The Lord did not suffer as to the Divine, but the human". "The Divinity cannot suffer or be tempted." Neither can the unrational, material humanity. Therefore Christ was not tempted at all. And still further, wanting that which "distinguishes man from a mere animal", "a spiritual mind", he was incapable of anything, in the experiences of the wilderness, the garden, and the

* A. C. 6138. † A. C. 2649. Doct. of Lord, 35. T. C. R. 102, 103.

cross, but mere *animal* suffering. We can find in him neither *example* in purity, nor sympathy in our temptations. Some theorists hold that the Divine nature suffered, and thus find what they call God's example and sympathy in Christ's sufferings. The common doctrine is, that the complete human nature,—a veritable human soul,—was tempted and suffered in such a union with the complete Divine Nature, that we have in our Lord a perfect example, fulness of Divine sympathy in our temptations, and atonement for our sins. But this system denies all these to its adherents, by denying that the Divine in Christ could suffer, or be tempted, and that he had any rational soul but the Divine.

Another problem deserves a brief inquiry. On what principle, except that of the identification of the Divine and Human, is "God man, and man God in Christ"? Was it by the *assumption* of the human nature in the Incarnation? But that which constitutes the human nature and is its essence,—the human soul,—Christ did not assume. Nor, for the same reason, could this be effected by God's being *united* to, or conjoined with man. That with which he was united in the Incarnation was not man, but what, being without a spiritual mind,—was not "distinguished from a mere animal". With what truth can it be said that "the divinity and humanity were *united* together in one person", when the divinity *is* the humanity, and there was no other real humanity in Christ with which it could be united?

How, indeed, could God *become* man by incarnation, when he *was* man from eternity—"the very and only man"? But his "human was *made* divine", and thus Christ was glorified. Which of his humans was made divine? His divine-human, conceived from the Father, was already and *essentially* divine. The material, "human-human", from the mother, was all separated from him, and put off, even to its "total *extinction*". It is not easy to see how *this* human could be made divine, and yet *destroyed*,—utterly separated from the Divine, and by the same process, forever united to it, so as to "become Jehovah". And this is the more difficult as Swedenborg teaches that the "human nature cannot be transmuted into the divine essence,

nor can it be commixed with it".* It is therefore alike impossible to make the human, divine or the divine human.

What, then, is the real significance of the Incarnation and Glorification in this system,—God become man, and man God? "When the Lord *put off* the human from the mother, he *put on* the human from the Father, and *thus* became one with the Father and Jehovah." "The Father came nearer and nearer in the acts of redemption to the Lord, till at length they so conjoined themselves that they were not two, but *one*."† But who is this "Lord", and who "the Father" that are put in such intense *personal* relations to each other? How did the Lord, in the Incarnation *put off* the "human from the Father", the putting *on* of which is his glorification, and makes him Jehovah again? In what sense did the Incarnation make them "two", and the glorification "one"? Does the Incarnation present the Father and Son as two divine *persons*? This the system holds as the great heresy of the Old Church.

The distinction is between the two "Essentials of the one God", and expresses their abstract relation. That Jehovah should, in the Incarnation, separate himself into two or three essentials, accords with the doctrine that God was "not triune, before the world was created", and that "the Trinity was brought into being in Jesus Christ". But there is a mystery in this explanation of mystery. How can he who is one indivisible substance and essence from eternity, *separate* himself in time, into three essentials of the one God? We do not see, except on the principle of emanation or proceeding,—of "finiting himself", as, in what the system calls *creation*. But, though God would not be "triune before the world was created", there would be after that as many essentials of the One God as there were "finitives" and proceedings of the one substance. This would make the Incarnation of God to begin in Adam, and to be repeated in every child of Adam to the end of time. Such an incarnation of God in the whole race, which Strauss calls a *truer* one than that limited to Christ, harmonizes with, and explains Swedenborg's doctrine that God is the inmost

* D. L. 35.

† T. C. B. 97.

Esse, Life, and Being of every man as really as of Jesus of Nazareth—that he dwells in the body, blood, bones, and brains of every man as an “organ recipient of God”, and “a receptacle of God”,—that man’s will and understanding are not his, but the *Lord’s*, and the *Lord himself*, and that in every man, it is “God alone that lives”,—that “sees”—that “acts”.

God was as *really* incarnate and man, on this theory, and man God, in Abraham as in Christ. The patriarch was as essentially the Form and Person of God as the Messiah. Hence Abraham, in the spiritual sense, “signifies the Lord”. “By Abram no other is meant in the Word than the Lord.”* Indeed it is expressly affirmed that “Abram is the Lord’s internal man, which is Jehovah”.† Thus the Incarnation of God in Abraham is as unmistakable as in Jesus. The difference is merely circumstantial. The external man proceeds “substantially from the internal”—yea, is nothing else than the internal so *formed* that it may act suitably in the world wherein it is”.‡ Thus Jehovah, as Abraham’s internal man, was formed into Abraham as into His own external man. The visible material man was only a *formation* of Jehovah, as the one indivisible and only man. This oneness of God and man is softened by the terms “representative”, “significative”, and “correspondence”. But it stands out unveiled in the postulate that “no one is man but Jehovah alone,” that He is “Very Man” and the “Only Man”.

One step further in the line of this attenuating explanation reduces the Incarnation and Glorification to their feeblest significance. The distinction between the Father and the Son is that of Good and Truth. Good is called the Father-principle, and Truth the Son-principle. But are they two distinct *essentials* of the One God, capable of separation, so that one shall *go forth* from the other, or appear *out of* the other? Swedenborg says, “The Lord in his essence is *nothing else* but Divine Good”, Good and Truth “are not two, but one”. “The God-head is indivisible.” What then is the import of this termin-

* A. C. 1989.

† A. C. 1894.

‡ A. C. 5337.

ology—Divine Truth “derived from”, “proceeding” or “going forth”, from Divine Good “in the Incarnation”, and “returning”, and being “united to it” in the Glorification? Swedenborg answers, “For Divine Truth to proceed from Divine Good, or the Son from the Father, is to present oneself the same, only in another form”. It is “the Divine, *formed* as a man”. But if the Godhead is indivisible, and the Lord is nothing else than Divine Good, and Good and Truth are “not two, but one”,—why are they so sharply distinguished as *two* essentials in one essence,—one *going out* from and *returning* to the other? Purely “for the sake of man’s apprehension”, is the answer. Prof. Bush, in the guileless honesty for which he was distinguished, expresses the extreme difficulty of grasping the process of this “going forth” and “returning”. The heat of the sun coming forth in the light of the sun, is Swedenborg’s most frequent and felicitous illustration. But the disciple, far richer in Biblical lore than his master, justly thinks “a further effort of the mind is requisite to conceive of the Divine Truth as coming forth from Its purely abstract form, and embodying itself in human nature”. But in the final analysis, this difficulty vanishes. In reality, there is no such process. “Progression”, says Swedenborg, “is not predicable of Love or Wisdom, or of Good or Truth, for these are real God”.* Thus the central wheel relied on for working the system—proceeding, progression, or going forth, falls, with other things of time, and space, and person, into a phantom.

The Incarnation then, as now defined, was not of the Son of God, as a proceeding from the Father, but of the one only essential, Divine Good, as the Father-principle, presenting himself “the same, only in another form”, “the Divine, *formed* as a man”. But what is it for the Divine to be formed as a man? Does not the system hold God to be essentially man, and in man’s form? How can that “be *formed* as a man”, which, from eternity, is *in*, and *is* man’s form? Again, how could the Father present himself as the Son, in the Incarnation, “the same, only in *another form*”, when the system al-

* B. E. 119.

lows but *one* Form, and that is God's? He can no more appear in another *form*, than in another substance. And, we do not see how the other part of the definition is any more consistent,—“to present oneself before *another* in a form accommodated to *him*”.* There is no *another*. He himself is the only *one*, whether called man, form, esse, or entity. Thus the whole idea of a Trinity of essentials, of Proceedings, of Incarnation and Glorification, is unreal and illusive. The whole terminology of Father and Son, Good and Truth, coming forth and returning, making the Divine Human, and the Human Divine, by the internal sense of the system, means in reality this and nothing more,—the One, Infinite, and Eternal Substance, called God-man; or Love and Wisdom, *appears* to go forth *from* Itself, and in Its own form, presents Itself *to* Itself, to be perceived and apprehended *by* Itself, and then return and be united again to Itself. This self-evolving and self-involving process, called in the documents, flux, influx, and reflux, going forth and returning, is eternal. It never began and will never end. It is continued from a central “cardiac” and “pulmonic force”, as unfree and essentially physical as the beating pulse, or the law of gravitation.

In concluding this article, we wish to glance at the bearing of this philosophy on the great practical doctrines of Regeneration, Redemption, and Sin.

The definition given of *Regeneration* is, “From natural to become spiritual”. The process is the same as that by which Christ's natural, in his regeneration, was made Divine, and is the reverse of generation. The change is effected by the influx of Love and Wisdom, or Good and Truth, which Swedenborg says are the “real God, or God himself”. This flows into the natural evil forms of fixed substance, form within form, and fills, refines, and quickens them from fixed to fluent substance—from gross to finer,—from nature to spirit. This is the reputed process of this metaphysical regeneration.

One of the peculiarities of it is that it *never ends*. Prof. Bush calls it “an everlasting act”, Mr. Clissold, “a perpetual

process". Swedenborg says it begins in infancy and continues to "eternity".

Another peculiarity is that, though it professes that from natural, men become spiritual, it does not so change a man's nature that from *evil* and *false*, he becomes essentially good and true. "There are states of evil, and of the false in *every* man without end."* "Evil, as well hereditary as actual, with the man who is regenerated, is not exterminated so that it disappears, or is made none, but is only separated, and by an arrangement from the Lord, is rejected to the circumstances."† "Hereditary evil from the father is of a more interior nature than that from the mother, and remains to eternity, for it can never be eradicated."‡ Spirits and angels in heaven are not so regenerated but that "by virtue of their proprium, they all have a continual tendency towards hell"§ —"are impure, yea, nothing but evil".||

We think it is a sad defect in this New Church creed, that it holds for fundamental truth such an ineffectual doctrine of regeneration. It leaves the regenerated, in himself, just where, according to the author, it finds him,—*nothing but evil*. How inadequate to the condition of man! How unsatisfactory to all who hate sin and love holiness! What a forlorn hope does it hold out! Vain struggle after an ideal, unattainable good!

The central doctrine of *Redemption* undergoes a similar reconstruction. Its comprehensive definition is—"the subjugation of the hells, and the establishment of order in the heavens, and after this, the institution of a church".¶ In the battle which the Lord fought with the hells in the spiritual world, at the Last Judgment, in the year 1757, "he tore up from their places the hills and mountains which the infernals in the spiritual world occupied, and removed them to distant places, and made some sink down; he deluged their cities, villages and fields with a flood, and tore up their lands and cast them, together with the inhabitants, into whirlpools, bogs, and fens; besides many other things.**

This doctrine of Redemption will strike our readers as new,

* A. C. 894.

† A. C. 4564; D. P. 79, 279.

‡ A. C. 1573.

§ H. H. 596.

|| D. P. 279.

¶ T. C. R. 84, 95.

** T. C. R. 124.

except, perhaps, those to whom the genius of Virgil, Dante, or Milton, may have made it familiar. Although the author assures us that it was "a spiritual battle", the whole aspect is singularly physical and Cyclopean. But does this redemption secure a full deliverance from sin? As it denies the church-doctrine of the Trinity, so it does, with equal explicitness, that of atonement for sin and justification by faith. And it goes still further in its denials. "It is an error of the present age, that evils are thought to be *separated*, yea, cast out when they are remitted. That no evil into which a man is born, and which he actually imbibes, is *separated* from him, but that it is only removed in such a manner that it doth not *appear*, hath been given me to know from heaven. Before that, I was in the belief which most people entertain in this world, that evils, when they are remitted, are cast out, and that they are washed off and wiped away, like dirt from the face, by water. But this is not the case with evils and sins".* "If a man, in his childhood and youth, hath appropriated to himself a certain evil, by doing it from the delight of his love, as, if he hath defrauded, blasphemed, revenged, committed whoredom, then, forasmuch as he hath done these things from liberty according to his thought, he hath also appropriated them to himself. But if he afterwards repenteth, shunneth them, and considers them as sins which are to be abhorred, and thus, from liberty, according to reason, desisteth from them, then there are appropriated to him goods to which those evils are opposite. But *the evils cannot be so cast out as to be said to be extirpated*." "This is the case with all hereditary evil, and at the same time, with all *actual* evil of man".† When sins in the regenerated are removed towards the sides or circumferences of the soul, "it then *appears* as if evils were rejected, and thereby man purified from them, or, as they say, *justified*". Yet all the angels of heaven, who, according to Swedenborg, are only the spirits of redeemed men, "confess that what appertains to them, so far as it is from themselves, is *nothing but evil, and the false thence*". "Those who, while they lived in the world, have confirmed in them, that they are justified and without

* D. P. 279.

† D. P. 79.

sins, and thus that they are holy, are remitted into a state of evils from what is actual, and what is hereditary, and are kept in it, until, by living experience they know that, of themselves, they are *nothing but evil*"; and that "the good in which they had *seemed* to themselves to be, was from the Lord, consequently that it was not theirs, but the Lord's".* He speaks again of those, "who, after death, were taken up by the Lord into heaven, . . but carried with them a belief that they were cleansed and pure from sins, and therefore not in a state of guilt; at length, they came to *boast* that they are no longer sinners like others, and to exercise a degree of *contempt* for others when compared with themselves". "That this imaginary belief may be removed, they are *remanded* from heaven, and let into their evils which they had contracted in the world, and at the same time, it is shown them that they *are in hereditary evils* of which they knew nothing before. And, when they have thus been *forced* to acknowledge that their evils are *not separated* from them, but only removed, and so that of themselves they are *impure*, yea, *nothing but evil*, . . they are again taken up by the Lord into heaven".†

It is not strange that the Christian world, after a hundred years of inculcation, is slow to exchange the old doctrine of redemption for this new one. What is there of "glad tidings" to a lost world in that gospel which leaves sin "uneradicated", and uneradicable to eternity — which does not pardon the sinner till he ceases from all his sins, and holds that, then, he does not *need* pardon? What kind of *salvation* is that which leaves the *saved*, in their best estate, with their evils and sins not "extirpated", not "separated", nor "cast out"; and who, in their own proper nature, are impure, yea, *nothing but evil*? Surely it is not an "imaginary belief" that the redeemed in heaven are purified, justified, and so sanctified by the Lord Jesus that they are without sin; much less is it an offence so great that those who entertain the belief are "remanded from heaven" into the hells, where they are "forced to acknowledge" the doctrines of this new Christianity. It may seem strange to the ordinary reader, that the Lord should send the

* A. C. 4564.

† D. P. 279.

saints out of heaven into the hells, to convince them of this Swedenborgian doctrine that they are still *sinner*s. But the student of the system finds that this is a favorite expedient for securing conviction upon debatable subjects. All discussions in the spiritual world, of which there are many in Swedenborg's writings, end in the triumph of Swedenborg's party. All good spirits become converts to the system, and all who reject it, are bad ones.

In regard to the doctrine of *sin*, it is claimed as an excellence of the new system, that it treats sin and evil as a disease that needs not forgiveness, but *cure*. As a violation of law or order, it is no more capable of atonement by the death of Christ, than a violation of the law of gravitation, or a fit of sickness. The unitive force of the system makes all laws, as Mr. Hayden says, "one in kind", and "of one class". The distinction between moral and natural law is pronounced "man-made, and has no corresponding objectivity in the nature of things". The confounding of all things in one nature, logically necessitates this doctrine of one *law*. Matter and mind, though distinguished nominally by a discrete degree, are "of the same nature". The ethical and physical are the same. Metaphysical science is also mechanical, and Christianity an essential chemistry. Fire is visible love, and ice congealed, stratified hate. Sin is a disease, or infestation, and needs not a mediator, but only a physician or exorcist. It is as absurd to speak of forgiving a fault, as a fall from a precipice, or a fever. But the New Church system does not supply any adequate medical or chemical treatment for the disease. It furnishes neither successful physician, machinist, nor exorcist. Its *Materia Medica* has no more a curative than a pardoning power. The very God-man proves an incompetent Restorer of the breach. The blood of Christ does not cleanse "from all sin", nor from *any* sin. For, of all that come under the dominion of sin, whatever the amount of "opposite goods" he may be kept in, not one finds deliverance.

But there is another step in this analysis, which, if we do not mistake, leaves "disease" only a rhetorical expression for sin, which, in reality, is *substance*. Good is substance. Evil,

as an entity, is the opposite pole of the same one substance. Good is substance at the centre of the spiritual sun, evil the same at the "ends" of the receding atmospheres, or the "circumferences". One is the first "self", the other, the ultimate, or postreme "self". One is Pure, Living, Fluent, Divine, and God; the other is the same substance and nature, gross, dead, fixed, with "the divine pressed out", and Satan. Thus "influential good" or pure substance when it flows into the *forms* of evil, in the ultimates, is turned by them into gross substance and evil. It is on this principle of sin as substance, that neither in regeneration nor in redemption, can it be exterminated, or "made *none*", but only removed to the circumferences. Mr. Fernald accounts for the origin of evil on this theory of his favorite author. "Man derived all his substance from the Creator, but he was so far discreted from the Divine Being, that his substance lost by a necessity which God himself could not prevent, . . . a portion of its perfection, and so was *originally* disordered, and so the origin of evil." Thus, he says, "Man was an imperfect production from the hands of his Creator, and was comparatively evil." This is a logically consistent statement. Man, at the first, did not *become* evil. He was *made* so. Swedenborg's allegorical construction of the first two chapters of Genesis, proceeds upon this view. The first cognition it takes of man as finite or ultimate, is as *needing regeneration*. It knows nothing of a sin or fall, prior to this necessity. And to accommodate the history of the creation of man to this theory, he says, "To create, to form, to make", in the Sacred Record, "signify to *regenerate*".* Nor does his idea of man as a *vegetable* production militate with this theory, viz., that he dropped from "a fruit-tree", which bore "a small egg" on a "parturient branch", into which nature had collected "as into a sort of ark, her most distinguished treasures", and within which "was the first happy token of connubial intercourse of spiritual essence with the supreme aura of nature".† Mr. James thinks the service which Swedenborg has "done to the rational or scientific mind by the light he has cast on the great truth of human solidarity is in-

* A. C. 16.

† Worship and Love of God, pp. 43-50.

calculable". "He shows us that since the world has stood, no man has been chargeable before God with either his moral good or evil, because neither the one nor the other *originates* in the man himself." "In order that God himself should charge us with any of the good or evil which we, with obdurate stupidity, are forever charging upon ourselves, it would be necessary for him first to forget his creative relation to us, and begin to look upon us as essentially *underived* and independent existences, which is absurd."

Hence it is, that, according to the New Church, God never is angry with the wicked. He never curses, or punishes them, in this life or the next.* He does not even judge them, or in any way impute evil to them, or criminate them, or accuse them of it, or condemn them for it. Thus, as a personal Ruler, God makes no *essential* distinction between sin and holiness. He is personally as little pleased with the one, as displeased with the other—a logical result of the *identity* of the human and divine nature, which is the central principle in this New Christianity. Nor do the unregenerate, or the spirits in hell, feel any compunction, regrets, or remorse for sin. Why should they? As God feels no displeasure towards them, on that account, why should they towards themselves? There is a kind of suffering in the hells which the author calls torment, and sometimes, by figure of speech—punishment. But it is purely physical, by "compression", by the "bruising process", by "plates of redhot iron", by sitting on "ant-heaps", and by "gyratory motions" and revolutions upon a tight "rope". All is the *reciprocal* operation or infliction of the infernals upon themselves. Thus *evil* is angry with *itself*, accuses, tries, condemns, and punishes *itself*, through a chemical process by its "odor" or "stench", as do carrion and all excrements. The good are admonished of its presence by the sense of "smell", and the devils perceive the presence of good and truth by snuffing their exhaling "odorous particles". "The imputation of evil after death does not consist in accusation, blame, censure, or in passing judgment, as in

* A. C. 245.

the world ; but the *evil itself* effects this." "And inasmuch as evil is there perceived, as it were in its *odor*, it is *this* which accuses, blames, finds guilty, and judges, not before any particular judge, but before every one who is in good ; and this is what is meant by imputation. The imputation of good is effected in the same manner", that is, by its odor, and the sense of smell.*

A doctrine so essentially new and exclusive would naturally require for its propagation the *instrumentalities* of a New Church. And the church, which, resting its claim on the Bible, announces itself as the only living church—"the church of the Future", would of course be forearmed with expedients for adjusting that Book into conditions of success. What are some of these expedients ? This is one. The almost universally recognized Canon of Scripture is impeached. Thirty-two, out of the sixty-six books of the Bible are excluded, as *not a part of the Word of God* ;—all in the New Testament, except the four Gospels and the Apocalypse, and ten of the Old Testament.† The ground of this exclusion is the doctrine of correspondence. Nothing is the Word which is not divinely inspired, and nothing is thus inspired, which is not written according to correspondence, and hence, has the celestial, spiritual, and natural sense. The Divine Word is a ray of God's pure substance, emitted and extending through the celestial and spiritual spheres into the natural, and is the *same* Divine Substance in each. Hence this "*inscripturated* Word", as well as the Incarnate Word, according to the doctrine of Correspondence, *is* God. "It is *from* Him", says Swedenborg, "and *is Himself*".‡ In 1854, the Executive Committee of the Swedenborgian Convention of the United States, by a Sub-Committee, reported, "That it is expedient to publish a new edition of the Scriptures, containing the books of the Word *only*". It is further reported "that they have made some progress, but have not completed the revision." Prof. Parsons regards it as one of the inestimable

* Brief Exposition, 110 ; C. L. 524.

† A. C. 10, 320-25,9094.

‡ T. C. R. 776.

blessings which the Lord is giving to mankind through his New Church, that the canon of Scripture is now determined and *settled* "for future ages, by the unerring test of the science of Correspondence".

But this doctrine of Correspondence performs still more important services for the New Church. After excluding from the Bible nearly half its books as not divinely inspired, it subsidizes the entire contents of those that remain, by the principles of interpretation which it establishes. As every thing in the Word is written by Correspondence, so nothing in it can be understood except by the same law. According to this law, the genuine doctrine is taught only by the internal sense. But this sense, though contained in the letter of the Word, is so "*concealed*" in it, that it can be discovered only by Correspondence, which is "the key". This locks up the Word and unlocks it. For reasons that seem very satisfactory to Swedenborg, it was hidden from the Apostles, and for seventeen hundred years after, from the entire Christian church, and then given to *him*. With this he claims to have unfolded, by divine and infallible dictation, the genuine doctrine, as the basis of the New Church. What that doctrine is, it has been our main object in this article to show. But when it is confronted by the obvious grammatical and historical sense of the Word, that sense is pronounced the mere covering of the Word, "the skin", the "shell", the "bark and rind", the "husks". "Without the internal sense", says Swedenborg, the Word "may be compared to a sack, balloon, or bladder that is collapsed and flaccid". Thus the defence is withdrawn from the province of ordinary Biblical criticism, within the lines of this occult correspondential sense. Here, in this *terra incognita*, the learned author constructed his chief works, defensive and offensive.

His reputed intromission into the spiritual world, considering the tendencies of men to seek communication with that world, has very considerable strategic force. We believe that this spiritual world, with the Swedish Seer, as with the seers of the present day, was the world of *his own mind*. The spirits and angels were his own thoughts and affections. They could tell

him nothing which he did not know before, or which his own mental or mesmeric processes would not give him. Hence he wisely never ventured to converse with any spirit or angel which he had not known in this world, either from personal acquaintance, from hearsay, or from history. His "intromission" was the external Swedenborg proceeding into the internal Swedenborg. In other words, it was his process of *interior* thought. "They who think much on religious subjects", he says, "and are so intent upon them as to see them, as it were, inwardly, in themselves, begin also to hear spirits speaking with them."* This gives the key to the "Revelations", and the "Seership" of the Swedish Philosopher, for, from the fiftieth year of his age,—he was an intensely religious thinker. It also explains the phenomena of his visions—the great number of spirits he saw—from ten to twenty thousand *daily*. They all converse, lecture, and debate in exactly his vocabulary and style—as a man's thoughts always do. They talk with him at all his waking hours, day and night. They contradict and deny when he hears Old Church preaching, satirizing the English Bishops, who did not favor his new system, in nearly the same words that Swedenborg employed for a similar purpose in his didactic treatises. They even accused him of intemperance, when they thought he ate more bread and milk than was good, as a man who studied much, took little animal food, and much coffee without milk, at all hours, day and night, might, in certain moods, be supposed to rebuke himself.

But the boldest adventure in the New Church polemical strategy, is, in its assault upon the motives and character of some of the most distinguished teachers of the Old Church. In this movement, the author passes from principles to *persons*, from rational argument to the pronouncing of judgment. By the "goats", referred to in Matt. xxv, 31, whom the Saviour condemns to everlasting punishment, he says, are meant those "who are in the present justifying faith of the Old Church†". The Reformers, who, he asserts, entirely separated good works

* H. H. 249.

† B. E. 84, 85.

from justifying faith, because the laity accounted these as necessary to salvation, "*pretended* to insert them into justification merely to tickle the ears of the vulgar"—and "that their system might not appear to contradict the Sacred Scriptures, but have the *semblance* of religion, and thus be *salved over*".* Swedenborg says that Luther, with whom he claims to have spoken about a hundred times in the spiritual world, "owned to him that he received the doctrine of justification by faith alone, *merely* with the intent that he might make an entire separation from Papacy", and this too, "contrary to the warning of an angel".† "There is in the Reformers, a certain deep-seated opposition and aversion to actual repentance, which is so violent that they cannot force themselves to self-examination, and to see their sins, and to confess them before God. They are seized, as it were, with a *certain horror at the very intention of such a thing*."‡

Of the Moravians, whose heroic Christian charity has carried them with the Gospel to the darkest portions of the globe, Swedenborg says: "They had cherished nothing of charity towards their neighbor, and nothing of love to the Lord". The spirits who explored the interiors of their thoughts, declared that they *revile* the Lord, and that they *reject a life of charity, so as even to hold it in abhorrence*.§

Upon some of the inspired penmen, our author is even more severe in his judgments. David, the sweet Psalmist of Israel, notwithstanding his deep penitence, after more than twenty-five hundred years, on the testimony of the Seer, is excluded from heaven as an adulterer, and is without, among dogs and adulterers. The apostle Paul, he professes to have seen often in the spiritual world, and he gives his character as it was there disclosed to him. He accuses him of the most unbounded desire for self-aggrandizement, and of the grossest hypocrisy, and of being governed by these principles after his conversion, as really as before. "He did all things", according to Swedenborg's visions, from "the end of being greatest in heaven", associating himself with other demons "to make

* B. E. 79, 46. † Letter to Ortenger. ‡ B. E. 114. § Last Judgment, 86.

themselves God". He suffered "the bruising process" with adulterers and adultresses, by which it "was made known to all that he is of such a *nefarious character*".*

Contrary to obvious facts, he asserts that Paul "has not mentioned in the epistles the least word of what the Lord taught",—that "he received nothing from the life and discourse of the Lord", that he was not allowed to take one parable or doctrine from Him, and explain it, but that he derived *all from himself*.†

This makes a distinct issue between the chief apostle of the Old Church, and the apostle of the New. Prof. Bush, whose frankness we have always admired, acknowledges that, as New Churchmen they have "to succumb to the charge of defamation, or to attempt to sustain and vindicate the statements" of their author. And he admits the *dogmatic exigencies* which call for the attempt to sustain them. "We recognize in the epistles of Paul the greatest of all obstacles to the spread of the New Church. Nor, until the authority attached in the mind of Christendom to these epistles be *weakened*, do we see how the doctrines of that church are ever to accomplish their transforming work in the world." "What inference remains", he asks, "but that those writings are marked with *falsity*, and consequently cannot be possessed of adequate claims to rank with the truly canonical Scriptures of the Word?" This charge of falsity made by the Professor against the apostle, falls back on the incompatibility of his doctrines with the teachings of Swedenborg. "The prevailing systems of dogmatic theology", he says, "found themselves primarily upon the epistles", and "the whole structure of Calvinism rests upon Paul as its chief corner-stone. Deprived of this basis, where were its so called doctrines of grace?" "And are not these the doctrines whose sanctity is supposed to be assailed by the New Church? Is it not precisely *here* that the antagonism between the two systems mainly betrayed itself?" These doctrines, of which the inspired apostle is admitted as the "chief corner-stone", he characterizes as "Dragonism", a "congeries of falsities", and

* Spiritual Diary, 4561, 4631, 4413, 4412, 4311. † Spiritual Diary, 4412, 4.

as "favoring the natural and sensual man". "The New Church man cannot be built up under a ministration of such falsities, and especially one that *ignores the true object of worship*."

Another able Swedenborgian writer says, "We recognize in the epistles of Paul the original programme of a system of doctrines . . which stands in *diametrical opposition* to the whole genius of the New Church". "And so long as the sanctity and the verity of these epistles stands *unimpeached*, so long must the progress of the Lord's New Church be materially retarded."

These frank statements of the disciples, harmonize with the antagonism of the system as announced by the master. And, what is important, they disclose the *necessity* for the impeachment of the apostle's character and writings. It is purely *dogmatic*. His doctrines are incompatible with the speculations of the Swedish seer; hence they are false, hence not inspired; and hence he must have been a *bad man*, and the church which confirms itself in his doctrines, must be "dragonic" and dead.

This strong antipathy of Swedenborg to the apostle's doctrine and character, extends to his *social ethics*. The reprehension of what the Seer calls scortatory love, is explicit and just. It is "diabolical" and "from hell". But the great defect is in the definition of scortatory love. On the positive side, it includes only that adultery which the offender believes not to be sin, or evil, or "contrary to reason". On the negative side, it excludes, 1. Fornication before marriage, and after the death of a consort. 2. Concubinages, apart from the wife, for a just cause. 3. Mild kinds of adultery.* Cohabitation with a concubine and the wife *at the same time*, is contrary to the conjugal relation; but with the concubine while the wife is set aside, it is not in opposition to, but is "a relative" and part of the same holy covenant. So are fornication and "mild kinds of adultery" parts of it. They are "between what is greatest and what is least of the *same thing*".† Thus these clear infractions of this primal and central divine institution,

* C. L. 423.

† C. L. 425.

are summarily licensed as virtues of the same class, only in a less degree. Excess of fornication is hurtful, and, since but "few" can refrain without "too great restraint", and "damages", and "unknown evils"—there is no other "asylum" than what, "in French is called a *maitresse*". Thus "care is to be taken by parents" to guard their young sons against "immoderate fornications", by opening to them a "refuge" in what is moderate and regular. The occasions which justify this kind of concubinage are various infirmities and social or moral obliquities. The diseases which are a just and sufficient cause, Swedenborg says, after mentioning a large number, are "multifarious"—"cancers and other like ones"—"loss of memory and other like things"—"hernia, and other like diseases". Among other just causes, are "stubbornness, in not obeying what is just", "doing mischief", "excess of luxury", "publishing the secrets of the house", "besides more"—"when the mind of one goes away from the other", and "internal dissimilitude, from which is antipathy".*

Now, this is a very large license. Few libertines have pleaded for a larger. This is also a very indefinite kind of legislation for so delicate a subject—there are so many unmentioned "other like things". And it is worst of all that the offender is constituted judge of what, by this code, justifies his offence. To what insult, ignominy, and brokenness of heart, does such a doctrine doom multitudes of feeble, but faithful wives, and to what a vile slavery to licensed passion, does it give over as many husbands! What a derangement of social order, and prostration of domestic purity and peace, would come from such a trampling down of human and divine law, as is here sanctioned! Nor are these concubinal licenses limited to the unregenerate and sensual. They are as free to the Christian of the New Church, as to the Pagan. Why should they not be? Such a concubinage in this new ethics is not at all repugnant to the conjugal tie, nor does it diminish mutual love and esteem. It is "not against the Christian religion", for conjugal love is "the very jewel of the Christ-

* C. L. 251-253, 470-473.

ian life". It "does not injure the conscience", nor is it "hurtful" in any respect. It is proper, and right, and reasonable, and chaste in all.

That Emanuel Swedenborg should inculcate such a social philosophy, considering the laxness of the age, and the country in which he lived, and what he admits as his "strongest passion", and its long indulgence, is not very surprising. Libertinism was the reputable vice of many among the learned and the scientific. A distinguished Swedenborgian writer says, apologetically of Swedenborg—"His times and his position were such as to foster the corruption of every merely natural man to the utmost"—that his diary, at the age of fifty-five or six, records visions and dreams "grotesque and ludicrous", and "in many instances unquestionably *impure*",—that "the chambers of his imagery are manifestly tainted". But it is difficult to understand the zeal of those of his followers who are of the purest social virtue, in defending and propagating such teachings as infallible, and as making a part of the "heavenly doctrines" of the New Church. Can they really wish to make them prevalent? They hold that no writer does such honor to the divine institution of marriage as Swedenborg. But we have never read any other claiming to be Christian, that so *debased* it, by mixing with it fornication, concubinage, and adultery as of the same essence. Professor Parsons says, the works of Swedenborg "enthroned the majesty of chastity", more than those of any other mortal. This may be true of what Swedenborg *calls* the chastity of moderate fornication and concubinage. But he who breaks down the essential distinction between fornication and marriage,—between a courtesan and a wife, dethrones and *degrades* the latter, and does not know what chastity is. Thus the antagonism of this New Church reaches to the ethical system of the old Church, and sweeps it clean away, as it does its philosophy and Christian doctrine.

The issue, then, which the Swedenborgians join with the Christian Church is not a strife of words, as are too many theological controversies. It is not a debate about forms, or orders, or un-essential doctrines, on a basis of common, fundamental principles. On its own presenting, it assails the

whole Old Church system. It proposes no compromise. It allows no mediation. It began in speculation and a claim to superior charity. It ends in personalities and defamation of character. The war is exterminating. In the spirit of many of the belligerents, it is earnest, and we are bound to believe, *honest*. In some, it is kind, courteous, honorable. But in the intent and expectation of the leaders, it is radical, uncompromising, and exterminating. Will the Church withstand the assault? It has endured many such, as the student of history well knows. It has withstood *this* for a hundred years, and been all the while gaining in vitality and vigor, and we believe it will continue to do so, despite all opposing forces, for "the Lord God in the midst of her is mighty".

ART. IV.—THE HOMERIC DOCTRINE OF SIN, ITS EXPIATION AND ITS PENALTY.

By WILLIAM S. TYLER, D.D., Professor in Amherst, Massachusetts.

HOMER has no word answering in comprehensiveness or depth of meaning to the word sin, as it is used in the Bible; and that for the obvious reason that the consciousness of sin was awakened, the idea of sin was developed, under the peculiar discipline of the Jewish and the Christian dispensations, as they never were among the Greeks or any other people of ancient times. The noun *ἁμαρτία*, which is appropriated to express this idea in the Greek of the New Testament, does not occur in the Homeric poems. The verb *ἁμαρτάνειν* is used often in the sense of missing a mark (Il. 5, 287) or failing of an object (Od. 21, 155), but rarely of a sin against the gods, as in Il. 9, 501. The same verse is also the only instance in which *ὑπερβαίνειν*, the etymological equivalent of our *transgress*, is used in the sense of transgression or trespass: *ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβῇ καὶ ἁμάρτη*, *whenever any one may chance to have transgressed and sinned*, etc., against the gods. The corresponding noun *ὑπερβασία*, *transgression*, occurs infrequently, but al-

ways in a moral sense, of the violation of some law of God or man, as, for instance, the crimes of the suitors (Od. 3, 206 ; 22, 168), the violation of an oath which is an offence especially against Jupiter (Il. 3, 107: μήτις ὑπερβασίῃ Δίος ὀρκία δηλήσεται), and the sins and follies of youth in general (Il. 23, 589).

But the word which is most frequently employed to express wrong doing of every kind, is ἄτη with its corresponding verb. As this word shows most clearly the light in which sin was viewed by the early Greeks, it demands a somewhat careful examination. The radical signification of the word would seem to be a *befooling**, a depriving one of his senses and his reason, as by unseasonable sleep (Od. 10, 68 ; 12, 372) and excess of wine (Od. 21, 295), joined with the influence of evil companions (Od. 10, 68) and the power of destiny or the deity (Od. 11, 61, cf. 12, 372). The idea of some supernatural power or influence seems always to be associated with this befooling, and its ultimate source is always conceived to be the gods or the fates. Hence the Greek imagination, which animated and impersonated every great power, very naturally conceived of Ἄτη as a person, a sort of omnipresent and universal cause of folly and sin, of mischief and misery, who, though the daughter of Jupiter, yet once fooled or misled Jupiter himself, and thenceforth, cast down from heaven to earth, walks with light feet over the heads of men and makes all at times go wrong (Il. 19, 91, cf. 9, 505). Hence too when men come to their senses and see what folly and wrong they have perpetrated, they cast the blame on Ἄτη and so ultimately on Jupiter and the gods (Il. 19, 86-90) ; for the same folly and wrong, which, in the latter part of this remarkable passage, Agamemnon ascribes to the agency of Ἄτη, at the beginning, he refers to Ζεύς, and Μοῖρα and Ἐρινύς.

The passage is thus imperfectly rendered by Pope :

"Nor charge on me, ye Greeks, the dire debate ;
Know, angry Jove and all-compelling Fate,

* I here follow very nearly in the footsteps of Nägelsbach, to whose section on this subject (in his *Homeric Theology*) I am indebted for valuable thoughts and still more for illustrative passages.

With fell Erinys, urged my wrath* that day,
 When from Achilles' arms I forced the prey.
 What then could I against the will of heaven?
 Not by myself but vengeful Até driven;
 She, Jove's daughter, fated to infest
 The race of mortals, entered in my breast.†"

In like manner Priam, blinded by his fondness for the beauteous Helen, and for her paramour, his false and faithless son, relieves her of all responsibility for the war, by laying the blame on the gods (Il. 3, 164-5):

"No crime of thine our present sufferings draws;
 Not thou, but heaven's disposing will, the cause."

Yet Helen, in her reply, condemns and despises herself, and makes no attempt to cast the responsibility on the gods (Il. 3, 180, cf. 241; 6, 344). And Agamemnon elsewhere confesses his folly and wrong, repeating the confession (*ἁσάμην*, 9, 116 and 119) and making no attempt to shift the blame on a higher power; and the very same act of injustice to Achilles which in one place is imputed to an irresistible overruling power, is expressly referred, in another, to the monarch's own pride and self-will (Il. 1, 133, 185, *et passim*). So the riotous suitors and the inconsiderate comrades of Ulysses went under a kind of judicial blindness—nay, under an immediate divine impulse—to their doom (Od. 18, 346); and yet they went yielding to their violent and wanton passions, following their own strong inclinations (Od. 17, 431; *ὑβρεὶ εἰζάντες, ἐπισπόμενοι μένει σφῶ*). And the two ideas are sometimes brought into immediate juxtaposition in striking resemblance to the Scriptures. The suitors, says Homer, were destroyed by the appointment of the gods and by wicked deeds. Even so the betrayer of the Lord Jesus went as it was written of him, and yet went under the impulse of his own blind passions to his own place; and

* Literally, *folly*, wrong, *ἄτην*.

† The Greek is very expressive: *Ἀτὴ ἢ πάντας ἄταυ*. The agent, the action and the effect are all expressed by the same root. *Folly which fools all, infused wild folly (ἄγριον Ἀτὴν) into my bosom*. And this *Folly* is only the executioner of *Jove* and *Fate* and another name for *Erinys*.

though the Redeemer was delivered up according to the *determinate counsel* and *foreknowledge of God*, yet it was with *wicked hands* that his murderers crucified him and put him to death.

In Homer, then, as in the Bible, sin is folly, blindness, madness so strange that it seems explicable only on the supposition of some external, supernatural, blinding and bewildering agency, and yet so fully and so consciously in accordance with the sinner's own inclinations, and in obedience to his own impulses, that he cannot shake off the responsibility. The wicked suitors have no knowledge; they are as unwise as they are unjust:

ἀφραδέων ἐπεὶ οὐτι νοήμονες οὐδὲ δίκαιοι (Od. 2, 282):

they have wrought folly in Ithaca, as great sinners wrought folly in Israel (Josh. vii, 15; Gen. xxxiv, 7), and the whole people will reap the consequences (Od. 2, 239) unless they purge themselves of the iniquity. And this suggests another point of resemblance. In Homer, as in the Bible, sin is misery, calamity of the most dreadful kind; in other words, sin and its punishment are so inseparable, nay, so identical, that they are expressed by the same word. Readers of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures are familiar with this so-called Hebraistic usage. But it is even more striking in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. ἄτη is both sin and suffering, both folly and calamity, sometimes the one idea and sometimes the other being more prominent, but neither at any time wholly excluded*. If the chief idea in any passage is that of folly, yet it is folly leading to calamity, perchance to utter ruin. If on the other hand, calamity seems, in any passage, to be the principal idea, it is still only that calamity which results from folly and moral blindness. The whole history of the suitors is a standing illustration of the great fact in the government of God, that moral blindness leads to deeper blindness, and

* Hence the mistake of Buttmann in making *calamity* the original and principal meaning of the word. Cf. Butt. Lex. sub. v. That it is a mistake, is sufficiently clear from the usage of the word as illustrated in the text.

sin is punished by more aggravated wickedness, *till at length persuasions and entreaties are useless*—such is the very language of the poet (Od. 16, 278)—*for their appointed day of vengeance has already come*. “And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient” (Rom. i, 28).

Man is a frail, feeble, erring and sinful creature, weakest and most to be pitied of all the animals that live and move upon the earth, easily elated by prosperity, and as easily depressed by adversity; impatient under the latter, proud, self-righteous, and self-confident under the former, and too often rebellious under both (Od. 18, 130–140).^{*} As his tempter (Ἄτη) goes about all over the world (πᾶσαν ἐπ’ αἶαν, Il. 9, 506), harming men (βλάπτουσ’ ἀνθρώπους), and tempts all and leads them astray (πάντας δᾶται Il. 19, 91), so sin and misery are universal in the world. In speaking of the race, however, or of themselves, or of their neighbors and acquaintance generally, Homer’s heroes are much more ready to deplore the misery than to condemn the sin. They never say such evil and bitter things of themselves, as David, Isaiah and Job; and nowhere in the Iliad and Odyssey do we read such pictures of human depravity, as we read everywhere in the Law and the Prophets and the Psalms, and not less in the Gospels and the Epistles. “By the law is the knowledge of sin”, even as by the Gospel is its remedy.

But the Gentiles are not *without* law. Even in the Bible of the ancient Greeks, sin is the transgression of law (ὑπερβασία). Law is that which is laid down (θέμεις from θε- root of τίθημι, as *law* from *lay*), settled, established as the course of nature, the custom of society, the usages of mankind, the rights of individuals, families, communities, and nations; in short, the whole natural, social, and moral order of the universe. All this is included in the oft-repeated phrase θέμεις ἐστίν, or ἡ θέμεις ἐστίν, which in different connections means: as it is *right*, as the *custom* is, as is *proper* between man and man, as is *due* to

^{*} This striking passage is quoted below, p. 290.

the host or the guest, as is *befitting* the king and commander, or the subject and the soldier. These various laws, of nature and custom, of right and fitness, are all laws of Jupiter (Διὸς μέγαλοιο θέμιστες, Od. 16, 403), and counsels or purposes of the gods (θεῶν βούλας, *ibid.* 402), which the wise and good man, like Ulysses, will carefully consult before he proceeds to action, and then scrupulously obey (*ibid.*), while the foolish and wicked, like the unreasonable and unjust suitors (οὔτι νόημονες οὐδὲ δίκαιοι) or the mad-cap Arés himself, know no law (οὔτινα οἶδε θέμιστα, Il. 5, 761, cf. Od. 2, 281). Jupiter, with the co-operation of the other gods, is the author and executioner of these laws—their guardian and avenger. Moreover, human laws and governments proceed from him as their original source. He gives the sceptre to whom he will (Il. 2, 205–6); and by him kings reign and princes decree justice; literally, *before him* (πρὸς Διός, Il. 1, 239) they guard and execute the laws. So that all laws, human as well as divine, are clothed with something of divine authority, and all violations of them are sins in the sight of the gods.

The duties that spring from this natural order and divine constitution, fall naturally under the three-fold division common to all ethical systems, and distinctly recognised by Homer (Od. 2, 64–67), of duties to self, duties to fellow-men, and duties to God.

Among the duties which the Homeric hero owes to himself, or the laws which he feels bound to obey, especial prominence is given to the law of self-respect, the sense of personal worth, the pride of ancestral dignity, the desire to excel in bravery, the love of glory, the law of honor, the law of conscience, and the duty of self-control. “Be men, be mindful of yourselves” (Il. 15, 487); “be men, respect yourselves” (*ibid.* 561); “be indignant at the wrong yourselves, while you also regard the good opinion of others” (Od. 2, 64); or as Pope has the two former passages:

“Be mindful of yourselves, your ancient fame;
And spread your glory with the navy’s flame.”

“O Greeks! respect your fame,
Respect yourselves, and learn an honest shame.”

Such are some of the most frequent and stirring appeals which the leaders address to their troops on either side.

"To stand the first in worth as in command,
To add new honors to my native land;
Before my eyes my mighty sires to place,
And emulate the glories of our race."

Such is the education which the Lycian Glaucus boasts to have received from his royal father (Il. 6, 206); and the Trojan Hector declares in the same book (442, seqq.) that he cannot withdraw from the deadly fight even to please his wife, for he not only dreads the reproach of his countrymen and countrywomen, but his own soul scorns the ignoble deed, since he was taught to be always brave, and fight among the foremost ranks for his own glory and the glory of his royal father.

"Juno, my son, and Pallas, if they please,
Can make thee valiant; but thy own big heart
Thyself restrain. Sweet manners win respect."

These are the last words of counsel which the aged Peleus addressed to the youthful Achilles when he set out for the war—words which that impetuous hero did not heed, and so want of self-government blighted all the happiness of his brilliant but brief career. It is just this relinquishing of the helm to the control of the passions instead of the supremacy of reason and conscience, which gives *Atê* the *opportunity* to bewilder and blind the soul still more, and thus work its ruin. And if the man blinded and maddened by passion refuses to listen to entreaty, the very ministers of mercy and mediation between heaven and earth at length turn against him and plead for vengeance (Il. 9, 510). So that even the sins and follies which the man perpetrates under her blinding influence, are voluntary and responsible in their *origin*, and the calamities which he suffers, and which, like the sins, are called *Atê*, are self-caused, being the result of the voluntary abdication of the throne by reason and conscience to unrestrained passion, uncontrolled self-will, or, it may be, excessive pride and self-glorification.

Among the relative duties, none is more earnestly inculcated or more beautifully exemplified than duty to parents. See the filial love and respect with which the manly and heroic Hector, the bulwark at once of his family and of his country, still treats his honored mother (Il. 6, 264, seqq.). See the filial spirit of Telemachus, bound up in the fortunes of his long absent father, performing long journeys by sea and land, to glean tidings of his fate, weeping on his neck at the lodge of Eumæus, defending him, under the guise of a beggar, from the insults of the suitors in the palace, affectionate, confiding, watchful, and obedient to his every word, look, and action, till at length he receives the welcome sign :

“Slings his keen falchion, grasps his spear and stands
Armed bright for battle at his father's side.”

And in living demonstration of the maxim of one of the Seven Sages, that parents may expect from their children that obedience which they themselves paid to their parents, look at that scene near the conclusion of the Odyssey, than which there is scarcely anything more touching in the whole range of history or fiction, where Ulysses, now victorious over all his enemies, reëstablished on his throne, and restored to the embrace of his beloved Penelope, cannot rest till he has sought out the aged Laertes, finds him in his garden clad in rags and toiling at menial employments, weeps in concealment over the sad spectacle, plies his faded memory with facts in their early history to convince him that it is indeed no other than his own long lost Ulysses, and holds him clasped to his bosom, till the old man recovers from the swoon which so unexpected and joyful an event has brought over his bewildered faculties. The boy Telemachus hardly treats his mother with as much respect and deference as the man Hector (for there is scarcely any age at which one submits to maternal authority with so little grace as when he is passing out of his teens); yet he refuses compliance with the demand of the suitors to send her back against her will to her own father's house, and paints in glowing colors the scorn of men (*νέμεσις ἐξ ἀνθρώπων*) and vengeance of the gods (*στρυγερὰς Ἐρινῦς*) which Providence (*δαίμων*) will visit on an undutiful son :

"While thus he speaks, Telemachus replies,
 Even nature starts, and what ye ask, denies.*
 Thus, shall I thus repay a mother's cares,
 Who gave me life, and nursed my infant years?
 How from my father should I vengeance dread!
 How would my mother curse my hated head!
 And while in wrath to vengeful fiends she cries,
 How from their hell would vengeful fiends arise!
 Abhorred by all, accursed my name would grow,
 The earth's disgrace, and human kind my foe!"

In Homer, then, as well as in the Scriptures, "Honor thy father and mother" is "the first commandment with promise"; and the primal curse rests on filial ingratitude and rebellion.

Nearly allied to filial duty is that reverence which is due to age, and which, in Homer as in the Pentateuch, is rendered in the most touching and graceful forms. Priam relies on the united power of both these motives to move the heart of the slayer of his son, and urges the plea with a pathos which even the implacable Achilles cannot resist (Il. 24, 489):

"Ah! think, thou favored of the powers divine!
 Think of thy father's age, and pity mine!
 In me that father's reverend image trace,
 Those silver hairs, that venerable face;
 His trembling limbs, his helpless person see!
 In all my equal, but in misery!
 These words soft pity in the chief inspire.
 Touched with the remembrance of his sire,
 The reverend monarch by the hand he raised,
 On his white beard and form majestic gazed,†
 Not unrelenting: then serene began
 With words to soothe the miserable man."

The Iliad and the Odyssey have each its own matchless picture of conjugal affection and fidelity, the one a Trojan, the other a Grecian pair, the former doomed to a sad parting in the very beginning of their married life, soon after Providence

* Literally it is not possible to banish her from the house. Compare the similar but still more lofty answer of the youthful Joseph when solicited to sin (Gen xxxix, 9): *How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?*

† Οἰκτεῖρων πολλῶν τε κάρη πολλῶν τε γένειον.

had blessed them with a pledge of their mutual love; the latter destined, after long separation and sorrow, to meet and, in a serene old age, to enjoy the reward of their mutual faithfulness, but both, though dead yet speaking, to the hearts of millions, of the honor and blessedness of pure unchanging wedded love. Hector and Andromache, Ulysses and Penelope! when will those names ever be forgotten! And who that remembers them can ever forget the lessons which they teach! Over against them in the Homeric gallery stand another pair blackened and scathed by the indignation of gods and men, standing monuments of the guilt and ruin of conjugal infidelity — Ægisthus and Clytemnestra; a foul adulterer and a faithless friend, who with murderous hand stabbed their lord and king at the friendly feast, and whom, even in Hades, whither they have been sent by the avenging hand of Orestes, the injured and murdered husband still follows with his curses (Od. 11, 409 seqq.):

“O wife! thy deeds disgrace
The perjured sex, and blacken all the race;
And should posterity one virtuous find,
Name Clytemnestra, they will curse the kind.”

While, in Homer as in the Bible, there is thus a peculiar sacredness about the domestic relations, the violation of which brings down the special vengeance of the gods and the Erinyes, the stranger, also, is under the especial protection of Jupiter, who rejoices in the title of Ζεὺς ξένιος, the god of the stranger and the guardian of the rights of hospitality (Il. 13, 624; Od. 14, 389), and who will surely avenge any wrong done to the stranger beneath the roof (Od. 9, 266–71; cf. Deuter. x, 18), as well as to the host, who affords him hospitable entertainment, (Il. 3, 351–4). The fate of Troy and the catastrophe of the Iliad turn on the violation by Paris of the rights at once of the husband and the host, for which double crime the Trojan king and people have rendered themselves responsible by refusing or neglecting to make reparation (Il. 13, 625 seqq.), and must therefore suffer a dreadful overthrow.

With the stranger, the poor and needy, the beggar and the

suppliant are often associated as under the special guardianship of Jupiter :

"Low at thy knee, thy succor we implore,
Respect us, human, and relieve us, poor.
At least some hospitable gift bestow,
'Tis what the happy to th' unhappy owe ;
'Tis what the gods require : those gods revere ;
The poor and stranger are their constant care :
To Jove their cause and their revenge belongs,
He wanders with them and he feels their wrongs." (Od. 9, 266-71.)

It is a violation of established law (*οὐ θέμις ἔστι*) to dishonor the stranger ; for all strangers and beggars are under the protection of Zeus (*πρὸς Διὶς εἶσιν*)—a sentiment often repeated in the *Odyssey* (6, 207 ; 14, 57) ; and the gods and Erinyes are their avengers (17, 475).*

An implacable, unmerciful, unforgiving spirit is often censured as unlike the gods, and unbecoming helpless, dependent mortals. The suitors are as unmerciful as they are unjust ; and the gods do not love cruel and oppressive deeds (Od. 14, 82). The aged friend of Achilles warns him to be merciful as he would obtain mercy, and not to scorn the entreaties of men, lest the gods spurn his prayers (Il. 9, 496).

"Now be thy rage, thy fatal rage resigned ;
A cruel heart ill suits a manly mind :
The gods, the only great, the only wise
Are moved by offerings, vows, and sacrifice.
Prayers are Jove's daughters," etc.
"When man rejects the humble suit they make,
The sire revenges for the daughters' sake."

The argument is of the same *kind* as in the sermon on the mount : Be merciful, for God is merciful ; and forgive, that you may be forgiven.

Human laws are not only called by the same name as divine laws (*θέμωρες*), but are administered under the same divine sanction. Kings and judges execute law and justice as in the presence and with the authority of Jove (*πρὸς Διὶς*,

* The like sentiment is repeated with emphasis in the Old Testament (Ex. xxii, 21 ; Lev. xix, 33 ; Deut. x, 18.

Il. 239). The sceptre and the laws are his gift (Il. 2, 205). Heralds are the messengers of Jove as well as of men (Il. 1, 334). The oaths by which treaties are ratified and justice administered are witnessed by Zeus (Il. 3, 276), and are even called his oaths (*Διὸς ὅρκια*, Il. 3, 107); and though he may fail immediately to punish the violation of them, he will sooner or later accomplish the vengeance to which he is pledged (Il. 4, 161), and Pluto, Proserpina (Il. 3, 278) and the Erinyes (Il. 19, 260) will be his unfailing executioners:

“Not thus our vows, confirmed with wine and gore,
Those hands we plighted and those oaths we swore,
Shall all be vain; when heaven’s revenge is slow,
Jove but prepares to strike the fiercer blow.
The day shall come, the great avenging day,
Which Troy’s proud glories in the dust shall lay.
I see th’ Eternal all his fury shed
And shake his ægis o’er their guilty head.
Such mighty woes on perjured princes wait.”

Those who, like the suitors, disregard the rights of men, are also charged, as in the form of indictment for murder in the English law, with having no fear of God before their eyes:

“Laws or divine or human failed to move,
Or shame of men or dread of gods above.”

Such is the indictment of Ulysses against the suitors, who had long promised themselves impunity, but who now, at length, are overtaken with sudden vengeance (Od. 22, 25).

The chief duties to the gods are respect for their persons, worship at their altars, obedience to their commands, and submission to their will.

The penalty of a direct insult to any divine personage, though it be an infant god or a god disguised in human form, is death. At least those who dare offer such a personal affront to deity, never prosper, and never live long upon the earth:

“Know thou, whoe’er with heavenly powers contends,
Short is his date, and soon his glory ends;
From fields of death when late he shall retire,
No infant on his knees shall call him sire.” (Il. 5, 406-9.)

"Not long Lycurgus viewed the golden light,
 That daring man who mixed with gods in fight,
 Nor failed the crime th' immortals' wrath to move,
 Th' immortals blessed with endless ease above;
 Deprived of sight by their avenging doom,
 Cheerless he moved and wandered in the gloom:
 Then sunk unpitied to the dim abodes,
 A wretch accursed and hated by the gods." (Il. 6, 136 seqq.)

A sentiment not unlike the woe which the Scriptures denounce on him who striveth with his Maker, but how inferior in moral dignity and sublimity!

Men may expect to enjoy the favor of the gods in proportion to the frequency, abundance, and richness of the vows and prayers, sacrifices and offerings which they bring to their altars. Throughout the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the gods are represented as moved by such offerings at their respective temples very much as earthly sovereigns are won by presents and obeisances offered in their courts, insomuch that Poseidon rescues Æneas on the score of his constant and acceptable offerings (Il. 20, 298), and Zeus is almost tempted to contravene the decrees of destiny in favor of Hector, because he has burned so many fat bullocks on his altar (Il. 22, 170, cf. 179). When we read of Nestor sacrificing to Poseidon at nine altars, and nine bullocks on each altar (Od. 3, 7), we are reminded of the thousands of victims which Solomon sacrificed, in the middle of the court as well as on the brazen altar, at the dedication of the temple, though the latter far exceeds the former in the costliness of his sacrifices, as well as in the grandeur and sacredness of the occasion. The neglect to honor any god or goddess with sacrifices which they regard as their due, especially the slight implied in his or her omission while other divinities receive their due honors, is an unpardonable offence. Thus the far-famed Calydonian boar was sent upon the Ætolians in vengeance for neglected sacrifice, because while the other gods were rejoicing in their hecatombs, to Artemis alone Æneus, king of the Ætolians, had brought none of the first-fruits of his fields and vineyards; whether the slight was intentional or not, it was a great mis-

take and a great sin (*δάσατο δὲ μέγα θυμῷ*, Il. 9, 537); and the fields and vineyards of Æneus must pay the penalty, and the whole nation must be involved in a calamitous war to expiate the offence (Il. 9, 535 seqq.).

An affront offered to a priest or other representative of a god, like an offence against his person or his altar, provokes the divine vengeance. It was Agamemnon's insult to the priest of Apollo and refusal to restore his daughter that brought the pestilence on the Grecian host and gave occasion to the wrath of Achilles, which was more fatal than the pestilence itself, to the Grecian cause; for in this case as in the somewhat similar case of David, the sin of the monarch was visited primarily on the people and the king was punished, and punished sorely, *through* the calamities that fell on them (Il. 1, passim, cf. 2 Sam. xxiv).

Robbed of his own captive prize in revenge for proposing the return of Agamemnon's, Achilles is ready to draw his sword and slay the monarch in the very midst of his assembled army. But Athene, sent by the queen of the gods, presents herself before him and bids him restrain his anger, "command his passions and the gods obey". Achilles instantly obeys, and assigns this good reason for obedience:

"Hard as it is, my vengeance I suppress;
Those who revere the gods, the gods will bless."

There is no conviction more deeply inwrought into the minds of all the leading men of both sides in the Trojan war, than this: not so much the right of gods to command as their power to bless or curse; not so much the duty of obeying the gods, but the sure reward of obedience and the certain punishment of disobedience; and there is scarcely a book in the Iliad or the Odyssey that does not furnish a practical commentary both on the belief and its realization.

From this same superiority of power on the part of the immortal gods over short-lived and changeful mortals, results the wisdom and necessity as well as the duty of fear (Od. 4, 389), of reverence (*αἰδέοιο θεούς*, Od. 9, 269; Il. 24, 503), of silent and unquestioning submission to their will: Do not by

any means, yielding to folly and rashness, talk large (*μέγα εἰπεῖν*), but leave the matter to the gods,* since they are far more powerful (Od. 22, 287). Such is the sage counsel of the disguised Ulysses to one of the haughty suitors, while in giving the like advice to another, he indulges still more his natural vein of reflection and argument (Od. 18, 130):

"Of all that breathes or grovelling creeps on earth,
Most vain is man! calamitous by birth:
To-day with power elate, in strength he blooms;
The haughty creature on that power presumes:
Anon from heaven a sad reverse he feels;
Untaught to bear, 'gainst heaven the wretch rebels.
For man is changeful as his bliss or woe;
Too high when prosperous, when distressed too low,
Then let not man be proud; but firm of mind,
Bear the best humbly and the worst resigned;
Be dumb† when heaven afflicts, unlike yon train
Of haughty spoilers insolently vain."

But his warnings are unavailing. Spoiled by prosperity and self-gratification, they all perish guilty at once of robbery towards man and rebellion against the gods. And not a few of the Grecian heroes triumph over the Trojans in the war only to fall victims to their own pride, folly and self-will on their return to their native land, thus lending the sanction of the greatest of Greek poets to the proverb of the wisest of Hebrew kings: The prosperity of fools shall destroy them. Ajax, the son of Oileus, is the most conspicuous warning, who, though wrecked and cast upon a rock, sinned greatly (*μέγ' ἁσέθη*,‡ Od. 4, 503) by declaring that he would escape in spite of the gods, and so Poseidon smote the rock with his trident and soon sunk the rebel in the depths of the sea. And Agamemnon and Achilles, though neither of them directly rebels or opposes the will of heaven, yet both of them encroach too nearly, though in very different ways, on the prerogatives of

* *θεοῖσιν μῦθον ἐπιτρέψαι*, cf. Ps. xxxviii, 5: Commit thy way to the Lord.

† *συγῆ*; literally, let him keep in silence the gifts of the gods, whatever from time to time they may give (appoint).

‡ This expressive phrase is repeated half a dozen times on the same subject, and occurs often in Homer.

the gods; and the brilliant, self-willed and passionate career of the latter comes to a speedy conclusion before the fall of Troy, while the former triumphs over his enemies only to perish ingloriously in the embrace of his friends.

The paramount fundamental principle, then, which Homer inculcates in regard to sin is, that it is sure to meet with deserved punishment. For this, both parties habitually pray:

"Whoe'er involved us in this dire debate,
Oh! give that author of the war to fate." (Il. 3, 320.)
"Give me, just Jove, to punish lawless lust,
And lay the Trojan gasping in the dust;
Destroy the aggressor, aid my righteous cause,
Avenge the breach of hospitable laws!
Let this example future times reclaim,
And guard from wrong fair friendship's holy name." (Il. 3, 351.)

This they confidently expect. Jove will not be an abettor of falsehood and perjury (Il. 4, 235). Solemn treaties and sacred oaths cannot be violated with impunity (Il. 4, 158).

"When heaven's revenge is slow,
Jove but prepares to strike the fiercer blow.
The day shall come, the great avenging day,
Which Troy's proud glories in the dust shall lay,
'Tis not for us, but guilty Troy to dread,
Whose crimes sit heavy on her perjured head."

And these prayers are heard, these expectations are realized; in the progress of the war and in the final issue, justice usually prevails, and crime generally meets with its deserved punishment.

These passages illustrate also the object or end of punishment. It is partly to satisfy divine justice or hatred of sin, and partly to deter others from transgression. Zeus is angry with fraud and wrong, and therefore shakes his dreadful ægis over the wicked (Il. 4, 168), and others will fear to repeat the crime, even in future generations (Il. 3, 353).

Punishment is the penalty due to sin; or, to use a favorite expression of Homer, not unusual in the Scriptures also, it is the *payment* of the debt incurred by sin. When he is pun-

ished, the criminal is said to pay off, or pay back (*ἀποτίνειν*) his crimes ; in other words, to expiate or atone for them :

*σύν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτισαν,
ὄν σφῆσιν κεφαλῇσι, γυναιξὶ τε καὶ τεκέεσσιν. (Il. 4, 161-2.)*

i. e. they shall pay off, pay back, atone, etc. for their treachery, with a great price, with their lives, and their wives and children. Or rather to show the certainty of this atonement, the past tense is used and they are represented as having already made the atonement.* The same verb is used of the suitors, with an accusative of the crime to be expiated or atoned for :

πρὶν πᾶσαν μνηστῆρας ὑπερβασίην ἀποτίσαι. (Od. 13, 193.)

"Till the suitors shall have atoned for all their transgression."

The middle voice of the same verb is employed in the sense to *get* payment for an offence, to *take* satisfaction for a crime, in other words, to take vengeance on the offender and punish the criminal (Od. 3, 206, 216). The prevailing sentiment of the Iliad and Odyssey is that punishment is the proper and only proper expiation of sin.

At the same time the doctrine is expressly taught that the gods may and sometimes do remit the penalty, when duly propitiated by prayers and sacrifices accompanied by suitable reparation :

"The gods, the only great and only wise,
Are moved by offerings, vows and sacrifice ;
Offending man their high compassion wins,
And daily prayers atone for daily sins.
Prayers are Jove's daughters, of celestial race,
Lame are their feet and wrinkled is their face ;
With humble mien and with dejected eyes,
Constant they follow where Injustice flies ;
Injustice swift, erect and unconfined,
Sweeps the wide earth and tramples o'er mankind,
While Prayers, to heal her wrongs, move slow behind.

* Cf. Rom. viii, 30 : *οὓς δὲ ἐδικαίωσεν, τούτους καὶ ἐδόξασε* : Whom he justified, them he also glorified, though the glorification was not yet accomplished, but it was the certain result of the justification.

Who hears these daughters of almighty Jove,
 For him they mediate to the throne above :
 When man rejects the humble suit they make,
 The sire revenges for the daughters' sake.
 From Jove commissioned, fierce Injustice then
 Descends to punish unrelenting men." (Il. 9, 497, seqq.)

There are many points of great interest in this remarkable passage. In the first place, *Sin* ('Ατῆ, rendered Injustice by Pope) is here made to be the punishment of sin unrepented and unforgiven. In the second place, it is expressly taught, that the gods are sometimes propitiated and turned from their purpose (παράτροπῶσ') to punish sin by prayers, vows and sacrifices offered by the sinner. In the third place, Prayers are impersonated and represented as mediators between heaven and earth, daughters of Jove and divine, yet meek and lowly, feeble and *marred*, who, when accepted by the sinner, intercede in his behalf with the King of gods and men, but, if rejected, plead for double vengeance on his head.*

We have a practical illustration of this doctrine in the first book of the Iliad, where Apollo averts the pestilence from the army, when the daughter of 'his priest is returned without ransom, and a sacrifice (ἐκατόμβη, v. 447) is sent to the altar of the god at sacred Chrysa. Here, too, there is an intercessor, whose prayers accompany the offerings and make sure their acceptance with the god, and that no other than the injured priest whose wrongs had first brought the pestilence upon the Grecian host. Apollo hearkens to the intercession of his priest, accepts the sacred hecatomb, is delighted with the accompanying songs and libations, and sends back the embassy with a favoring breeze and a favorable answer to the army, who meanwhile have been purifying themselves (ἀπελνμαίνοντο, v. 314) and offering unblemished hecatombs of bulls and goats on the shore of the sea which washes the place of their encampment.

The question has been raised, whether in this and the like

* Hence these Prayers ('Απαί) become Curses in other passages in the Iliad (12, 334), and in the Attic tragedies, another name for the Erinyes (Soph. Eum. 417).

cases in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* we have a proper *sin*-offering which is supposed to have a truly atoning and piacular efficacy, or whether it is only in the nature of a gift accompanying the prayers, like presents to an earthly sovereign, and intended to add efficiency to the reconciling power of the petitions. It is not easy to meet this question with a decisive answer. The manner in which the gods speak of these sacrifices as their prerogative and portion (τὸ γὰρ λάχομεν γέρας ἡμεῖς, *Il.* 4, 49, et passim) and the personal, not to say animal, rather than moral satisfaction with which they receive and enjoy the δαῖτος ἐίσης, λουβῆς τε κνίσσης τε (*ibid.* 48), favor the latter supposition. At the same time, the accompanying rites and ceremonies, the forms of expression and sometimes the expressed object of the sacrifice bear a striking resemblance to those of the Israelites in the Old Testament and suggest a similar original intention, though they have already lost not a little of their high and sacred moral significance. The object of the propitiatory embassy to Apollo in the first book, for example, is thus stated by Ulysses: Agamemnon, king of men, has sent me to bring thy daughter, Chryses, and to offer a sacred *hecatomb* for (ὕπέρ) the Greeks, that we may propitiate (ἱλασόμεσθα) the king who now sends woes and many groans upon the Argives; and the language certainly approximates at several points very closely to that of the Pentateuch, and of the Epistles to the Romans, and the Hebrews. Again, the sacrificial lambs and cups of wine, which were offered in ratification of a solemn treaty, represented the parties to the treaty, and symbolically bore the curse of its violation; hence they could not be eaten and drunk, but the wine was poured out on the ground as an offering to the gods, with the accompanying imprecation: So let their brains be poured upon the ground who first break the treaty, and the lambs, if sacrificed, by the people of the country, were buried in the ground; if by strangers, were thrown into a sea or river (*Il.* 3, 291 seqq.; 19, 267).*

As to the punishment of sin in another world, Homer is explicit only in regard to great criminals, such as perjured

* Cf. Owen's *Iliad*, 3, 310, and Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities, under *Oath*.

persons and those guilty of unnatural crimes towards men, or rebellion against the gods. Pluto, Proserpine and the Eri-nyes are habitually invoked as the powers that under the earth punish departed souls who have sworn falsely (Il. 3, 277; 19, 259). And Ulysses, in his visit to Hades, sees Tityus, Tantalus, Sisyphus, and the like monsters of iniquity, suffering perpetual tortures corresponding to their crimes (Od. 11, 576. seqq.).

"There Tityus large and long, in fetters bound,
O'erspreads nine acres of infernal ground;
Two ravenous vultures, furious for their food,
Scream o'er the fiend and raven in his blood,
Incessant gore the liver in his breast,
The immortal liver grows, and gives th' immortal feast.

"There Tantalus, along the Stygian bounds,
Pours out deep groans (with groans all hell resounds);
Even in the circling floods refreshment craves,
And pines with thirst amidst a sea of waves;
When to the water he his lip applies,
Back from his lip the treacherous water flies.

"Next he beholds Sisyphus:
With many a weary step, and many a groan,
Up the high hill he heaves a huge round stone;
The huge round stone resulting with a bound,
Thunders impetuous down and smokes along the ground.
Again the restless orb his toil renews,
Dust mounts in clouds and sweat descends in dews."

In general, the lower world, as represented by Homer in his famous *Nekyia*, is not so much a state of retribution, as an image and shadow of the present life, where mortals all live again, or rather live on, and live forever, retaining the same character and habits and following the same or similar pursuits, as they followed and possessed in the upper world—an idea of future existence, which seems to have prevailed among simple people and in barbarous tribes in all ages from the earliest inhabitants of the East to the aboriginal tribes of our western wilderness, as is evidenced by the articles which they bury with their dead and the offerings which they bring to the graves of departed friends. Thus Orion is a giant hunter still, and still drives the savage beasts before him with his pon-

derous club, while Minos still bears a golden sceptre and administers justice to the dead, and Agamemnon, Ajax and Achilles each preserves unchanged and unchangeable the essential character which he had when he trod the earth and breathed the upper air. Positive punishment seems to be inflicted only on heinous offenders. Others reap the natural consequences of their conduct in this life; only their character is there as unalterable as their state, and their ruling passions are intensified at the same time that they are removed beyond the reach of those objects which on earth afforded them gratification. Thus amid error and obscurity, Homer bears testimony to the great doctrine of retribution, and the soul of man everywhere intuitively believes not only in its own immortality but in that fundamental doctrine of revelation as an eternal and immutable law of its being: Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.

ART. V.—THE PERPETUAL OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH.

By PROFESSOR EGBERT C. SMYTH, Bowdoin College, Me.

THE SABBATH IN NEW YORK. Document No. I of the New York Sabbath Committee. THE CIVIL SABBATH RESTORED. Document No. XV. SUNDAY. ITS ORIGIN, HISTORY, AND PRESENT OBLIGATION. Considered in eight Lectures, preached before the University of Oxford in the year 1860, on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton. By JAMES AUGUSTUS HESSEY, D.C.L., Head Master of Merchant Taylor's School, Select Preacher in the University, etc., etc.

THE New York Sabbath Committee was formed at a meeting of citizens held in April, 1857. Its organization, however, was not completed until November of that year, when Rev. R. S. Cook was chosen Secretary. We have placed at the head of this article the title of the first document issued by this Committee, with that of one of the most recent. The motto of this last pamphlet—*The Civil Sabbath Restored*—is

a just and suggestive summary of the remarkably successful labors of the Committee.

Four years since, the Lord's day in our commercial metropolis was rapidly assimilating in appearance to the form which it has assumed in the capitals of Europe. Although there was a wide-spread and powerful sentiment of respect for the day as of divine obligation, manifold customs destructive of a civil rest-day had gained footing, and were rapidly acquiring alarming power. The census of 1855 gave as the population of the city, 629,810. A careful inquiry, instituted by the Committee, disclosed the fact that 9,692 places were opened for business and amusement on the Lord's day, that is, about one place to every sixty-five of the entire population. Through the efforts of the Committee the attention of the friends of religion was turned to this gigantic evil. The sound Sabbath sentiment of the community was successfully rallied for reform. We have not space to review the progress of the work, and must be content with referring to the admirable publications of the Committee in which its history is given. Let it be put on record, however, that a score or Sunday theatres have been closed, the liquor traffic greatly restricted, Sunday news-crying abolished, much useful labor expended among the foreign population, documents in German and English prepared and distributed in great numbers, a manifest advance secured in the popular apprehension of the claims and benefits of the civil Sabbath, the legal right of every man to a weekly season of repose and worship, vindicated; and, in brief, "a Sunday characterized by traffic, noise, drunkenness and vice", made to give place to "a Sabbath marked by refreshing stillness and sobriety", and an impulse given to similar reformatory movements in other large cities in this country, and also across the Atlantic.

Such results are a sufficient proof of the wisdom and energy with which the efforts of the Committee have been conducted. They shed light also upon the true method of prosecuting reformatory measures under a free government. The success which in so large measure has attended the enterprise to which we have referred is manifestly, in great part, due to

the just conceptions its authors have entertained of the Christian theory of reform. Frankly avowing their principles, and tenaciously adhering to them, they have avoided theoretical entanglements, casuistry and logomachy. Aiming at feasible ends, they have made practical issues. No ground has been taken from which they have been forced to retreat. Every advance has been a victory. Relying upon the power of truth, they have wasted no time in crimination and recrimination. Believing in the instrumentalities divinely instituted, they have used them quietly and perseveringly, without adding or working any noisy machinery. The country at large has known little of their labors. Even in the city of New York, few appreciated the importance and power of the movement until the end was in many particulars gained. It is refreshing to witness this practical faith in truth, and in the efficiency of calm, quiet, manly, Christian action.

It is evident that this reform could not have met with so speedy and signal success had it not been for a widely diffused and influential reverence for the sanctity of the Lord's day. This sentiment pervades the American mind. The venerable Duponceau, after long familiarity with our people, remarked, "that of all we claimed as characteristic, our observance of the Sabbath is the only one truly national and American, and for this cause, if for no other, he trusted it would never lose its hold on our affections and patriotism". With us Sunday has always been a day of piety and rest, a holy day, and not a holiday. As such it is entrenched in the heart of the nation, in our religious creeds, in our civil legislation. Never, we are disposed to believe, notwithstanding the diversity and power of foreign elements which have entered into the national life — never has the institution of the Sabbath stood among us more firmly than now. This is the omen afforded by the movement to which we have referred in our commercial metropolis. There the danger from foreign immigration, and other well-known causes, was greatest, and there the public sentiment has been shown to be sound and right. Even more significant is the fact that although we have recently had occasion to apply to our condition the old maxim — *inter*

arma, silent leges—the law of the Sabbath has maintained its authority. Soon after taking command of the army of the Potomac, Major-General McClellan issued the following general order :

"The Major-General commanding desires and requests that in future there may be more perfect respect for the Sabbath on the part of his command. We are fighting in a holy cause, and should endeavor to deserve the benign favor of the Creator. Unless in case of an attack by the enemy, or some other extreme military necessity, it is commended to commanding-officers, that all work shall be suspended on the Sabbath ; that no unnecessary movements shall be made on that day ; that the men shall, so far as possible, be permitted to rest from their labors ; that they shall attend divine service after the customary Sunday morning inspection, and that officers and men shall alike use their influence to insure the utmost decorum and quiet on that day. The General commanding regards this as no idle form. One day's rest in seven is necessary to men and animals ; more than this, the observance of the holy day of the God of mercy and of battles is our sacred duty."

Since his promotion to be General-in-Chief of the armies of the United States, the author of the above has issued a further order in the same spirit. They reflect the prevailing, the powerfully predominant sentiment of the country at the present hour, while in tone and phraseology they are true to our Puritan traditions.

So intimately connected is the weekly observance of a day of rest and devotion with the public welfare, so essential is it to the interests of morality and piety, that we gladly welcome any intelligent and earnest effort to enforce its obligation. To this meed of praise the Bampton Lectures for 1860 are fairly entitled. Their author is an English clergyman of the Established Church, a graduate of Oxford, and some time Fellow of St. John's College. He is evidently, as his election to the office of Bampton Lecturer would fairly lead us to presume, a man of good natural abilities, trained after the most approved English fashion. By the terms of the Bampton foundation, the eight annual lectures, for which it provides, must be delivered in about a year after the appointment of the lecturer, and be printed within two months after they are preached. Dr. H.'s book gives evidence that he has chosen a theme

which for a much longer period has occupied his thoughts. To the eight prescribed lectures he has added a body of notes covering, in smaller type, more than half as many pages as the text. These exhibit a somewhat wide range of reading, and extensive preparation for the discussions of the Lectures. We wish, however, that more space had been found for the critical examination of important points necessarily treated imperfectly in the discourses. The object of the Bampton Lectures is to defend and confirm the Christian faith. The lecture form of the series ordinarily requires, if a higher purpose is to be served than that of immediate popular impression, that there should be room, outside of the text, for discussions whose details cannot well be introduced into a sermon, though it be preached to a University audience. The value of such an apologetic manual would be increased if instead of extended illustrative quotations, often from authors of no higher reputation than the Lecturer, there were a more thorough grounding, or further extension, of results assumed in the body of the work.

The first lecture in the course is occupied with a statement of existing theories respecting the Sabbath and Lord's day. The most general division of opinions is into two classes, which are termed, respectively, Sabbatarian and Dominical. The former term is used in no invidious sense, but merely as a convenient designation of all theories which trace the obligation of the Lord's day in any form directly to the Decalogue, or apply to the Christian day the law of the Sabbath. The latter term covers the views of all who make the Lord's day a purely Christian institution.

The last lecture is a practical application of the views elucidated in the previous discourses. The intervening sermons are chiefly historical. These are instructive and candid in their presentation of facts, and deserve attention. With all of the conclusions reached we cannot concur; and especially in some of his arguments founded upon utterances of the Fathers, and of the Reformers, we think that our author has not exercised one of the most important attributes of a good historian, the power of criticising opinions from the point of view occupied by their authors and advocates.

It is well known that several estimable and influential members of the Church of England have recently inculcated opinions respecting the origin and obligation of the Lord's day, which sever it from any divine sanction. Dr. Arnold cuts it off entirely from direct Scriptural supports, and appears to regard it as supplemental to Christianity. The Apostles, Paul at least, expected that the Gospel would raise men above the need of Sabbaths. But the "old sickness" remained, and the "old remedy" was found to be still necessary. Accordingly, while with the best of the Quakers, he finds no direct Scriptural warrant for setting one day in seven apart, with them also he earnestly deprecates as "most michievous" anything tending to weaken the respect paid to the Lord's day.* Mr. F. W. Robertson, following in the same track with less caution, preaches eloquently and popularly, from a text, whose genuineness, in the clause upon which he relies, is not altogether firmly established, upon the religious non-observance of the day; and, like the reasoners whom Paul long ago refuted, attributes the moral corruption and wickedness of criminals, whose career of iniquity began with Sabbath-breaking, to the restrictions of the law.† Mr. Alford infers from Romans xiv, 5, "that Sabbatical obligation to keep any day, whether seventh or first, was not recognized in apostolic times; and that the observance of the Lord's day is only binding on us from considerations of humanity and religious expediency, and by the rules of that branch of the Church in which Providence has placed us".‡ In Archbishop Whately's view, the Lord's day is a festival purely Christian, "observed in conformity with the practice of the Apostles and their followers in every Christian church from their time downwards".§ To the Apostles, however, in this particular he does not attribute any higher power than the Church now possesses, so that his view is substantially the ecclesiastical one.|| Others still, as we understand Dr.

* See, in Stanley's *Life and Correspondence*, Letters to his Sister, to Mr. Newton, and to Mr. Justice Coleridge.

† Sydenham Palace Sermon. Sermons, Second Series, No. 14.

‡ Commentary on the New Testament.

§ Essays. Second Series, Essay 5, n. p. 128.

|| Thoughts on the Sabbath, p. 18, referred to by Dr. Hessey, p. 189.

Hessey to intimate, adopt the theory recently advocated by Hengstenberg. All authoritative institution of the day, whether Ecclesiastical, Mosaic, or ante-Mosaic, is discarded; and its observance is supposed to have sprung from the desire of the first disciples to honor the memory of their divine Master. The same sentiment has perpetuated the honor originally paid to the day on which the Saviour rose. As all genuine Christian feeling is the fruit of the Holy Spirit, in a secondary sense the day is of divine ordination.*

These views of Sunday, obviously more or less directly impeach the completeness of the Scriptures. The necessity of the Lord's day is conceded. As human nature is, religion cannot thrive without it. Yet all Scriptural authority is denied it. Paul did not contemplate it as a part of the Christianity he enforced. It arose out of a need he did not provide for—perhaps did not foresee. To this extent, therefore, the Gospel is insufficient to meet the inevitable demands of human nature, if that nature is to be brought under the power of the Gospel. The written word is in this matter not a sufficient rule of faith and practice.

These theories also transfer to the domain of ecclesiastical authority the whole question of the Lord's day. Whether or not such a day shall be observed at all, or how often it shall recur, are matters as purely dependent upon the decisions and rubrics of the Church, as is the regulation of the order and forms of public worship. The same power, for example, whatever that may be, which ordains that there shall be on the first day of the week two or three public services, and within certain limits decides in what these shall consist, is, upon any ecclesiastical theory of the Lord's day, equally competent to abolish Sundays altogether. *Qui habet institutionem habet destitutionem*—or, as Dr. Hessey well paraphrases, "If the Church made the first day holy, she may make any other day holy instead; she may change the cycle, she may enlarge it indefinitely, she may get rid of holy days altogether" (p. 190).

* Hessey, p. 349. Hengstenberg, *The Lord's Day*. Translated for Clark's Foreign Theol. Lib.

Although ranking himself on the side of those who maintain what he styles the Dominical theory, Dr. H. takes a position which he thinks precludes such results. In his view the Lord's day is a positive Christian institution, ordained of God through his Apostles, as indicated in his inspired word, and not to pass away, until the close of the dispensation to which it belongs. The resurrection of our Lord upon the first day of the week, and his repeated appearance to his disciples on that day and the corresponding one of the succeeding week, together with the miracle, and the religious communications, of Pentecost—which in that year occurred on the first day of the week—signalized the day as one with which peculiar associations must ever be connected by those who hear "the Gospel of the Resurrection". These facts, notwithstanding Mr. Baden Powell's sneer at "visionary interpreters",* are at least sufficient to designate the first day of the week as one deserving especial honor, if, under the Christian dispensation, any day is to be set apart for religious purposes. That this condition was fulfilled is rendered in a high degree probable by various allusions in the New Testament implying an established custom, on the part of Christian believers, of assembling on the first day of the week for religious instruction and exhortation, for the celebration of the eucharist, and the collection of alms.† Especially important is the language of the Apostle John, in which he designates the first day of the week—so his words must be applied,—as the Lord's day. There is a matter of course way of alluding to the day as of peculiar religious significance, here and elsewhere noticeable, which is of great value. What the New Testament itself thus makes highly probable, the testimony of the principal writers of the two centuries immediately succeeding the death of John fully establishes. Unanimously, and with explicitness, they refer to the day as one held in especial honor, and received by them, "as a part and parcel of what was recognised as Scriptural (not merely as Ecclesiastical) Christianity". We have

* Article on the Lord's Day. Kitto's Cyclopædia of Bib. Lit. vol. ii, page 269.

† Acts xx, 7. Heb. x, 25. 1 Cor. xvi, 1, 2.

nowhere seen this evidence more fully and pertinently exhibited than it is by Dr. H. The following comments upon the difficulty felt by some on account of the paucity of the allusions made by the New Testament writers to the day, are well worth attention.

"It is impossible to estimate the comparative importance of an institution in the ancient Church by the mere number of times on which it is mentioned. The Sabbath is seldom spoken of in the historical parts of the Old Testament, albeit it was the sign between God and the Israelites. It was always and everywhere implied. So the Lord's day was implied under Christianity. For it should be borne in mind that the Κυριακή Ἡμέρα of old was the day on which the Κυριακὸν Δείπνον was celebrated, on which Christians realized their connection with Christ and with each other, in a word, their 'risen life', most especially. He who absented himself from this ordinance virtually severed himself from 'the Body of Christ' and relapsed into heathenism. It was, therefore, scarcely necessary, in addressing those who had no earthly inducements to be Christians, but had rather every discouragement to being such, to urge them to honor the Lord's day. Their visible joining in the ordinance of the Holy Eucharist was of itself a doing honor to the day on which it is celebrated. Afterwards . . . the tone of Christian writers altered considerably. It seemed necessary . . . to warn Christians to observe the Lord's day, and to partake in the Lord's Supper. . . . So far, then, from considering the infrequency of exhortation to keep the Lord's day to be an argument that it was not held by the primitive Christians to be a scriptural institution, I conceive that it is an argument which tells just the other way. I should have been surprised to find more said about it. I should have suspected either the genuineness of the documents put into my hands, or a latent distrust on the part of the writers as to the *status* of the institution." (Pp. 68, 69.)

With our author's view of the Lord's day as a positive institution of Christianity we entirely concur. Received by the Church from the Apostles, it has a higher than ecclesiastical sanction. It does not come under the category of those things which any church "hath authority to ordain, change, or abolish". Neither is it the mere creature of Christian instincts and sacred memories, nor of the general influence of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of believers. It is the fruit of an inspiration peculiar to Apostles, an inspiration which infallibly guided them in their work of founding, and, so far as necessary, organizing Christian churches. Resting upon these con-

clusions Dr. H. discards all other Scriptural supports of the Lord's day as a divine institution. It is part and parcel of Christianity, and distinct from, and even antagonistic (p. 89) to the Sabbath. We cannot but think that the argument for the divine authority of the day is needlessly and seriously impaired by disconnecting it, as does the work before us, from the earlier institution. The reasons (so far as it is necessary at this point to consider them) which induce its author, and others who agree with him, to seek a foundation for the Lord's day so exclusively and purely Christian, are, the silence of the N. T. writers respecting any sanction of the Christian festival derived from that of the elder church, certain positive declarations of the Apostle Paul respecting days and Sabbaths, and the noticeable separation in the writings of the Christian fathers of the new day from the old.

The negative argument derived from the absence in the writings of the Apostles of any hint even that the Lord's day is a Sabbath, or that it is in any wise founded upon the Fourth Commandment, or is the fulfilment of a previous ordinance, need not detain us from an examination of the testimony of the ancient Scriptures. In case we discover any clear intimations in these that the observance of a weekly day of rest, a true and spiritual Sabbath, is in accordance with the revealed will of God, and binding upon all men, the silence of the New Testament will not avail to set this testimony aside. This silence, moreover, upon the Sabbatarian theory is easily explained. The Apostles received a collection of writings which they believed to be divinely inspired. These they commended unhesitatingly to their converts as profitable for instruction and guidance. They had no thought of establishing a religion without any day of religious obligation. This, their practice and the fact of the universal observance of such a day attest. They had no superstitious notions about the inherent sacredness of particular days; but they were practical men, and were divinely guided. They saw that Judaism was fulfilled in Christ, that the Sabbath as a mere ordinance of Judaism had ceased, that another day had been peculiarly honored by the Founder of Christianity, that it commemorated an event more

worthy of honor than the original creation, or the deliverance of their fathers from the bondage of Egypt—and they recognised and honored it as the Lord's, and so gave it to the churches. But this designation of one day in seven presupposes facts, which, recorded in their accepted Scriptures, entered into the simplest rudiments of their religious knowledge. These are, the existence of a hebdomadal cycle; the Scriptural idea of this period as a season of six days of labor with one of rest and devotion; and the expression of this idea in documents bearing on their face the evidence of universal relations. The Apostles did not introduce the week, nor alter it. It remained as at the Creation. It remained as recognised in the Decalogue. Its Scriptural idea was the idea familiar to their minds from the beginning of knowledge, and interwoven with all they had known of true religion. Their silence, therefore, respecting the obligation of a weekly day of rest is in itself easily explained. It was not because, as some have supposed, they expected that men would at once rise above the need of fixed times of worship. Neither was it for precisely the contrary reason which others give, because they saw that men need the Sabbath so much that there is no occasion for enjoining it—human necessities being sure to cry out for it, and human wisdom being sufficient to regulate it. It was because their only care and work was to make the long established weekly day of rest subservient to the New Dispensation, clearing it of all superstitious accumulations, and connecting it directly with the kingdom of Redemption. The obligation, the divine precedent and sanction of such a day, were not in dispute, and needed no discussion. The Apostles' care was to designate it, and to connect it with the Redeemer. This they did by inculcating that the old Sabbath had determined; and by observing, and teaching their followers to observe, another day of the established weekly cycle—the Lord's day. The obligation of a day set apart to religion was not questioned; it ceased no more than the weeks ceased to run their ceaseless round.

No more are we precluded by any positive allegations of the Apostles, or of the early Fathers, from looking into the

Scriptures of the Old Testament for authority for the holy day of the New Covenant. Referring to the language of the Apostle in Col. ii, 16, and Gal. iv, 9, 10, Dr. H. remarks, "No testimony can be more decisive than this to the fact that the Sabbath was of obligation no longer". This we freely grant so far as the Sabbath was merely a sign between Jehovah and the Israelites or Jews, a shadow, or a part of a system of shadows. But the inquiry may still properly be pursued in the light of the earlier Scriptures, whether this was the whole, or even the fundamental idea, of the Sabbath—or whether, not simply in its Mosaic, but in *every form*, the Sabbath was abolished. Dr. H. (pp. 177–180) successfully refutes those who find in these declarations of the Apostle, and in those of Rom. xiv, 6, any disparagement of the Lord's day. The same Apostle, who thus wrote, instituted the religious observance of one day of the week. Not such a day, therefore, in these passages, is before his thoughts; but the festal seasons and days, including the weekly Sabbath, of the Jewish law. His language, for this reason, does not debar us from the inquiry whether there is not, between the day he instituted and the Sabbath, historical and ideal connection; whether as a religious day it may not find its sanction in a previously existing, not merely Jewish, but *religious* institution; and whether, in connection with a temporary ordinance, there is not revealed a mandate of Jehovah, or some indication of his will, binding upon man as man.

If the apostolic teachings upon this subject thus leave the way open to us to repair to the Scriptures of the Old Testament, still more manifestly do those of the early fathers. Their testimony to the fact of the existence of the Lord's day as a part of apostolic Christianity, is conclusive; not so their opinions respecting Old Testament exegesis. Good men, in their interpretations of Scripture, seventeen centuries ago, may have been mistaken; as good men now may be. Nowhere, so far as we can ascertain, does any writer of the generations immediately succeeding that of the Apostles, refer to them as having dis severed the holy day of the New Dispensation from all connection, in any form, with the teachings of the Old

Testament: nor is any such doctrine communicated in their writings. Dr. H. makes an admission which is only just, that the Sabbath against which the fathers protested, and from which they so sharply and frequently discriminate the Christian festival, is not the Sabbath of the Law, but that of tradition. We are surprised that the bearing of this concession upon the previous use of patristic testimony is not more fully recognised. If we still further remember the intimate association of the word Sabbath with the temporary ordinances of the ceremonial law, and the shadows of a system designed to be merely introductory to a better; and if we transfer ourselves to a time when Judaism and Christianity, not in their divine principles and true relations, but in human interpretations, were in fierce conflict, the language of the early writers will not prejudice us against the idea of a historical and organic connection between Sunday and the Sabbath.

There are, moreover, positive reasons, antecedent to the investigation of the declarations of the ancient inspired Scriptures, why we cannot comply with the demand now so strongly made, that no foundation for the Lord's day shall be sought in the Old Testament. Dr. H. raises the inquiry, without, we conceive, fully answering it, how it came to pass that the Lord's day was universally accepted by the early Christians as a part of their religious system. The fact is undisputed. It points directly to apostolic authority. We cannot explain the early, universal reverence for the day, the regard shown to it as matter of Christian duty, save by supposing it to have been recognised as virtually of divine origin through the commissioned messengers of the Most High. This Dr. H. urges with effect against the ecclesiastical theory (pp. 184, 185). But the fact deserves further attention. At the time the Gospel was promulgated the hebdomadal cycle had not been introduced into the Roman Empire. Not until very many Gentile churches had been planted and Christianity had assumed its legitimate form, did the custom of reckoning time by weeks begin, even in domestic life, to establish itself. The week was virtually a Jewish institution, so far as these churches

were concerned. Yet the observance of one day in seven went hand in hand with the Gospel. It went into Greece, where time was reckoned by decades; into Italy, where the division was far more artificial and at least equally incompatible. What induced the Apostles thus to set apart one day in seven? Why thus practically ordain, not merely for Jews, but for Gentiles? Dr. H. admits that in determining what proportion of time should be the Lord's, the Apostles paid respect to the Sabbatical ordinance. "This *directed* them in their *choice* of a cycle", is the somewhat remarkable language used (pp. 25, 210). If they simply followed the precedent of the Jewish law, being directed by it, what choice had they? If, as he elsewhere affirms, they were merely rationally influenced by the analogy of the Sabbatical precept, wherein consisted its decisive and controlling reason? We cannot well conceive the Apostles deliberating and finally deciding upon the question, whether a religious cycle which we find recognised in the record of Creation, and ordained in the Decalogue, should continue. We wish, at least, that Dr. H. had more explicitly stated what weight he supposes the analogy of the Sabbath had with the Apostles. Were they at liberty to choose a different cycle? Did they feel no obligation resting upon them so to ordain in the churches they planted, that gradually, yet surely, a weekly religious day should be accepted by Gentiles as well as Jews? And may not Christians now discover in the Scriptures which they commended to their followers, which were read in the stated assemblies of their disciples, the reasons that controlled them? To us the admissions Dr. H. makes as to the early and universal reverence cherished for the Lord's day, combined with the equally extensive adoption by Gentile Christians of a cycle at first commended to them only as a religious one, and for whose origin, at least as religious, we must repair to the Jewish Scriptures, necessitates the recognition of a Sabbatarian connection between Judaism and Christianity. Dr. H.'s theory is weak without the support, at this point, of a Scriptural sanction — and for this we must look to the older dispensations.

There is another weak point in the Dominical theory, even in the form which Dr. H. advocates, which suggests the desirableness of not cutting off the Lord's day from its connection with the Sabbath, unless for the most decisive reasons. Dr. H., with every earnest and religious man, seeks to promote the religious observance of the Lord's day. He affirms his belief that "the way in which it is regarded is no uncertain index of Christian steadfastness or decline, signum aut stantis, aut cadentis Christiani" (p. 25). He holds it to be "a day set apart—a day for religion" (p. 307). He has no sympathy, we presume, with the merely ritualistic conception of the character and obligation of the day implied in the expressions of one of his reviewers.* Yet he cuts it off from all direct or authoritative connection with the only passages in the word of God which distinguish one day in seven as, in a peculiar sense, holy time. This he concedes in the following language, occurring at the close of a review of the New Testament authority for the day:

"So far as we have gone, the external character of the Lord's day at the close of the first century appears to be that of a positive institution of the New Dispensation. It is a day of Christians assembling at short periodic intervals of time, on which certain duties to God, to a man's self, and to his neighbors were performed. As a matter of fact the interval between one Lord's day and another is of the same length as that between one Sabbath and another. But nothing Sabbatical either in the sense of commanded rest (though rest to a certain extent would be a necessary condition to the fulfilment of its duties, and indeed, as we shall show hereafter, is implied in the very idea of the Lord's day), or in the way of implication that the whole of it is to be employed in directly religious observances, . . . is to be found in what may be called the Charter deed of the institution of the Lord's day" (p. 58).

As neither the Jewish Law, nor the Westminster Confession, nor any approved treatise upon the Sabbath, so far as we are aware, prescribes that the *whole* of one day in seven should be "employed in *directly* religious observances", we presume our author's meaning to be identical with that expressed by Paley

* See Ed. Rev. Oct. 1861, p. 278. Amer. Ed.

in the following passage. This is the more clear inasmuch as Dr. H. refers to it in a note to the above.—“The assembling upon the first day of the week for the purpose of public worship and religious instruction is a law of Christianity of divine appointment; the resting on that day from our employments longer than we are detained from them by attendance on these assemblies is to Christians an ordinance of human institution: binding nevertheless”, etc.

Dr. H. objects to the ecclesiastical theory, that it places it within the power of the Church to change, or even to abolish, the day. We see not but that his own view admits the right of shortening the time deemed sacred. If the right to alter the day is dangerous, far more so, because far more likely to be exercised, is that of reducing the hours directly consecrated to religion, or devoted to the repose and quiet which best prepare for the most beneficial use of the means of grace. Dr. H. argues, indeed, from the idea of the day, and from human necessities, the importance of suspending upon it all merely secular pursuits; but he advances no Scriptural reason for such a proportion of time. Unless he gives authority to the “analogy of the law,” he can find none. Dr. Chalmers’ argument, founded upon the delight the true Christian finds in the Sabbath, is criticised as merely “subjective”—“one that will hardly prevail with the gainsayer”. Dr. C. might refer such an one to his previous allusion to the fact that the law of the Sabbath “stands enshrined among the moralities of a rectitude that is immutable and everlasting”; but Dr. H. has no such refuge. He can only refer to an ecclesiastical authority which may not be recognised; or, if admitted, may be exercised to diminish, rather than enhance, a strict observance of the day: or to subjective reasons, which even good men, from education or prejudices of some sort, may not appreciate. One of the most distinguished and evangelical of living German biblical students several years since, in conversation with a friend, defended the popular custom in Europe of devoting a large portion of Sabbath hours to recreation. He reasoned from the necessities, as he believed, of his own mind—the impossibility of spending

more than half of the day in religious contemplations and employments. The lessons of history show that reliance upon merely subjective guarantees of the Lord's day as a religious institution, is attended with very great hazard. We may point our author not merely to the continent, but to an experience nearer home. Queen Elizabeth, by royal proclamation, gave her subjects a license upon Sunday far beyond any labor of necessity; ordering that "all persons, vicars, and curates shall teach and declare unto their parishioners, that they may with a safe and quiet conscience, *after their Common Prayer*, in time of harvest, labor upon the holy and festival days, and save that thing which God hath sent". The Queen herself, in the afternoons of Sundays, indulged in sports and pastimes, as on other days. The popular desecration of the day became so great that, in 1584-5, a bill passed both houses of Parliament "for the better and more reverent observing of the *Sabbath day*". The bill did not receive the Queen's assent, and its particular provisions are unknown; but, in presenting it to her Majesty, the Speaker of the House implored her to give law concerning the Fourth Commandment. This her Majesty was not willing to do, and only by the popular reformation which took place in connection with the efforts of the Puritans, and by way of reaction from the terrible evils of the previous license, was the nation saved from moral bankruptcy.* Respect for the Lord's day—the whole of it—as of religious obligation has, in no small degree, given to the English-speaking nations their moral superiority to other peoples. And this respect has been very largely founded upon the perception of a supposed Scriptural obligation to keep holy one day in seven. It is the result of Sabbatarianism. We do not make this reference in the way of proof that the Sabbatarian theory is the Scriptural theory. This must be shown from the record itself. But we maintain that such results as we have indicated are clear and forcible enough to establish the propriety of dismissing anti-Sabbatarian prejudices, and of demanding solid and convincing evidence that the religious cycle which the Apostles

* See Hopkins's *History of the Puritans*, Vol. III. Chap. on the Sabbath, p. 590.

seem to have adopted from their Scriptures and ours, but which they have not directly enforced, has no foundation and authority in these Scriptures. And we are the more persuaded of the necessity of such an investigation, when we find so intelligent an advocate of a better observance of the Lord's day as Dr. H., falling into a style of expression respecting it extremely liable to misapprehension, inasmuch as it seems to add to religious improvement and to the rest subsidiary to this, social enjoyment, change of air and scene, harmless recreation, as legitimate objects of the day (pp. 334-336). The language used is carefully guarded against perversion, yet it discloses a tendency which would easily lead to serious infringements upon the interests of religion and virtue.

These obvious theoretical and practical difficulties encompassing every form of the Dominical theory; the failure to provide an objective guarantee for the Lord's day, palpable to the common mind, and guarded from human alterations or abatements; the failure, also, fully to explain the early reverence felt for it as a divine institution, and to account for the universal acceptance by Gentile Christians, accustomed to diverse calendars, of the characteristic features of the Jewish week; and the regular recurrence, once in seven days, of a holy Christian festival—are at least of sufficient importance to commend to candid attention that view of Sunday which we may term Anglo-American as well as Sabbatarian, the theory which was the faith of our fathers, and which, modified in respect to some confessed exaggerations, is the common faith of their descendants.

The distinctive feature of this theory is, that it finds in the Word of God the explicit inculcation and enforcement of the obligation to keep holy one day in seven. As our argument is with those who admit the necessity for man of stated seasons of religious worship; and who admit, upon some grounds, the obligation of the Lord's day, and even make it an Apostolic institution; we scarcely need guard against a possible perversion of the Sabbatarian view. Yet, to remove every occasion for misunderstanding, it may be well to state, that the special consecration of one day to religion does not imply any irreli-

gious secularization of other days; any more than the dedication of one edifice as a place of worship, implies that other places, not so hallowed, are to be devoted to worldliness. As regards either intrinsic holiness, or the creature's duty of glorifying the Creator, all places, all seasons, all labor and rest, are alike. Christianity condemns, not the keeping of Sabbaths, but the profanation of week days; not the observance of stated festivals, but superstition and formalism. Strange that the Christian view of all days as holy, should be perverted into a secularization of all; that the ideal of a universal consecration to God of human powers and time, should be regarded as sanctioning the violation of the day which symbolizes the eternal Sabbath of rest. "They cry *spirit*, but they mean *flesh*." Even under the Mosaic Law special offerings were symbolical, and ancillary; not intrinsically religious, but ad-minicular to religion, and suitable forms of expressing its spirit. They were given as pledges of the whole; as helps to the right, the religious, use of the whole. A good man now, in consecrating one day in seven to holy rest, acknowledges thus that all days are the Lord's, and best prepares himself to use them all as the Lord's. Sunday offerings are offerings of the first fruits. There is nothing, even in that somewhat vague Gospel, the "spirit of Christianity", contrary to such a consecration. It is enough that Paul, just now in high esteem with liberalism, saw no inconsistency between esteeming every day alike, and recognising the utility of a religious distinction of the first day from the rest.

The classical passages in favor, not of a transference of the Jewish Sabbath to Sunday, but of a historical and organic connection between the earlier festival and the Lord's day, so that the obligation of keeping holy one day in seven may be seen from his own declarations to be the will of God, are Gen. ii, 2-3, and Exodus xx, 8-11. From the view taken by Dr. Hessey of the bearing and importance of these passages in the vindication of the Christian weekly festival, we are constrained, after the most respectful and patient canvassing of his arguments, to express an almost entire dissent.

The Sabbatical value of the declarations made in Gen. ii,

2, 3—using the term Sabbatical merely as descriptive of a weekly day of hallowed rest—is not dependent upon the decision of the questions, whether or not the patriarchs kept a Sabbath, or whether the Mosaic cosmogony was in any form disclosed to mankind before Genesis was written. The passage has an intrinsic weight which is sometimes lost sight of in attending to subordinate questions. Experience shows that periodic seasons of rest and devotion are a human necessity. That certain periods are too long, and others too short, may also be determined by the light of nature. What is the best cycle, in the absence of conclusive natural proofs, may well be made matter of divine revelation. We claim that the passage before us affords perpetual light upon this subject; and since the light is that of the divine example and promise, it has not only illumining, but directing power. It reveals to men, as long as the present natural economy lasts, the path of duty and happiness. The fact of the divine rest upon the seventh day, whenever disclosed to mankind, and to whatsoever subordinate uses appropriated, must ever remain one of universal interest. It stands in the record of the creation, not of Palestine, but of the world; not of Jews, but of man. It speaks not of the rest of Jehovah, but of Elohim. It announces not merely the divine cessation from creating, but distinguishes a period, gives to it a distinctive character, and sets apart one day for special duties and the communication of special favors. Though such a cycle is beyond clear and certain discovery by man as the one best fitted to his complex nature and doubly related life, still experience is competent to affirm its wisdom and worth. As really, if not as obviously, do mankind need the Sabbath rest, as that of night. Its physical benefits, moreover, which candid men universally admit, are best secured when it is most sacredly kept in accordance with its higher ends. As piety is conducive to morality, so is the spiritual Sabbath to the physical. The better we become acquainted with human nature, the more significant are the words, "the Sabbath was made for man". We can accept the declaration in Genesis as meaning no less than that a weekly day of hallowed rest enters into the plan of creation. The idea of such a

day is shadowed forth in divine acts which, no matter when revealed, themselves are of universal interest and susceptible of a universal application.

"But what", asks Dr. Hessey, somewhat curtly, after quoting the sublime record, "But what does it amount to? It is merely an announcement of what God did, not a setting forth to man of what man should do" (p. 135). Why, we are constrained to ask in reply, was such an announcement made to man? Dr. H. supposes that these words were inserted with reference to a Sabbatical use to be made of them in the promulgation of the Fourth Commandment. How could they ever serve such a purpose, what sanctioning or motive power have they, unless the divine example is in some sense authoritative? Our author rests, in part, his argument for the obligation of the Lord's day upon the example of the Apostles. He does not claim an explicit command. He does not comment upon the record of Paul's preaching at Troas, on the first day of the week, when the disciples met together to break bread: "What does it amount to?" Obviously, the divine will may be revealed to men otherwise than by formal commandment. And what lower meaning can naturally be obtained from these words, "God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it", in the connection in which they stand, than this; that the divine example teaches men, all to whom it is revealed, that such a day is one on which it may be expected that Heaven's choicest favors will be bestowed, and grateful, holy worship will ascend in return? What less can be understood, than that it is a day incumbent upon man as a sanctified day? In what sense can God be said to bless the day, save that of blessing it to man; or to sanctify it, save that of setting it apart for hallowed and holy observances? Much of the religious instruction communicated to the old-world fathers (as Dr. Fairbairn has shown in a work* characterized by sound learning and good judgment, to which our author makes no allusion, we believe, among many inferior books cited) was in all probability made known by divine acts. The time for full

* Typology.

and formal legal institutes was not at the beginning. As we have already remarked, however, for our present purpose it is not necessary that we should be able to show, as matter of fact, the observance of a primeval Sabbath; or the possession by men, before the days of Moses, of the facts he published respecting the creation. All that we claim is, that a declaration like that before us, incorporated into the creation-narrative, and exhibiting the divine example, indicates to man the divine will—the lesson that, in the natural and moral economy which the Creator has established, there is a necessity created, and a provision made, for a Sabbath. As Regeneration does not destroy man's original constitution, as Redemption is not antagonistic to Creation, so the Lord's day is not independent of, nor hostile to, the original Sabbatical idea. That, when sin had entered, and Elohim had revealed himself as Jehovah, and as the Author of a new and more glorious creation than that from the primæval chaos, such events should be made the special object of commemoration, and a day be designated in reference to them, does not impair the force of the original record; but rather, by retaining its cycle, recognises and confirms its lasting authority.

To these views the chief objections urged by Dr. H. are, that Genesis was a revelation to Moses, not to Adam, and that the patriarchs kept no Sabbath. Such criticisms seem to us entirely aside of the mark, even if thoroughly substantiated. As great stress, however, is laid upon them, we desire carefully to examine their foundation.

The Hebrew word for Sabbath is not found in the texts we have been considering, neither is there any direct proof that it was ever on the lips of the patriarchs. As they may be said not to have known the name of Israel's covenant God, so may they be said not to have had the Sabbath. It does not follow that they had not the promises of Jehovah; nor that they had no stated times of worship; nor that, in some form, the substance of Moses' narrative of the creation, and of the Paradisaic state, may not have been in their possession. There is one fact which favors an affirmative de-

cision of such points. We refer to the fact of the early knowledge possessed by the worshippers of the true God, and by nations with whom they may be supposed to have come in contact, of a septenary division of time.* The manner in which this cycle is referred to, indicates that it was in familiar use long before the days of Moses. There is even a slight suggestion of it in the narrative of the offerings of Cain and Abel. How far and how early it spread over the earth, is involved in deep obscurity. Some have asserted that it was in use with every nation of antiquity. Others, that it was restricted to the Jews, and to the families from whom they claimed descent. Each of these positions is probably equally wide of the truth. The present opinion which, according to Arago,† “has obtained the greatest number of adherents”, is, that, besides the Jews, it was in use only among the ancient Chinese, Arabians, Chaldeans, and Egyptians. The question arises, how is the origin of this cycle to be explained? Several attempts have been made without reference to the facts of which we have knowledge through the Mosaic cosmogony. The most popular one, at present, is that which Dr. H., we are surprised to see, affirms that he accepts “*without hesitation*”. “The course of the moon”, he remarks, “and especially the appearance of the new moon or *νοῦμηνία*, would suggest a division, roughly stated, of twenty-eight days. This, perhaps, would be the first and most prevalent division. It certainly was all but a universal one, for it is found even where weeks were unknown, and where they are still unknown—among the aborigines of the New World” (pp. 141, 142). Having on the two preceding pages affirmed that “It is only in the East that anything like a septenary division is found to prevail”, and that “it is not true that it (a septenary division) was ever general in the heathen world”, our author, it will be noticed, proceeds to prove that the division of twenty-eight days was all but *universal*, because found where weeks were unknown! But letting this pass, what does the existence of the lunar di-

* Gen. iv. 3, 4 (?); vii. 4; viii. 10, 12; xxix. 27; i. 10; Ex. vii. 25.

† Arago's *Popular Astronomy*. Eng. Trans. vol. ii. p. 722.

vision *without* the weekly, and that down to the present day, show, if not this,—that the two are not necessarily, nor even easily, connected? This is evident upon other grounds. The present value of a synodic revolution is more than twenty-nine days and a half. The time between two new moons is not a number of days of which seven is a factor. The hebdomadal cycle is not a natural cycle, like that of years, or months, or days; it is artificial and arbitrary so far as our mere knowledge of natural laws carries us. “The object of the *natural divisions*”, says the distinguished astronomer before referred to, “has been to indicate with convenience and precision the dates of events . . . *The week indicates the regular succession of days of labor and rest*”. This is an established distinction, and we submit that it is much more philosophical to look for the origin of the week in the line of its idea, even if it constrains us to fall back upon divine revelation. It is evident that if, in any form, the fact recorded in Gen. ii, 2–3, was communicated to mankind at the beginning, the hebdomadal cycle recognised in the subsequent narrative, and also the seemingly symbolical use of the number seven, are facts easily and fully explained.

Our author, however, urges, “if the septenary division is found out of *Scripture*, without the Sabbath, why may it not occur in *Scripture* without it” (p. 141)? The possibility of this we concede. We are not anxious to show that the original idea of the week was always *preserved*. Once instituted, it might continue, although the world forgot the Creator, and lost all care for the hallowed rest. Dr. H. is at pains to convey the impression that the extension, among the nations, of the hebdomadal period, was not great. He does not seem to be aware that, in so doing, he limits the likelihood of this cycle’s having had the origin which he unhesitatingly accepts; nor that the fidelity with which the descendants of Shem adhered to this division, when other nations so easily lost it, favors the idea of its religious origin and associations. The more he succeeds in diminishing the evidence of its heathen use, the more closely does he link it with its scriptural explanation and character. That a day holy to the Lord should be

lost by those who forgot God altogether, is no marvel. "A highly spiritual ordinance like the Sabbath", Mr. Gladstone has recently well remarked, "was one little likely to survive the rude shocks and necessities of earthly life; while it could not, like sacrifice, derive a sustaining force from appearing to confer upon the gods an absolute gift profitable to them, and likely to draw down their favor in return".*

But if Noah and Abraham had a Sabbath, it is objected, they, or some of the old-world fathers, would have been noticed as keeping it (p. 135). We scarcely need remark how unsafe is such a process of reasoning. We may point, in illustration of its inconclusiveness, with the eminent scholar and statesman just quoted, to the designs upon the shield of Achilles, intended to represent the standing occasions of Hellenic life, yet giving no hint of religious observances. Or we may refer, with others, to the silence of the Scriptures respecting the rite of circumcision, from the time of the entrance of the Israelites into Canaan, down to the days of Jeremiah—a shorter period, indeed, yet all the more strong for our purpose, inasmuch as the records are so much more extensive and minute, thus increasing, by a double ratio, the probabilities of allusion. Indeed, the case may be put more strongly, if the statement is correct that no account of the observance of this rite occurs from the days of Joshua to those of John the Baptist. A yet more conclusive reply is, that there is no mention whatsoever in the ante-Mosaic history, of any stated occasions of religious worship. Dr. H. refers approvingly to Hooker's remark that "Even nature has taught the heathen, first, that festival solemnities are a part of the exercises of religion; secondly, that praise, liberality, and rest are as natural elements whereof solemnities consist". Does he suppose, from the silence of Scripture, that the patriarchs had not as clear a knowledge of religion as the heathen? Does he suppose there were no days of praise, liberality, and rest, until the Jews gathered manna in the wilderness, especially when, according to the common interpretation, we are taught that, as early as

* Gladstone's *Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age*, vol. ii. p. 172.

the days of Enos, there began to be the formal observance of social worship?

Further occasion for disconnecting the idea of a day of rest from that of the weekly cycle Dr. H. finds in the record of the giving of manna, in the sixteenth chapter of Exodus. Very different conclusions have been derived from this narrative by competent scholars, and these conflicting results may well suggest a less confident statement than our author gives. The facts in the case are undisputed; their significance is often determined by previously adopted conclusions.

The facts upon which Hengstenberg, as quoted and endorsed by our author, relies in the attempt to derive from this chapter an account of the origination of a weekly day of religious rest, are: (1) The astonishment of the elders at the double portion of manna gathered on the sixth day; (2) The disobedience of some of the people to the command to rest on the day which they had been told was a Sabbath; (3) The absence of any reference by Moses to an existing Sabbatical ordinance. These considerations, it is claimed, leave "no doubt" that the Sabbath, not the Jewish Sabbath, but the sacred observance of the seventh day, was then first instituted. We will examine them in their order.

1. The perplexity of the elders. To render the argument from this fact conclusive, it must appear, that no other explanation of the perplexity can be given, save that of entire ignorance of a sacred septenary institution. So far is this from being the truth, that the narrative itself supplies another explanation. Astonishment and perplexity, it should be noticed, are words a little highly colored for the simple statement, *The rulers came and told Moses*. They came in doubt. They came for information. This they might well need. Explicit command had been given that a prescribed amount of manna should be gathered, and any attempt to preserve it from day to day had been prohibited. "And it came to pass, on the sixth day, they gathered twice as much bread, two omers for one man; and all the rulers of the congregation came and told Moses." We may suppose them to have come either to inquire if the people had done wrong, or to know

what should be done with the surplus, or for both objects. The reply of Moses favors the supposition that they had some knowledge of the seventh-day rest: "This is that which the Lord hath said, To-morrow is the rest of a holy Sabbath unto the Lord: bake that which ye will bake", etc. There is no record of the communication to Moses of these words. It is possible the verse is to be divided differently from the manner in which it is punctuated by our translators. Moses then would say, "The fact you state has been divinely ordered. I was told there would be given a double portion on the sixth day (v. 5). The import of this miracle I will explain, and the use to be made of the double portion of the manna". We prefer, however, the common interpretation. Moses, then, is to be understood to communicate, as by divine authority, the fact that the next day was to be kept as a Sabbath. This implies a previously unsettled life; either that, as Philo was of opinion, the Sabbath fell into desuetude in Egypt; or that it was observed there as well as circumstances allowed, but not with entire rest. But what decisive, or even probable, evidence is there, that here is an account of the absolute institution of a day of worship? Not a word is said in explanation of the meaning of a Sabbath to the Lord. The term seems to have explained itself. New provisions, stricter regulations, were to be enforced. The *Jewish* Sabbath was to appear. But there is no evidence that these were wholly strange words to the elders—"The rest of a holy Sabbath unto the Lord; eat that to-day; for to-day is a Sabbath unto the Lord: to-day ye shall not find it in the field. Six days ye shall gather it; but on the seventh day, which is a Sabbath, there shall be none".

2. The disobedience of the people. This does not prove that the institution was a new one. Sabbath-breaking, we must believe, is not yet extinct, any more than the Sabbath. Notice, also, that some disobeyed the explicit command, "Let no man leave of it till the morning".

3. The silence of Moses respecting any existing ordinance. The fact may be pointed either way. It is at least offset, for our author's use, by Moses' equally striking silence respecting the nature of the remarkable day he is said here to institute.

The most probable explanation of both phenomena—the silence respecting a previously existing sacred day, and respecting the import of the words, the rest of a holy Sabbath—is, that the chapter gives us an account of the revival of a day which had somewhat lost its proper position, and which was to be invested with new guarantees, and enhanced importance. If we are still referred to the statement, "See, for that the Lord hath given you the Sabbath", the reply is easy. This is not said to the elders, but to the people, through Moses, after the sin of those who transgressed. It refers to the preceding narrative, and follows its interpretation. That the words intrinsically and necessarily signify no more than the revival, or new and more impressive inculcation, of a custom previously known is clear from Neh. ix, 13, 14: "Thou camest down also upon Mount Sinai, and *madest known* unto them thy holy Sabbath". Yet the day, in the theory of those who quote this and kindred passages, in proof of its exclusive Jewish origin, had been previously made known.

The lowest ground, therefore, which can be taken, consistently with truth, appears to us to be, that it cannot be shown that a *Sabbath* was not kept until the Israelites entered the wilderness; and, farther, that probabilities strongly favor its previous observance. This being the case, the use which we have made of Genesis ii, 2-3, is confirmed. We also claim that such an interpretation is legitimate upon grounds independent of the decision of the question of the actual observance of a primeval Sabbath. The passage in its bearings upon the obligation of consecrating one day in seven, cannot be dismissed with the remark: "What does it amount to"?

Equally below the universal interest and permanent authority of the record, is our author's treatment of Ex. xx, 8-11. He does not enter upon the important question of the true position and authority of the Decalogue in the system of revealed religion, and we shall restrict ourselves to a brief notice of the objections he advances to deriving any sanction for the Lord's day from the Fourth Commandment. These, so far as we are able to gather them, and so far as they have not been already virtually considered, are as follows:

1. The Jewish Sabbath was enjoined as a sign between God and his people. 2. It was a Positive Institution. 3. There is no possible expedient by which we can retain the seventh day Sabbath, and alter the time of its recurrence, or the manner of its celebration.

To the statements numbered (1) and (2), we have no objection to make. The Sabbath is expressly declared to be a sign. It was positively ordained. The fallacy we have to notice is, in assuming that its special end gives the whole idea, ground and object of the institution ; in assuming also that for a positive institution there may not be reasons in their sphere as cogent and permanent as ethical laws. It is in this last respect, especially, we think, that confusion exists in discussions of this subject. The seventh and eighth commandments convey precepts of natural morality. There is still an obvious advantage in their utterance from Heaven with the voice of divine authority. The sense of obligation in the human heart is thus quickened and strengthened. The law of a Sabbath may be founded in reasons as universal and important as are the statutes respecting the marriage covenant and the rights of property. If these reasons are less upon the surface, there is the more occasion for the distinct promulgation of a divine law. That the observance of a Sabbath is thus founded in reasons permanent and general, may be properly inferred from two considerations. It was written by the finger of God upon one of those tables of stone all whose other contents have this character of universality and perpetuity. Each of these commands constitutes one of the laws the Spirit of Christ is to write upon the heart. We do not affirm that a positive institution is a moral law. But our argument is, that the circumstances accompanying the annunciation of the Fourth Commandment, and the position assigned to it, approve it as occupying in the mind of the divine Legislator a place of lasting consequence and authority. They who make it the foundation of a merely temporary institution do violence to the salient facts pertaining to it. The other consideration is, that with the law given upon Sinai, uttered by Jehovah himself (Moses, it would seem, receiving it as one of the people), and written upon the

tables of stone, as one of the Ten Commandments, is connected, either as reason or motive, an allusion of universal interest. No theory of the Sabbath as a merely Jewish institution, fairly embraces these words: "Remember the Sabbath-day, to keep it holy . . . *for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day; wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath-day and hallowed it.*"

Here we are met with the objection we have numbered for convenience (3). We find our reply in the admission made that the Sabbath is a positive institution, and in the conclusion we have shown to be authorized that it has a permanent foundation. As a positive institution, it is susceptible of change. As founded in permanent principles, it is not susceptible of abolition. Particularly should we expect to find it assuming, with changes of Dispensation, corresponding forms. If observed by Enos, it was not kept precisely as by David. What is the essential element is easily understood by its character and its expressed reason. It is essentially an ordinance of *time*. It cannot be spiritualized away from such a provision. Yet it does not restrict us to the seventh day Sabbath; and this for two reasons. The first is, that another day was observed by Apostles and designated for their followers. The second is, that the allusion, in the command, to the seventh day, is on the face of it a mutable and historical provision. The words "Remember *the* Sabbath-day", "But the seventh day is a Sabbath"—refer to an existing institution. They have an immediate historical application. They are precisely parallel, in this respect, with the allusion, in the promise attached to the Fifth Commandment, to the promised land. Yet this promise the Apostle Paul applies without hesitation to the children of Gentiles in an Epistle written to a church, or body of churches, having no lot in the land of Canaan.* And it is, in general, one of the most characteristic features of divine revelation that immutable principles are inculcated in connection with transient forms, that permanent truths are revealed in union with historical and temporary

* Eph. vi, 1-3.

conditions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the teachings of our Saviour and his Apostles. Nor is there any insuperable difficulty in the way of clearly and definitely ascertaining the truth intended to be conveyed. In the Fourth Commandment we find recognised the same idea of the week conveyed in the record of creation. It is a septenary period, having six days for labor and one for rest. It is the same period transmitted by the Apostles to the Christian Church. The table in which the Commandment in question appears, with the other table, is made up of permanent principles. The same reasons for its originally occupying an equally high place in authority with those commands associated with it, remain. We are referred in its very terms to a universal reason or motive for its observance. If we assign the Decalogue a place with other Mosaic legislation, and suppose it, as formal law, to have passed away, then the Sabbatical ordinance survives (as Archbishop Whately and others are careful to assert respecting the *other* commandments), not because it is a precept of the Mosaic Law, but because there is a cognizable reason for its perpetuity as cogent in its sphere as are those which uphold the perpetual authority of its fellows. If, with what we deem a better understanding of the subject, we accept the Decalogue as a brief but comprehensive summary of the permanent principles which lie at the foundation of all true religion and morality, we then obtain yet higher sanction for the perpetuity of a Sabbath. Nor are reasons such as these to be set aside by the conceded fact that the principles of the Decalogue, even in the instrument itself, may be seen to have had a temporary reference, and to have been suited to existing historical conditions. This results from the necessity of the case, and is only one illustration among many of that law of divine revelation which expresses the general in the particular, the permanent in transient forms.

As to the manner of keeping the day, this, within certain limits, must necessarily vary with the progress of the race—especially with advancing revelations of divine truth and its more extensive appropriation. The Christian Sabbath cannot be a Jewish Sabbath, any more than the risen Saviour is in

every respect what he was while under the Law. There is, in revealed religion, development; but not that sundering of the New from the Old so much in fashion now, in certain quarters.

The chief difficulties, however, to which Sabbatarian tenets have given rise, it is of some consequence to observe, have sprung from misconceptions of the Jewish Sabbath as a religious day. The Sabbath of the Fourth Commandment has been too much regarded as only a part of a system of Sabbaths, and in its connection with the civil and ceremonial law. It has also been interpreted in the light of Rabbinical and Pharisaic traditions, rather than in that of Holy Scripture. It should never be forgotten that our Saviour's example is a commentary on the Sabbath of the Decalogue. Were there space to spare, we should be glad to follow Dr. H. in his candid and interesting discussion of this branch of the subject. His conclusions evince the Jewish Sabbath to be so much more evangelical in its character than is commonly supposed, that he feels constrained to give reasons why it should have been abrogated. The solution of his difficulties he finds in the Pharisaic perversions of the day, and in its intimate connection with a temporary and imperfect system; very good reasons for the change Sabbatarianism claims was made, but not satisfactory as an explanation of a total abolition of a day which may well receive the encomium passed by the Creator upon his primal works, and which, in its Christian form, we believe will continue more and more to win the reverence and love of human hearts. Sufficient allowance has doubtless not always been made for the physical necessities of men in the use of such a day. Much has been said, also, contrary to Christian charity and to Christian liberty. Excesses inevitably lead to reactions. Yet the greatest danger lies at present in a sundering of gospel from law, of the New covenant from the Old, of Christianity from principles of righteousness which are the pillars of religion. It cannot be too often insisted, that Christian liberty is freedom in law, and has its fruit in holiness; and that restriction is still a schoolmaster indispensable in the spiritual training of the race.

ART. VI.—THE ORIGIN OF IDOLATRY.

WE propose in this Article to consider some questions concerning Idolatry, its origin, nature, objects, and history, as it is, on the one hand, described in the Holy Scriptures, and, on the other, in Rawlinson's *History of Herodotus* and in the works of various earlier writers on the subject.

In the notes, essays, and illustrations added by Mr. Rawlinson to his version of *Herodotus*, much new light is supposed, by the accomplished Editor and his associates, to be thrown upon this subject by their investigations of the inscriptions, the sculptures, and other relics recently exhumed from the ruins of Babylonia and Assyria; and by their criticism of the early Greek writers on the history and mythology of those countries. And, on the assumption that the popular theory of Idolatry which is presented in this great work, as in a host of Latin, French, and English works which preceded it, is the true theory, the Editor, it may be readily allowed, has, on some particulars, cast much light. But upon the main questions concerning the origin and the real objects of idolatrous homage; the animus, motives, purposes, date, circumstances of the first idolaters; the relations of the subject to the chronology, and above all to the *theology* of the Holy Scriptures; the relation of Idolatry at first to visible material images and to the after growth of Polytheism; and upon the moral, religious, and political aspects of this stupendous system of imposture, tyranny, and wickedness, this latest and most elaborate work affords, we apprehend, new contributions of uncertainty and mystery, rather than new and certain light.

If this be so, the reason of it undoubtedly is, that the long-prevalent theory upon the subject, and especially upon these main questions, is so erroneous, that no resort to Greek and Latin sources, or to the monuments and inscriptions of the earliest idolatrous nations, can serve to rectify it, or to reconcile it

with the only reliable criterion, the declarations and historical notices contained in the Word of God. Without a true theory of the nature, origin, and objects of Idolatry at the start, neither the sculptured images nor the long lost language of the inscriptions can be rightly construed. The Greek and Roman historians and mythologists had no conception of the primeval and true, if they had of any, theory on the subject; and practically—blinded and besotted by the system and its degrading forms—they knew only the childish, the debasing, and the cruel aspects, rites, and exactions of Polytheism.

Of the importance of the subject little need to be said. Idolatry, during all the ages since its institution, has been the bane, the curse and blight, temporally of the fairest portions of the earth, and spiritually of three fourths, or a larger proportion of the successive generations of the human race. If we suppose the average population of the globe since the age of Nimrod to have been seven hundred millions, ascribe to him the public institution of Idolatry after the deluge, allow thirty years for each generation of men, and suppose three fourths of each generation to have been idolaters, the aggregate number of souls sacrificed by this system, would now be more than seventy thousand millions. If instead of three fourths, nine tenths have been victims, the aggregate would be near ninety thousand millions. Yet, the origin, date, occasion, purpose, of this predominant evil, so far from having been satisfactorily explained or accounted for by any pagan or other class of writers, remains as profound a mystery as at any former period. The system is in itself so utterly debasing and abominable, so repugnant to reason and philosophy, and so abhorrent to the faith of revealed religion, that no sane mind can meditate upon it without being forced to exclaim,—Is it possible, that from a date long prior to that of any authentic secular history, this system can have reigned unto death and perdition over such a proportion of a race of intelligent beings created in the image, governed by the providence, and sustained on the bounty of the all-wise, all-powerful, all-beneficent God; and yet that it could have originated, established and perpetuated itself without a cause and occasion as stu-

pendous and as likely to be made public and to be transmitted from age to age, as the deluge, the confusion of tongues, and the dispersion of the primeval race of idolaters? Must there not be in it something far deeper as to its origin, its rationale, its object, its relations, than reason or philosophy can reach—something in the culpable depravity and judicial blindness of apostates and the workings of infernal malice, to account for the origin and history of the system?

If under the government of God idolatry is the greatest of crimes, a rebellion, a treason against the authority and the throne of Jehovah, and against his loyal subjects and true worshippers—if it is a denial of his supremacy, his perfections and his prerogatives—if it is a scheme of degradation, misery and destruction to men—if it is a system of antagonism and wickedness, involving every species of immorality and corruption (as described Rom. i) and every element of satanic malice and cruelty,—then it is no more to be believed that man devised and adopted it from necessity in his ignorance and helplessness, and without the means of knowing better, than that Adam fell from necessity, ignorant of his duty, and without the instigation of Satan. Nor can it be believed, that the primitive, continued, and unrepealable denunciations and inflictions of wrath and everlasting punishment upon all idolaters, are ascribed to infinite righteousness and truth otherwise than as the just penalty of guilt—the just punishment of idolaters for their wickedness in worshipping and serving another as God,—a pretender, an enemy, a rival. But concerning all this the ancient mythologies and histories, and the modern expositions of them, are silent. They treat the system,—which for four thousand years and more has engulfed the vast majority of the successive generations of men in darkness, misery, and despair,—as but one of the ancient institutions of the race, of uncertain origin and unknown date; as a device perhaps of demagogues and priests; as a product of primitive ignorance and barbarism so confirmed at length as to withstand the culture of Greece and Rome; as the spontaneous religion of nature prior to revelation, and more congenial to the heart in every age. They treat of its monuments as curious matters of art; of its conflicting nomenclatures, its

diverse pantheons, its mysterious symbols, its confused and irreconcilable chronologies, as matters of literature and criticism. But they teach us nothing concerning its origin, its date, its nature as a spiritual despotism, the secret of its power over the souls and bodies, lives and liberties of men, as an external system of degradation, tyranny and blood; as an abnegation of reason, a credence only of lies and impossibilities, a votive self-immolation to the jaws of Moloch. Of its remorseless grasp on all the individuals of successive generations born under its sway, the powerful and the weak, the learned and the ignorant; of the futility of all attempts of individuals at self-deliverance; of its effectual resistance to all but foreign and supernatural power and influence on the mind and heart, they tell us nothing. The system is left in the attitude of a mystery, an absurdity, a sport of human caprice and madness, a fathomless riddle of contradictions, an image of darkness, misery, and despair, involving from time immemorial the temporal and eternal destiny of three parts out of four of the human race, of which neither the three involved parts, nor the excepted Christian part, has any satisfactory theory or history, and to the nature, instigator, and object of which, unless it is to be found in the records of Inspiration, we have no clue.

Historically, this great system of tyranny and blood is the ground-work of the civil and social annals of a large portion of the race. It stands forth as the comprehensive organization and embodiment of antagonism and opposition to the true religion, and to virtue, truth, and righteousness. To counteract and prevent its universal success under the ancient dispensation it was necessary to institute a theocratic administration over a particular community of true worshippers to preserve and protect them, and for their defence and the vindication of the divine authority to inflict retributive and avenging judgments on the surrounding idolaters. Thus the destruction of Sodom, the plagues of Egypt, the extirpation of the Canaanites, the overthrow of other pagan nations from time to time, and the various subjections and captivities of the Israelites, when they apostatised to idol worship, were denounced

and executed in vindication of the true God and the true religion against the arrogance and treason of idolatry. Yet the hereditary, popular, and prevalent account of the origin, institution, and genius of this monstrous system, is, that during the infantile period of the race, men being without language and without revelation, and having to grope their way to one discovery after another, did their best when they invented idolatry as their religion; and being wholly ignorant of the true God, and feeling the most urgent necessity of some object of gratitude and homage for their daily blessings, concluded that the Sun had most to do towards the production of the fruits of the earth, and naturally began by addressing their sacrifices, thanks, and prayers, to that chief of visible objects. Next they assigned to each planet and star some particular good or bad influence over the affairs of men, and rendered homage to them as gods. Then as they acquired the use of language, and made progress in knowledge and in arts and sciences, their wants in the mean time being greatly multiplied, and their passions and vices stimulated, they showed their enlarged, refined, and appreciative gratitude to living and dead men who had served them as rulers, warriors and hierophants, and by degrees extended their veneration to all sorts of heroes and heroines, real and fabulous, and to dumb animals, reptiles, insects, vegetables, visions, passions, crimes, diseases, all the phenomena of nature, and all the objects of imagination. All this, indeed, turned out to be wholly contrary to the injunctions of Revelation, when the race was sufficiently advanced to receive divine instruction. But what better could be expected from the race in its helpless state of infancy and ignorance? How it happened that man, as he studied arts, science, and philosophy, did not grow wiser and better, and thrust away the putrid mass of childish and degrading superstitions and corruptions, neither the mythologists, the historians, nor the recent explorers of sculptures and inscriptions, afford us any explanation.

We trust that our readers will agree with us that it is time to call in question the theory of the pagan authors and their modern expositors on this subject—time to inquire whether the real author and god of idolatry was of no higher rank and

pretensions, of no more desperate aims and purposes, of no more unity and consistency in his malice towards man, and in his enmity, rivalry and opposition to God, than dead heroes and heroines as ignorant and powerless as their worshippers ; or whether Satan, the arch apostate, deceiver and tempter, assuming to be god of this fallen world, instigated this scheme of homage to himself as the means of enslaving the race he had seduced, of sustaining his revolt, upholding his kingdom, carrying out his antagonism against Jehovah, and accomplishing his ulterior designs.

The requisite limits of this article will allow far less of detail in the discussion than the subject deserves. Yet enough, perhaps, may be said to induce, on the part of our readers, a more extended examination both of the secular annals of idolatry, and of the teachings and implications of the Scripture records. As the results of a somewhat careful research of the principal writers on idolatry, and of the teachings of the Holy Scriptures, we present the following propositions, as an outline of what we take to be the theory contained in Scripture, and implied in the nature of the case, and in the moral and physical aspects and results of the idol system :

That Satan, the prince and leader of apostates, arrogating divine prerogatives and claiming to be god of this world, was the original instigator and object of idolatrous worship and service.

That this idolatry was the great treason and wickedness of the antediluvian period which demanded the extirpation of all but a single family of the race.

That for the reinstitution and establishment of the same worship and service after the deluge, the apostates under Nimrod erected the tower and temple of Bel for the worship of Satan, under that name, as the antagonist and rival of Jehovah.

That the idolatry primarily established at Babel was not polytheistic, but restricted to the one chief object of idolatrous homage, who arrogated to himself the sun (and subordinately solar and artificial light and heat) as his shekinah of visible glory, towards which the worshippers directed their adoration.

That polytheism was of subsequent adoption, and attended

by the use of images and symbols representative of the chief god, and of subordinate celestial intelligencies, and of deified heroes and heroines, as the system advanced in different nations.

That after the dispersion, at different periods, temples on the model and with the original objects of Babel, were erected by the idolaters of Assyria, Egypt, India, Mexico, and elsewhere.

That in each of the successive Pantheons, as described in the ancient inscriptions and reported by the historians, — as well those of the more barbarous nations as those of nations by whom arts and letters were cultivated, — the head of the list indicated the one universal object of idolatrous worship ; and, at least generally, the head name in each instance appropriated to the god, was the name appropriated to the Sun, and also to the material image of the god.

That because the respective nations had each one and the same chief god of their idolatrous homage, they mutually acknowledged and at pleasure adopted each other's subordinate local and household deities.

That various arts, more or less of science, and the use of written language, were coëval with the earliest details of idolatry, as is evinced by historical traditions and testimonies concerning primeval architecture, the building of the ark, the making of brick, metallurgy, sculpture, painting, inscriptions, musical and other instruments, geometrical figures, astronomical observations, and the like.

That the modern explorers of the relics of Babylon, Ninevah, and Egypt, — fascinated by the novelty of their discoveries, and prepossessed by the pagan mythology, — have given to their interpretations an imposing air and aspect which cannot be considered otherwise than as, at least, greatly wanting in deference to the authority of the Holy Scriptures.

That the exhumed inscriptions are, in respect to their real meaning and their chronology, only to a very moderate extent entitled to any confidence ; and that, in general, they are, on all hands, admitted to be mythical, and in proportion as they are ancient, undecipherable ; the ancient Chaldean cuneiform characters of Babylonia, not having yet been mastered.

And that, under the names of paganism, mythology, superstition and idolatry, with scarcely any more thought of their significance than readers generally have of the significance of the terms Foochooism, Lamaism, Druidism, Fetichism, philosophers, theologians, historians, and critics have generally treated this subject merely as one of the senseless vagaries of ignorant and debased communities, duped by priests and rendered abject by fear; rather than as a vast, organized, and essentially homogeneous system of atheism, bondage, and terror, by which the nature and effects of man's apostacy, guilt, condemnation, and final perdition are exemplified to the view of the universe;—such a rebellion of moral, accountable free agents, as can be suppressed and ended only by the transcendent power and grace, or by the avenging justice of the Creator, Mediator, and Ruler of the world.

Idolatry is a rival system in opposition to that of the Jehovah. It is the worship of a rival, a competitor, an antagonist. It is in all points opposed to the true religion, and Satan as head and leader of rebellion and rivalry is the founder, instigator, and object of the rival worship. That he instituted this method of securing to himself the allegiance and homage of the fallen human race immediately after the apostacy of man and by means of it exerted his sway over the antediluvian population is strongly indicated in the Holy Scriptures, and is justly to be inferred from the nature of the case, the object of his revolt, and the use which he made of the system in the succeeding ages among the heathen, the apostate Jews, and in more recent times in the Romish church. In the Epistle to the Romans, chapter i, there is a brief statement of the wickedness of men from the earliest period of their defection from the worship of the true God. They are collectively declared to be inexcusable: "Because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things"; and "changed the truth

of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more [rather] than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen. . . . And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind." In the Epistle of Jude holy men are exhorted "to contend earnestly for the faith which was once delivered to the saints. For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men, turning the grace of our God into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God [Jehovah Elohim] and (even) our Lord Jesus Christ [Jehovah the Saviour, Messiah]. . . . And Enoch, also, the seventh from Adam, prophesied of these, saying, Behold the Lord [Jehovah] cometh with ten thousand of his saints to execute judgment", etc. With like reference to the primeval period, it is said, Gen. vi: "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually . . . The earth was corrupt before God and was filled with violence . . . And the Jehovah said, I will destroy man whom I have created from the face of the earth".

These passages, taken in connection with the early institution of idolatry after the deluge, as if it were on a plan already digested and well known, sufficiently indicate that the preceding ages had been characterised by the like worship, as they were by the degrading and brutal vices and abominations peculiar to idolaters. The same conclusion is demanded and justified by the very nature and object of the rebellion and antagonism of Satan, which identifies him personally as head and leader of the revolt, aiming to establish a rival kingdom, as prince of the fallen angels, and professedly as god of this world.

Without attempting to illustrate the above propositions separately by distinct citations of authority, we must restrict what we have room to say to the leading features of the outline. It may suffice as evidence that Nimrod and his party erected the tower of Babel as the temple for the worship of Bel, Belus, Baal, represented by the sun, his supposed shekinah and tabernacle (as well as for the subordinate purpose of stellar observations by the priests of that deified intelligence), to

observe, that the same structure, renovated and enlarged, perhaps, occasionally, continued to be appropriated to that purpose as long as the kingdom and government of the Chaldeans and of Babylon endured,—a period of about nineteen hundred years. There is ample and varied evidence of this, both in the Scriptures and in the pagan records. The date assigned to the first undertaking of Nimrod, about one hundred years after the egress of Noah from the ark, precludes the supposition of any earlier post-diluvian institution of Idolatry. Till then the whole population was of one speech. The confusion scattered the idolaters from this metropolitan centre to different countries, where, retaining their original form of worship, they erected temples in imitation of that in Babylon, and consecrated them to the same chief intelligence and object of idolatrous homage: and where, being given over to a reprobate mind, they added to the original institute the system, the orgies, and the brutish vices of polytheism.

Josephus (*Antiquities*, Book I, chapter 4), expressing probably the explanation current among the learned Jews of his time, and anxious, perhaps, not to offend his idolatrous neighbors by any distinct allusion to Satan, says the early descendants of Ham “were so ill instructed that they did not obey God: for which reason they fell into calamities, and were made sensible, by experience, of what sin they had been guilty. For when they flourished with a numerous youth, God admonished them to send out colonies; but they, imagining that the prosperity they enjoyed was not derived from the favor of God, but supposing that their own power was the proper cause of the plentiful condition they were in, did not obey him. Nay, they added to this their disobedience to the divine will, the suspicion that they were therefore ordered to send out separate colonies, that, being divided asunder, they might the more easily be oppressed. Now it was NIMROD who excited them to such an affront and contempt of God. He was the grandson of Ham, the son of Noah, a bold man, and of great strength of hand. He persuaded them not to ascribe it to God—as if it was through his means they were happy—but to believe that it was their own courage which procured that happiness. He also gradually changed the government into tyranny, seeing

no other way of turning men from the fear of God, but to bring them into a constant dependence on his own power. He also said he would be revenged on God, if he should have a mind to drown the world again, for that he would build a tower too high for the waters to be able to reach ; and that he would be avenged on God for destroying their forefathers.

"Now the multitude were very ready to follow the determination of Nimrod, and to esteem it a piece of cowardice to submit to God ; and they built a tower . . . When God saw that they acted so madly, he did not resolve to destroy them utterly, since they were not grown wiser by the destruction of the former sinners, but he caused a tumult among them, by producing in them divers languages, and causing that they should not be able to understand one another. The place wherein they built the tower is now called *Babylon* . . . After this they were dispersed abroad on account of their languages, and went out by colonies everywhere." To confirm this account of the tower and the dispersion, to his heathen readers, Josephus quotes the good pagan authority, the *Sibyl*, as mentioning them. He then gives the original names of the countries or localities where the different colonies settled, many of which had since been changed and others substituted : but he adds, "Nimrod staid and tyrannised at Babylon."

Now if tradition represented Nimrod as asserting, and as persuading his confederates to believe, that their prosperity and abundance should be ascribed not to God but to themselves ; and if to ascribe their blessings to God was such an affront as to induce both him and them to defy his power and threaten revenge by erecting a tower higher than any possible flood, then it is just to infer, either that this was a renewal of the views entertained by the antediluvians for which they had been destroyed and that Nimrod personally aspired to rivalry with God and victory over him ; or that Nimrod was but the factor and spokesman of Satan. The scheme was as impious as it was vast and bold. How Nimrod could so soon after the deluge, and in so brief a space of time, originate and mature it, and persuade a happy and well supplied people to join him in it at such expense of labor and in open defiance and opposition to the Jehovah to whom they ascribed the del-

nge as a punishment of rebellion against him, it is by no means easy to conceive. But since there was an arch enemy of God and man, who had seduced and ruined the human race, who assumed to rule an antagonist kingdom of rebels in opposition to the Jehovah, and who claimed the homage and service of his subjects, and aspired to absolute mastery over them, it is credible, and conformable to every aspect of his subtlety and malice, that he should devise the system of rival worship and be himself the first, and even the supreme object of idolatrous homage. There is nothing overstrained or inconsistent in supposing him, in view of the victory of the Jehovah over him by the deluge, to have been actuated by motives of revenge as personal and as desperate as when he entered into and instigated Judas Iscariot to betray the Second Adam. But under what pretence Nimrod could assume to avenge himself on God for the destruction of the antediluvians for their wickedness, is not conceivable.

The principal topics which require consideration, relate to the original date, place, founder, and object of idolatrous worship; to the question, whether the first god of the system continued after the dispersion of mankind and the rise of polytheism to be in the different countries the one chief object of homage under various names in different languages; and to the design of images as symbols and representatives of the invisible chief intelligence, and of the inferior demons and heroes, to whom, as intermediate instruments of homage, they were consecrated. The historical testimonies which relate to these several subjects are connected and involved with each other, and cannot well be referred to separately. It is of consequence first to show that the intelligence designated in the Scriptures and in the lexicons and histories by the terms Bel, Belus, Belial, Baal, Belzebub, was the chief of the apostate angels called Satan, the tempter, the devil, the prince of the devils, god of this world, and by other equivalent epithets; that he was the primary and chief object of idolatrous worship in the temple of Belus, was at the head of the Babylonian pantheon, and also, under the same or other names, at the head of the pantheons of Assyria, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and the other pagan countries.

The fact that Bel was the great God of Babylonian idolatry in the temple of Belus is universally admitted. That he was the same personality as Beelzebub, Satan, the Devil, the Prince of fallen angels, is clearly taught in Scripture, especially in the New Testament. His not being expressly mentioned under these designations by Moses does not impair the evidence of his personal identity. In Gen. iii, he is called the *Serpent*; and though concealed from human view by a fitting embodiment, he speaks, and is spoken to and dealt with, as an intelligent person. In Job i and ii, he is called Satan—(*adversary, antagonist*)—also, 1 Chron. xxi, 1, Psalm cix, 6, Zech. iii, 1, 2; Isaiah xlv, 1, he is called *Bel*—“Bel boweth down”; Jer. l, 2—“*Bel* is confounded”—his images are broken; and li, 44—“I will punish *Bel* in Babylon”. In Judges, and the ensuing historical books, he is often denominated *Baal*, and his altar is spoken of in contrast with that of the Jehovah.

It is often a surprise to find in the introductory narrative of the Hebrew Scriptures, names and events introduced abruptly or familiarly, as though the subjects of them were already known. And there is abundant ground to conclude, not only from the character and the faith of the patriarchs, but from the prophecy of Enoch, and various allusions in the New Testament to Abel, Noah, Abraham, Melchisedeck, and others, that there was a mass of revealed doctrines and historic facts handed down from the beginning to the exodus from Egypt; when, as preliminary to a new series of events and revelations, and for the future instruction of all nations, such particulars of the primeval period as the case required, were reduced to writing by the hand of Moses.

In such a writing, that it might be intelligible to the generation then living, and to those to be instructed by them, the names of persons and places would naturally, nay, of necessity, be recorded as they were already known and in current use. Now of no fact, probably, were the earliest people of the several nations of the earth more fully convinced, than of the fact that there was an evil being, an apostate angel, a Satan, a devil, who, though personally invisible to them, had a hand in causing their miseries, was disposed to deceive, tor-

ment, and ruin them, and therefore was justly an object of fear and terror. When at the confusion of tongues the people were dispersed to different parts of the earth, they carried this conviction with them, and everywhere gave it the highest prominence in their theories of religion and philosophy, and made the Serpent the chief symbol of it. They distinguished this evil being from the opposite, whom they called the good Being, by personal names and titles, regarded them as equal in power, and as perpetually antagonistic to each other. Their fatal error consisted in their choosing, fearing, and serving the evil, instead of the good Being. They were, by the aid of their already depraved affections and dominant passions, as effectually deceived as Eve had been. Instead of going into a particular elucidation of this statement, we can only refer to Prideaux's account of the origin of idolatry,—of the Sabeian and Magian sects, of the doctrines of Zoroaster, and of the Persian system; to the dualism of the Persian philosophers, and in general to all writers on the ancient systems of pagan idolatry and philosophy. In most of the systems, and especially in the more barbarous nations, either the intelligence known as the devil and Satan, has been directly worshipped under those designations; or under the figure of the Serpent as his natural and acknowledged emblem and symbol.

But we fear that modern orthodoxy floating on the full tide of classical pagan literature, upheld by rationalism and false science, may reluctant at this view of the subject; and we therefore appeal to lexicographers and historians.

BEL. A name by which the heathen, and particularly the Babylonians, called their arch idol. (*Parkhurst.*) "Bel, Bal, or Beal, was the name of the chief deity of the ancient Irish." (*Ibid.*) "*Bel, Belus*, the chief domestic god of the Babylonians, worshipped in the celebrated tower of Babylon." (*Gesenius.*) *Herodotus*, Book I, chap. 181, describes a part of the tower of Babel as "the sacred precinct of *Jupiter Belus*". Being a Greek, he naturally added the name Jupiter to the Babylonian name of the same god. In a note on this passage, Sir H. C. Rawlinson observes that "The Babylonian worship

of *Bel* is well known to us from Scripture (Isaiah, etc.). There is little doubt that he was the recognised head of the Babylonian pantheon, and therefore properly identified by the Greeks with their Zeus or Jupiter. . . . In the inscriptions of Nebuchadnezzar, [the later, not the most ancient, which confessedly are not deciphered] the name of *Bel*, as a distinct divinity, hardly ever occurs. . . . In Assyrian inscriptions, however, *Bel* is associated with Babylon. Pul and Tiglath-Pileser both sacrificed to him in that city as the supreme local deity, and Sargon expressly calls Babylon 'the dwelling-place of *Bel*'. In a succeeding note he says—"The Chaldeans appear to have been a branch of the great Hamite race, *Akkad*, which inhabited Babylonia from the earliest times" [that is from the times of Nimrod]. "With this race originated . . . the institution of a religious system and the cultivation of all science, and of astronomy in particular." Herodotus in the next chapter says, "They—the Chaldeans—declare that the god comes down in person" into his temple; on which a note informs us that "This fable of the god coming personally into his temple was contrary to the *Egyptian* belief in the nature of the gods. It was only a figurative expression, similar to that of the Jews, who speak of God visiting and dwelling in his holy hill, and not intended to be taken literally." This is one of many instances in which the overpowering fascination of the recent discovery of Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian relics and inscriptions, has induced a belief or impression that their testimony—though as yet as imperfectly understood, perhaps, as what the geologists call the "Testimony of the rocks"—is of higher antiquity, credibility, and authority, than the literal language and testimony of the Holy Scriptures.

BAAL. "The ruler. By this name the idolaters of several nations worshipped the *solar fire*—which is to sense and appearance the ruling principle in nature.—Sanchoniathon (or whoever was the author of the *Phœnician theology*, published in Greek by Philo Biblius) says, speaking of the Sun: 'This god the Phœnicians thought to be the only lord of heaven, calling him *Beel saman*, which in their language is Lord of

Heaven. *Plautus*, in the Carthaginian language, writes it *Bal samen*." Parkhurst—who goes on to observe "that *Baal* as an object of worship meant the solar fire—that the contest between *Elijah* and the prophets of *Baal* was to determine either the superiority of *Baal* or that of *Jehovah*—that at first the idolaters worshipped *Baal* in conjunction with *Jehovah*"—i. e. the image of *Baal* as if it represented the *Jehovah* or the intelligence whom they regarded as the true creator and ruler of the world. The absurdity of supposing that the contest between *Elijah* and the prophets of *Baal* was intended to determine whether or not the Sun, instead of an intelligence alleged to have the Sun for his shekinah, was superior to the *Jehovah*, is palpable.

Bel. Nebuchadnezzar out of the spoils of Jerusalem "did make that golden image to the honor of *Bel*, his god, which he did set up, and dedicate to him in the plain of *Dura*" (*Prideaux*, vol. i, 87). "Nebuchadnezzar put all the sacred vessels which he carried from Jerusalem into the house of his god at *Babylon*, that is, into this house or temple of *Bel*. For that was the name of the great god of the Babylonians. He is supposed to have been the same with *Nimrod*, and to have been called *Bel* from his *dominion*, and *Nimrod* from his rebellion. For *Bel*, or *Baal*, which is the same name, signifieth *Lord*, and *Nimrod* a *Rebel*, in the *Jewish* and *Chaldean* languages; the former was his *Babylonish* name, by reason of his empire in that place, and the latter his Scripture name by reason of his rebellion in revolting from God to follow his own wicked designs. This temple stood till the time of *Xerxes*" (*Prideaux*, vol. i, p. 100). See also the same volume, p. 177, where in his account of the first idolaters, he says that "Their notion of the sun, moon, and stars, being that they were the tabernacles or habitations of intelligences, which animated those orbs in the same manner as the soul of man animates his body . . . they thought these the properest beings to become mediators between God and them. . . . They first worshipped them by their tabernacles, and afterwards by images also. By these tabernacles they meant the orbs themselves, in which the in-

telligencies had their habitations. And therefore when they paid their devotions to any one of them, they directed their worship toward the planet in which they supposed he dwelt."

"*Baal*, among the Babylonians, was called in the Aramean manner, *Bel*, *Belus*. . . . The Greeks gave him the name of Hercules, and compared him with Jupiter." (*Gesenius*.)

"*Belial*, Satan." (*Ibid.*) Satan as being the head, father, representative of rebels. Hence the phrases "Certain children of Belial" (Deut. xiii, 13), "Certain sons of Belial" (Judges xix, 22). "Deliver us the men, the children of Belial" (Judges xx, 13), "Count not thy handmaid a daughter of Belial" (1 Sam. i, 16), "Now the sons of Eli were sons of Belial" (*ibid.* ii, 12). "The children of Belial said, How shall this man save us?" (*ibid.* x, 27). "He is such a son of Belial, that a man cannot speak to him" (*ibid.* xxv, 17), "Let not my lord regard this man of Belial" (*ibid.*), "What concord hath Christ with Belial?" (2 Cor. vi, 15). Also a variety of phrases of equivalent import: "The children of the wicked one—Cain who was of the wicked one—Ye are of your father the devil—Thou child of the devil." *Bel*, *Belus*, *Belial*, *Baal*, *Beelzebub*, are names of one and the same personality; who in the New Testament is styled *Prince* of this world; "*Prince* of the power of the air" (Eph. ii, 2); "a *god* of this world" (2 Cor. iv, 4). Christ himself repeatedly designates Satan as "the Prince of this world" (John xii, 31; xiv, 30; xvi, 11), "Prince of the devils"—"Beelzebub, adversary, enemy, tempter, father of apostate Jews, instigator of Judas to betray Him". He therefore was the original object of idolatrous worship by the Chaldeans in the temple at Babylon.

That Satan was the instigator and supreme object of idolatry, is evident from his being the great and persistent antagonist of the Jehovah, and from his worship being represented as in rivalry and opposition to the worship of the true God, and as being directed toward the Sun as his *Shekinah*, instead of towards the *Shekinah* of Jehovah in the tabernacle. And the children of Israel "found the Jehovah, and served—(to) or towards Baal and [(to) or towards] Ashtaroth" (Judges ii, 13).

"He that will plead for Baal, let him be put to death. . . . If he be a god (Elohim), let him plead for himself . . . Let the Baal plead against him "who hath thrown down his altar" (Judges vi, 31). "The children of Israel cried unto the Jehovah, saying, We have sinned against thee, both because we have forsaken our Elohe, and also served Baalim" (*Ibid.* x, 10). "Then the children of Israel did put away *the* Baalim and *the* Ashtarothe, and served the Jehovah only" (1 Sam. vii, 4). These names have the article in the Hebrew text; and the meaning is that the people ceased to address their worship to *the Baal*, the one chief and rival god represented by the sun; and also that which they addressed to the inferior intelligence represented by the moon as queen of heaven, and restricted their homage to the Jehovah as dwelling in his shekinah of glory within the ark of the covenant. "And they cried unto the Jehovah, and said, We have sinned, because we have forsaken the Jehovah, and have served *the* Baalim and *the* Ash-tarothe: but now deliver us out of the hand of our enemies, and we will serve thee" (1 Sam. xii, 10). "And Ahab served *the* Baal, and worshipped him. And he reared up an altar for Baal in the house of *the* Baal which he had built in Samaria. And Ahab did more to provoke the Jehovah Elohim of Israel to anger than all the kings of Israel that were before him" (1 Kings xvi, 31). "And Elijah said, How long halt ye between two opinions? If *the* Jehovah be *the* Elohim, follow him: but if the Baal, then follow him. . . . Call ye on the name of your god (Elohe), and I will call on the name of the Jehovah: and *the* Elohim that answereth by fire, let him be *the* Elohim. . . . And they called on the name of the Baal from morning even until noon, saying, O Baal, hear us. . . . And Elijah said, Cry aloud: for he is a god (Elohim): either he is talking, or he is pursuing, etc. . . . And Elijah said, . . . Hear me, O Jehovah, hear me, that this people may know that thou art Jehovah *the* Elohim. . . . And—the answer being vouchsafed—all the people said, The Jehovah, he is *the* Elohim; the Jehovah, he is the Elohim" (1 Kings xviii). Here the rival objects of homage are alike addressed as personal intelligencies, each supposed by his worshippers to be

able to hear and answer, and to vindicate himself. The simple question was: Which is the true Elohim, and which the pretender and usurper? Again (1 Kings xix, 18), the Jehovah said to Elijah: "I have left me seven thousand in Israel which have not bowed unto Baal". "Ahaziah served *the* Baal, and worshipped him, and provoked to anger the Jehovah Elohim of Israel" (*ibid* xxii, 54).

"Jehoram put away the image of the Baal that his father had made" (2 Kings iii, 2)—that is, the image of the invisible person called the Baal. "Jehu said, Search, and look that there be here with you none of the servants of the Jehovah, but the worshippers of *the* Baal only. . . . And they brake down the image of *the* Baal" (*ibid.* x, 23, 27). And all the people (under Jehoash) "went into the house of *the* Baal and brake it down; His altars and *his* images brake they in pieces" (*ibid.* xi, 13). "Josiah put down the idolatrous priests . . . that burned incense unto Baal, to the Sun, and to the Moon, and to the planets, and to all the host of heaven" (*ibid.* xxiii, 5). The particle (*Lamed*) in the Hebrew text which is prefixed to the words translated Baal, Sun, Moon, etc., signifies in such connections, *to, towards, unto*. (See Gesenius.) As in Psalm xcix, 15, "Worship *towards* his footstool"; that is, turning *towards* it. Isaiah li, 6, Lift up your eyes *towards* the heavens—*tropically* of a turning or direction of the mind *to, towards, upon, any person or thing*" (Gesenius). The above passage, therefore, may with propriety be rendered, 'that burned incense unto the Baal, turning towards the sun'; and with reference to the mediate subordinates and auxiliaries of Baal, '*turning towards* the moon, and *towards* the planets', etc. So that a distinction between the sun and Baal as objects of worship is not intended. "They have built also the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto Baal (Jer. xix, 5). "And the Chaldeans shall come and set fire on this city, and burn it with the houses, upon whose roofs they have offered incense unto Baal, and poured out drink offerings unto other (i. e. another) Elohim" (*ibid.* xxxii, 29). "And they built the high places of *the* Baal, which are in the valley of the son of Hinnom, to cause their sons and

their daughters to pass through the fire unto Moloch" (*ibid.* xxxii, 35). The fire, it is well known, through which the victims were supposed to pass to the deified intelligence called Bel, Baal, Moloch, etc., was within the hollow of the material visible image.

Without further comment on these several passages, it is presumed to be evident beyond question, that the object worshipped under the name Baal was the invisible person elsewhere denominated Beelzebub, and Satan, the prince of the devils, and god of this world, as represented by the material images. The references to him are always in the singular, though some of the designations employed, as *Baalim*, are, like *Elohim*, often construed as if plural.

On the main point the Scriptures are consistent. They distinguish the one chief object of idolatrous homage from all inferior objects called gods and goddesses. They teach, that in rendering homage to that chief intelligence, the worshippers turned their faces towards the Sun, or towards an image supposed to indicate his attributes and his visible investiture, tabernacle, or shekinah; which practice being common to all the idolatrous nations, proves that they all worshipped the same chief god as head of their system. The ancient Greek travellers and historians, however, are by no means consistent with each other. For though in general they assert, or admit, that the chief god of the several nations was identical in attributes with that of Babylon, they also generally fail to regard the necessary inference as to the inferior attributes and place of the deified demons, heroic men, etc., and speak of them both collectively and individually, as though they were on a level in respect to attributes, and as though there was not a particular *One* who was the superior and prince of the rest, and who arrogated prerogatives not ascribed to them. In this our translators of the Hebrew Scriptures imitated the secular example by rendering epithets intended to designate the one personality named Baal, and sometimes *Elohim*, as if they were indefinite plurals and intended the whole genus of polytheism. Apparently, the confusion of the secular writers, even the best of them,

arose from their following the nomenclatures of successive pantheons founded on traditional legends and classified by reference to paintings and sculptured images, instead of being founded on the *attributes* ascribed in the inscriptions to the chief, and those ascribed to the inferior gods of the several pantheons. What the most ancient cuneiform inscriptions may contain on this subject no mortal can yet inform us; for the Greek historians do not tell, and the modern explorers and compilers are not yet able to read those records. And so far as the later Semitic type of inscriptions has been deciphered, they exhibit as compared with the inconsistent pantheons of the Greek historians, and as compared with each other, a profound confusion of mythical kings, of gods attended by goddesses, and of new names of places, rulers, and gods substituted by new and degenerate aspirants in the place and with the imputed attributes of their deified predecessors.

It would require more space than we can command to verify and illustrate these facts. But it is due to such believers in the holy Scriptures as Bryant and Faber, to observe, that finding no ground of confidence or satisfaction in the pagan theory, they by patient, persevering, and extraordinary labors, sought to construe the mythologies of the Greeks and others in such a way as to be consistent with the Mosaic narrative of events subsequent to the deluge. They therefore instead of relying on the heathen mythologies and legends, reasoned from the current traditions and monuments concerning the deluge, the building of Babel, the confusion of tongues, and the dispersion of mankind over all the earth, and traced the nomenclature of idolatry and polytheism back to Noah as the first deified hero of idolatrous worship; and as head of the subsequent pantheons. Back of him, however, they recognise no instigator or chief of the system. And they plainly seem to teach or imply, that the post-diluvians, out of gratitude and veneration, or from some other motive, were content to ascribe to him divine attributes and honors, and to worship him as the one chief god of their idolatry, and author of their blessings, in opposition to the Jehovah of the Old Testament Scriptures.

Considering then, that the names variously written Bel, Belus, etc., designated the first chief object of idolatrous homage in Babylon—that the tower of Babel was erected by Nimrod and his Hamite associates as the temple of that god, and that though refitted at different times by Nebuchadnezzar or others, it subsisted about nineteen hundred years till destroyed by Xerxes, about 470 B.C.—that in the course of this period, under different dynasties, other designations of this god were introduced and various modifications of the original name, as Bel-Samen, Bel-Merodach, which the later inscriptions have preserved—that the primitive name and various of its modifications and synonyms, as Baal, Moloch, Dagon, were adopted by the Canaanites and the Hebrews—that the worship of Baal was at first directed to the sun, as his shekinah, then to light and to fire, as emanations from the sun, without the intervention of *images*—that owing to the sun being out of sight about half the time, the worshippers substituted material visible images to supply the defect (see Prideaux i, 77)—that their first images were copies of the human form as the most obvious symbols of an invisible intelligence (and possibly having allusion to the theophanies of the Jehovah in that form) whom they called Baal and worshipped as their god—that polytheism grew up with the use of such images (see Calmet, Parkhurst, and others)—that when the moon and planets were named, the images formed to represent intelligences, demons, dead heroes, etc., as inhabiting them were named after them; we proceed to illustrate as concisely as we can the false theories which have prevailed and the inconsistencies and confusion of the nomenclatures, sculptures, and inscriptions lately brought to the notice of the public.

The principal writers on the subject, and probably all who have attained any considerable reputation, appear to agree in the opinion that post-diluvian idolatry was first instituted in Babylonia; that it consisted in the worship of one deified intelligence as supreme lord of the world; and that the same deity in chief was adopted by the succeeding nations and kingdoms as they arose. In general the same attributes are ascribed to the chief god of each of the nations, and the same

place assigned to them at the head of the successive pantheons. Polytheism was an aftergrowth. Beyond these facts the secular history and nomenclature of idolatry is in extreme confusion. Mr. Rawlinson observes, book 1, App., ch. 10, that "we have not yet acquired that mastery over the primitive language of Babylon—as distinguished from the later Semitic dialect of Assyria—which might enable us to verify the high pretensions of the Chaldeans in regard to natural religion, from modern materials. Of all the branches, indeed, of cuneiform inquiry, an explanation of the Babylonian mythology is undoubtedly the most difficult, not only from the extraordinary extent and complicated character of the subject—numerous independent objects of science being more or less closely connected with the Pantheon—but especially from the redundant nomenclature, each divinity having many distinct names by which he is indifferently designated, and being further indicated by an infinity of titles which may also be substituted at will for the proper name, according to the locality or attribute under which the god is worshipped. Of such titles there are at least forty or fifty appertaining to each deity; and in conning over, therefore, those mythological tablets in the British Museum, which contain lists of the gods or idols to be found in the different temples of the chief cities of Assyria and Babylonia, the student is bewildered by an endless variety of names, which, if they really indicated different deities, would render hopeless any attempt to dissect and tabulate the Pantheon." What is this but an express acknowledgment, after all, of the impossibility of determining anything whatever concerning the origin of idolatry from the monuments, the inscriptions, the language, the Pantheons, of the Egyptian, Assyrian, and Babylonian relics? What pertains to the remotest antiquity, the origin and the earliest ages of the idolatrous system, is as truly beyond their reach, as the time and manner of the creation, the true cosmogony of the earth, was to the ancient heathen and is to the modern geological and rationalistic philosophers. One cannot but wonder that, notwithstanding the confusion above described as arising from the modern date of the inscriptions as compared with the original

foundation of Babel, the author should still rely on these inconsistent and mythical authorities for the support of the prevalent theory concerning the origin and nature of idolatry, instead of taking as his guide the simple, intelligible, and far more ancient records and testimonies of the Holy Scriptures. During how many ages after the building of Babel the yet unmastered primitive language of Babylon prevailed prior to the intrusion of the less undecipherable dialect of Assyria, is not determined. But the author observes that, "so far as our present information reaches, it would seem as if Assyria during the long period of Chaldean supremacy had occupied a very inferior position in the political system of the East" (Rawlinson vol. i, p. 357). And yet in the arrangement of his list (see Sir H. Rawlinson's Essay i, p. 477) of the supreme idol deities of Babylon, Egypt, Assyria, Greece, Rome, etc., he gives precedence to that of Assyria, named *Asshur*, assuming, apparently, that he was the son of Shem, and that the apotheosis was coëval with the origin of idolatry. Whereas to Bel, Belus, Baal, Beelzebub, whom the Scriptures designate as the first god of idolatrous worship, he assigns a later date. He says: "There can be little doubt that in his character and position he answers to the great father, Jupiter, of the Romans; and it is equally certain that the primary element of his name is *Bil*, the Lord". But following the inscriptions, and, of course, construing them in accordance with his theory, he is of opinion that this god, variously designated as Bil, Bel, Belus, cannot be the same with the Babylonian Belus of later times; because the latter, as he thinks, is the same as *Merodach*, of the times of Hezekiah and Nebuchadnezzar: because "the famous temple of Belus of Herodotus is the temple of Merodach in the inscriptions"; and because the genealogy of Belus is by a certain writer applied to Merodach, and the designation of the God is sometimes given as Bel-Merodach. From these premises, as if forgetful of the change of language, above referred to, the practice which grew up of adopting new designations, and adding suffixes to the simple terms originally employed, he arrives at the impotent and gratuitous conclusion that, "If Merodach then be the true Belus of his-

tory, it is evident that this earlier and more powerful god could not have had the same identical name" (*Ibid.* p. 484). But with what sense can it be pretended that the name *As-shur* survived the admitted changes of language and increase of designations, which would not equally justify the conclusion that the primitive names, Bel, Belus, etc., notwithstanding those changes, still maintained their position and their significance in the Pantheon?

The consideration of the further propositions must for the present be postponed.

ART. VII.—PASSAGLIA, GUIZOT, AND DÖLLINGER ON THE ROMAN QUESTION.

PRO CAUSA ITALICA AD EPISCOPOS CATHOLICOS. Actore Presbytero Catholico. Florentiae, 1861.

OBBLIGO DEL VESCOVO ROMANO E PONTEFICE MASSIMO DI RISIEDERE IN ROMA, QUANTUNQUE METROPOLI DEL REGNO ITALICO. Per ERNESTO FILALETE. Firenze, 1861.

DELLA SCOMUNICA AVVERTENZE D'UN PRETE CATTOLICO. Firenze, 1861.

L'EGLISE ET LA SOCIÉTÉ CHRÉTIENNES EN 1861. Par M. GUIZOT. Troisième Édition. Paris, 1861.

KIRCHE UND KIRCHEN, PAPSTTHUM UND KIRCHENSTAAT. Von Dr. JOHANN JOSEPH IGN. VON DÖLLINGER. München, 1861.

THE question of the continued union of the Church and the State is at the heart of European politics. Among the great nations of the earth, the United States alone have passed, in their religious and political history, beyond the difficulties and entanglements of this inquiry. But in all other countries it is the yet unsolved problem—the sphinx's riddle of European diplomacy, to which no answer has been found. Amid commotions it is pressing toward a solution. In all other parts of

Europe, excepting Rome, the question takes the form, How can the Church be relieved from the superior, local authority of the State? In Rome it takes the form, Shall the Church (i. e., the Papacy) be deprived of its temporal rule? Shall the Pope cease to be a secular prince, and confine himself to a spiritual jurisdiction? Is the temporal sovereignty necessary to the rightful independence and authority of the bishop of Rome, as the head of the Catholic communion?

The course of events has made this papal question to be the central question of current European affairs. Italy has aroused itself from its political apathy, stilled its domestic feuds, become united under the Subalpine monarchy, and is now demanding, that Rome be made the capital of the new kingdom. The Pope resists, the Emperor Napoleon hesitates; but the handwriting is upon the wall. It is apparently only a question of time; a few months may decide the future fate of Italy, and the destiny of the Papacy. For whatever may be said about it by those Roman Catholic and even Protestant writers, who think that the papacy will flourish as well, when deprived of its temporal authority, as it now does — it rather seems probable that the loss of its temporal sway will drag down the papacy itself. It will lose its prestige among the nations. Its power will no longer be courted or feared. It will become a stipendiary of some secular government; and this will expose it to the envy or hostility of other powers. And the fact is, that the waning of its spiritual vigor is the very reason why these assaults upon its temporal possessions are so feebly resisted. Once it was mighty, and could ask no boon which kings would refuse; now it is in its decrepitude, its anathemas disregarded, and its infallibility contemned. Despoil it of the States of the Church, and its decrees will become advice, its mandates will have no terrors. France and Germany were both once enlisted to sustain the papacy, because, for a thousand years, they have been striving to obtain dominion over the Italian peninsula; and the favor of the Pope was therefore necessary to both. But let that peninsula become free, let these ambitious projects be annulled, and there is little reason left why either France or Austria should

submit to the papal domination. The unity of Italy is the decline of the Papacy.

The history of Italy ever since the peace of 1815 and the formation of the Holy Alliance, has been tending in this direction. That Alliance left Austria supreme in the peninsula, and seemed to give the papacy a new lease of power. Dating from that period, the ultra-montane tendency became predominant. The liberal Catholicism of Southern Germany, and the old Gallican Liberties, were rebuked. A retrograde movement was urged on by the restored Jesuits. The Propaganda was reinvigorated. The Carbonari in Italy were crushed by France and Austria. Even Sardinia gave education into the hands of the Jesuits. The civil offices in Rome were filled by ecclesiastics. Rome in 1825 celebrated a Jubilee. Even the French Revolution of 1830 stayed this papal progress for only a brief period. The insurrection of Ancona was suppressed by Austrian arms, which reëstablished the temporal sovereignty of Rome. The revolution of 1848 drove Pius IX from his capital to Gaeta; and even Ventura preached for a time political freedom. The Jesuits were again expelled from the States of the Church; Rome became a republic. But France and Austria combined and crushed the republic and restored the Pope. Cardinal Antonelli became the ruling genius of another strong movement to confirm the papal authority and rights. New concordats were concluded with Tuscany, Spain, Austria, Holland and Wurtemberg, in which large concessions were made to the See of Rome. The dogma of the Immaculate Conception was declared to be an article of faith by papal infallibility; and the idolatrous veneration of the Mother of our Lord was to add new zeal to the faithful, and deliver Rome out of all its distresses. The hierarchy was reëstablished in England, amid unavailing popular clamor. Oxford and extreme Lutheranism spake favorably of the "mother" church. Everything seemed to indicate a rapid progress of the papal power. But, meanwhile, men of thought, like Gioberti and Rosmini, were busy with schemes for the national regeneration. Gioberti, the philosopher and statesman, wrote vehemently against the Jesuits

(1846), and advocated an Italian confederacy, of which the Pope was to be the head, with liberal civil and social changes. Rosmini, too, in his famous work on the Five Wounds of the Church, contended for the virtual separation of the secular and the priestly power. Though his book was condemned, and he submitted to the decree, yet the influence of such speculations could not be prevented. Italy was full of projects for reorganization. And then came the hour of action. One kingdom had persistently refused to join in this reaction. Sardinia established a constitutional government. Victor Emanuel, king since 1849, resisted equally the threats and the blandishments of the priests. Under the patriotic and refined D'Azeglia, followed by the bold statesmanship of Cavour, ecclesiastical jurisdiction was abolished in civil and criminal cases; in 1855-6, convents and monasteries were confiscated on a large scale. The fulminations of the Vatican exploded harmlessly. The progress of events pointed to this kingdom as the true rallying point for the advocates of a national and united Italy. Mazzini's dreams of a republic faded away; Gioberti's scheme of a confederation under the papal presidency equally failed to satisfy the exigencies. A united Italy, under the royal house of Sardinia, with Rome as the capital, became the watchword and the rallying point. And the course of events has marvellously confirmed the wisdom of the plan, which the sagacious Cavour thought to be practicable, and which he pressed with such energy. To secure for Sardinia a place among the great European powers, he sent Sardinian troops to the Crimean campaign. Admitted to the diplomatic Congress of Paris, he introduced and pressed the Italian question, and procured a protest against the ecclesiastical misrule of the States of the Church. When Sardinia was fully prepared, Louis Napoleon in 1859 gave warning to Austria; and Lombardy was wrested from foreign rule by the campaign which ended in the battle of Solferino. Tuscany, Modena, and other states of Central Italy accepted with acclamation the rule of the house of Savoy. Napoleon could not prevent the union which he did not encourage. The next year the daring valor of Garibaldi wrested Sicily and Naples from the yoke of their

oppressors ; and Sardinia received a new kingdom, annexing also all the States of the Church up to the walls of Rome. Venetia and Rome still remain to be acquired ; Venetia, it may be, by arms ; and Rome by wrestling with the papal supremacy. At present, the presence of French troops in the Eternal City alone prevents the entrance of the Sardinian forces. The French Emperor is urging the Pope to yield, while concession is still possible. But in the correspondence recently published, Cardinal Antonelli writes that "no compact will ever be made with the spoilers of the Church. Any negotiation on this ground is impossible. The Sovereign Pontiff, as well as the Cardinals, before being nominated, bind themselves by oath never to cede any of the territory of the church. The Holy Father will therefore make no cession of that kind. Even a conclave of cardinals would have no right to do so, nor would a new Pope, nor any of his successors from century to century". Meanwhile popular demonstrations are reported as having recently taken place at Genoa and Milan, and in Rome itself, in favor of Victor Emanuel, and of Rome as the capital. At Milan the following protest was numerously signed : "Although respecting the Sovereign Pontiff of Rome, the head of the Church, we look upon Rome as the capital of Italy, with one king, Victor Emanuel". On Christmas last Rome was placarded all over with tri-colored handbills in favor of Italy. The streets were thronged with an enthusiastic multitude, crying : "United Italy forever ! Down with the Pope-King !" Baron Ricasoli, the straightforward successor of Cavour, has issued a circular, stating that the government is preparing to carry out the national wishes, and has made formal propositions about the mode of proceeding to Rome ; that the ministry will decide about these means ; and he deprecates all inconsiderate enthusiasm and clamorous manifestations.

Thus stands the Roman Question in the sphere of actual history. It offers the chief problem to be worked out in the onward course of European history. It appears to be approaching a solution favorable to the interests of civilization and the prosperity of religion. The old spiritual despotism,

which has so long ruled a large part of the world, must, it would seem, yield to the new spirit which is moving among the nations. Undoubtedly it is one of the turning points in the history of the Church. And hence the eagerness with which men listen to the words now spoken on this momentous theme by those who guide the thoughts, or indicate the tendencies, or seem to sway the destinies of mankind. Every enigmatic utterance from the Tuileries is made the theme of discussion. The chief interest centres, not in what the Pope says, but in what men say about the Pope. For it is felt that he is no longer the master of his own or others' fate. And among those who have recently spoken, the authors of the works we have put at the head of this article, occupy a conspicuous place. One of them represents the Italian theology; another is a French historian of wide philosophic views, Protestant antecedents, and conservative or compromising tendencies; the third stands at the head of the living German divines of the Roman Catholic faith. And their respective positions about the question enhance the interest awakened by their personal character and repute. The Italian, in the name of the Church, asks for the sundering of the temporal from the spiritual prerogatives of the Papacy; the French Protestant pleads in the name of Christianity, and as a check to infidelity, for the continuance of the present status of the See of Rome; the more speculative German boldly criticises the administration of justice in the States of the Church, clearly sees that the progress of events involves at least the suspension of the temporal sway of the Pope, but views all this as a transition stage to a better state of things, in which Rome shall repossess all its authority, and exercise it in a more spiritual and beneficent method. In Passaglia, Guizot and Döllinger, Italy, France and Germany, have uttered words which are worthy of being heard and heeded.

The significance of Passaglia's utterances is due in part to his eminent place among the Italian clergy. As a theologian he ranks with Perrone, even if he does not surpass him. As a member of the Society of the Jesuits, and a special confidant of Pius IX, he enjoyed unusual influence. His learning and ability are universally recognised. His various theological

productions are of a high order. In 1850 he published, at Rome, *Theological Commentaries*, in two parts, discussing the Trinity as represented in ancient symbols, the meaning of *essence* as applied to the Trinity, the right of the church to sanction formulas of faith, the nature of theology, and kindred topics. Another large work was a *Commentary on the Prerogatives of St. Peter, Chief of the Apostles, as proved by the Authority of the Divine Scriptures* (pp. 608). His *Lent Sermons* were issued at Rome in 1851. He is one of the editors of the new edition of the great work of Petavius, on *Theological Dogmas*. His *Commentaries on the Church of Christ* were published at Rome, in three vols. 1853-6. When the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was to be declared an article of faith, to him was assigned the office of drawing up the dogmatic definitions; and then he defended this article of faith by a huge collection of authorities and arguments in his *De Immaculato deiparae Semper Virginis Conceptu*, in 3 vols. 4to, Rome, 1854-5, pp. xiv, 2104. Among his minor writings is a treatise *De Aeternitate Penarum, deque Igne inferno*, 1856. He is one of the last men to be carried away by any enthusiasm about a novel opinion. Finding his views incompatible with the prevailing spirit of the Jesuit order, he obtained the Pope's approbation to leave it; yet he also received at the same time a fresh appointment as Professor of Philosophy in the Sapienza, or Roman University, where he was welcomed with applause by the students, partly on account of his rupture with the Jesuits. His influence was great and increasing. Apparently, in his personal traits he is a man to inspire confidence. One who has lately seen him, describes him as "a tall man, considerably above six feet high, with great breadth of shoulders, and flat chest; a spare, erect, imposing figure, with an easy, dignified, refined bearing; the most gentlemanly priest I ever beheld. His forehead is high, not massive, and rather slanting backward; the brow is sharp and prominent. He has a rich, glossy head of hair, slightly silvered all over. He may be fifty years old, certainly not more; and he complains that deep study and care have made him old before his time. He has regular,

deeply-chiselled features, with a remarkably wide, round, firm, but by no means heavy under-jaw. The eyes are deeply set, light brown; vivid, wakeful. The countenance is gifted with great mobility and sudden powers of expression. He is thin and pale, with deep furrows on the forehead and round the mouth. His habitual look is grave and thoughtful; but the face lightens up with occasional glimpses of great shrewdness and humor."

Nearly a year since, it was rumored that this eloquent and able divine was about to declare against the temporal rule as inconsistent with the present state of society, though allowable and useful in past days, taking the ground that the time had come for severing the diadem of royalty from the sceptre of the keys and the tiara of the priesthood. It was even declared, on no less an authority than that of the *Tablet*, that the Pope, amid his vacillations, allowed him to go to Turin on an embassy of conciliation, after the separation of the Romagna from the Roman States. At length, in September, appeared his now famous work *Pro Causa Italica*, which at once attracted the attention of Europe. Its positions were so bold and outspoken, that they portended a revolution. It was soon condemned by the Congregation of the Index, not by citing express passages, but for its general evil influence. Father Passaglia demanded a scrutiny of the Prefect of the Congregation. A Congregation of the Cardinals refused to admit his proffered defence. A papal Allocution of September 20th, inveighed in mediæval terms against the doctrines avowed in this work. The *Siecle* of Paris, said somewhat irreverently of this Allocution: "We find that addresses of this sort, in the different periods of the church, are very much alike, they always say that the enemies of the church are triumphing, that vice and crime are rampant, that hell has sent forth its monsters, that the faithful are exposed to terrific beasts; but that the Church in the end will surely triumph. The adversaries of the papacy are evermore rebels, robbers, and ruffians. . . . The last Allocution affirms that cursing, lying, murder, infamous journals, impunity for vice, prevail in Italy with the progress of such opinions". Father Passaglia was of course much sought

after by the Roman police; though his hostess, Madame Fulgens, proclaimed herself a British subject, yet her abode was searched. And meanwhile the defender of the Italian cause escaped in disguise; and had a triumphal journey to Turin, where he became the guest of a brother of late Minister Cavour. His name was erased from the list of Professors in the Roman University, and at once inscribed upon the list of the Professors of the University of Turin. At Rome his chair has been filled by the appointment of Abbé Pecci, also an ex-Jesuit, brother of the Cardinal Bishop of Perugia. In rapid succession Passaglia published the two other pamphlets cited at the head of this article, on the *Residence of the Pope in Rome*, and on *Excommunication*; and another pamphlet on *Schism, not a Threat of Revolutionists, but a well-founded Apprehension of Catholics*, which we have not seen. He is also one of the editors of a new religious journal, the *Mediatore*, published at Florence.*

We can only give a mere outline of the contents of these three works of Passaglia. The larger, and more important, is the plea to the Catholic Bishops for the Italian cause. In

* Others of the Italian clergy sympathise in this movement. Canon Pedimente, Abbé Simonetti, Father Papi, the prelate Liverani, Cardinal Chiesa, Father Belli, abbot of the Florentine Benedictines, Canon Reali, etc. Liverani's work on the *Papacy, the Emperor, and the Kingdom of Italy*, fearlessly exposes the corruptions and mal-administration of the ecclesiastical rule at Rome. "The Roman atmosphere", he says, "is impregnated with the vice of corruption". His scheme for reconciling the rights of the papacy and the crown, is to have the Pope crown Victor Emanuel King of Italy, reviving a mediæval fiction, that the ruler of Italy, when chosen by the Roman people, was to have his Italian sway consecrated by a papal benediction. He thinks that the King of Sardinia can demand this of the Pope as a legal right, under the compact made between Leo III and Charlemagne. Cardinal d'Andrea has also resigned his post as Prefect of the Congregation of the Index. He has published two letters to Antonelli, assigning the reasons, which are, in substance, that in the controversy about traditionalism, between the Bishop of Bruges and the Professors of Louvain, the Congregation of the Index decided in favor of the professors by the unanimous votes of sixteen members present; but that two absent Jesuit members having protested against the decision, the Pope overruled it, and Antonelli declared that the Jesuits must have their way. Don Fernando de Castro, one of the Queen of Spain's private chaplains, recently surprised the court, when assembled in the Chapel Royal, Madrid, by declaring his adhesion to the doctrines of Father Passaglia, in regard to the temporal power of the Pope. He also strongly advocated the unity of Italy. The sermon, it is said, has created the liveliest sensation in Madrid.

flowing Latin, with many a definition and patristic citation, and much circumlocution, he opens and develops his theme. He has very much to say of unity, and very much to say of the authority and glories of the episcopacy, and no person can hold more confidently, that Rome is the centre of unity to all the faithful. But yet, after all, he says, that unless the papacy really unites the Church, unless it is a source of blessings to the faithful, it fails in doing its real work, and it ought to be rebuked and reformed. This sounds like good Christian common sense; and it is finely illustrated, if not proved, by the Professor's copious citations from Cyprian, Augustine, and many of the fathers. He then urges the fact, that in the present state of affairs, the attitude of Rome is a source of disorder, perplexity, and innumerable evils. Italy demands, what Rome refuses, the abolition of the temporal possessions of the Church. If the Pope continue to refuse, greater evils still will be likely to ensue; and the church ought not to be the mother of discord, but rather of peace. Consequently, the Pope ought to give up his temporal power, and restrict himself to his proper spiritual functions, and then all will be well. And the temporal authority is not at all necessary to the papacy; the latter existed for many centuries without the former, and can do so again. The imperative interests of modern civilization demand this; and the state of society which made the temporal sovereignty a need and a blessing, has passed away. If the Pope will only forego his secular power, the Catholic Church will shine forth more glorious than ever. It is needful in the interest of Catholicism as well as in that of civilization. Such is the substance of the argument of the treatise *Pro Causa Italica*. And it is clenched by the intimation, that if the Pope does not yield, Italy will still maintain its ground, and a schism is inevitable. Cavour's policy, "*A free Church in a free State*", is the watchword for Italy.

As Protestants, we can very well admit the force of Passaglia's reasoning against the temporal sovereignty, without conceding his conclusion, that the loss of the princely crown will be a gain to the spiritual power of the Papacy. We can well afford to have the experiment tried, and think that events

indicate that it will be. We welcome his testimony to positions which Protestantism has constantly urged, especially to the main principle of his reasonings, that the church is for the union and welfare of the people, and that if it fails to secure this, it loses one of its strongest claims to authority. He also quotes and approves the saying of Jerome about the original equality of presbyters and bishops, and the right of presbyters to speak even when the hierarchy is opposed. He puts the case very strongly. He shows that the Roman Catholic bishops in their recent pastoral epistles have virtually betrayed their highest trust, have become a scandal to the church. To create dissension is no part of their proper office. Their real ministry is in the sphere of morals and the faith, and not in deciding questions of temporal order and rights. "Who", he asks, "ever gave these bishops the right to judge the princes of the earth"? St. Bernard long since said: "I have read that the Apostles were brought up to judgment, but never, that they assumed the character of judges". And even though the Pope may have said he cannot give up the temporal power, and have vowed to maintain it—still, such assertions and vows are not obligatory and unchangeable, because they have no proper divine warrant and authority. He depicts in vivid language the evils of the present state of things.

"Who does not see that the Italian people are hastening to that unhappy situation in which there is imminent peril, not trifling, but very serious danger; that a vast number of Italians, either by open and corporeal, or by secret and spiritual separation, are removed from the paradise of the church, and leave the church itself despoiled of its most chosen sons? Already a great part of the clergy are in open discord with the majority of the laity: already almost all the shepherds are separated from their flocks, whilst the shepherd of the shepherds, the successor of Peter, the venerable vicar of Christ on earth, hurls against the kingdom of Italy, and against Italian society, the dread thunderbolt of his censures. One might be tempted to believe that of the double power to bind and to loose, our bishops now retain the first alone, such concord do they exhibit in condemning, repelling, execrating whatever the whole nation desires and is striving to obtain."

He is especially vehement against the wholesale anathemas which the Pope has launched against Italian states and peo-

ple. Referring to the rule of Augustine, that excommunication should be sparingly used, where multitudes are infected with disease, he asks :

"Has this rule of the Church been observed by the bishops of Italy? Has it been taken any account of by the Roman Pontiff in the course of the recent political transactions? Had not the persons against whom his anathemas were thundered a multitude of company with them? Were they but few and scanty, and was the majority dissentient, or is it now dissentient from them? Were they destitute or are they now destitute of partisans sufficient to promote a schism? Let the Italian bishops reflect well on these matters, and observe whether the multitude of these populations are in favor of the superior authority which has inflicted a reproof, or in favor of the culpable party who resists it. Let them see to it, lest when the minds of the Italians are thus disposed, the excommunication tend, not to correct them, but to exasperate—not to heal with painful surgery, but rather to inflict a mortal wound."

Passaglia also discusses the question, whether political authority is necessary for the full and wise administration of the Pope's ecclesiastical power, concludes that the separation would not seriously impair his spiritual supremacy, and adds :

"And if there were former times in which the condition of human society was such as seemed to require that a civil principedom should be joined to the supreme Pontificate, the aspect both of public and private affairs is now so much altered, that nothing should appear to the Pope himself so desirable as a separation of the sceptre from the keys, and of the sacerdotal tiara from the regal diadem. Their separation is called for unanimously by those who are still subjected to the Papal reign, though unwilling and reluctant, by force of foreign arms; and it is called for unanimously by the populations of all Italy, which can no longer brook that the new kingdom should be deprived of Rome, its capital. It is called for unanimously by the most cultivated nations of Europe, who are convinced by the plainest reasons that nothing but loss and ruin can accrue to religion and to the Papacy from its retaining the temporal dominion. It is demanded by the approach of those dangers, both to the Church and to civil society, which cannot be averted unless the supreme Pontiff will incline his mind to counsels of peace and concord. It is demanded by his office, as the chief pastor, which should be wholly exercised for the benefit of the flock. It is demanded by every right, both human and divine."

The second pamphlet of Passaglia, published under the name of Ernesto Filalete, gives the reasons why the Pope

should still have his residence in the city of Rome, even if it become the capital of the Italian kingdom. Only calamity would result, he says, from such an exile. The Italians would be alienated, and Protestants encouraged. The papal exile at Avignon shows what must be the deplorable consequences. Ever since the year 42, he alleges, Rome has been the seat and centre of ecclesiastical power. The ancient episcopal seat was at St. John Lateran, on the Coelian hill, the place which Constantine designated. At present it is only a cathedral church, ruled by a vicar; and the Pope is on the Vatican hill, near the supposed site of St. Peter's tomb. Here, according to many ancient decisions, is his appropriate earthly residence. And no pontiff ought to quit this consecrated place, unless forced to do so against his will.—The third tract of Passaglia examines the subject of excommunication in its ecclesiastical and civil aspects. He boldly asserts, citing the high authority of Innocent III, that persons may be excommunicated by the church, without being excommunicated by God. Count Cavour, he contends, may not have gone to perdition, even though he died under the ban; and this, too, in part, for the reason, that the bull of the Pope was not published in the Sardinian kingdom. And, besides, such a sentence is of proper effect only when it relates to spiritual matters, over which alone the church has jurisdiction; it is void, when it refers to secular affairs. In a still wider view of the subject, he proves by many authorities, that excommunications are of no effect, when they embrace large multitudes in a state of schism, because then they are detrimental to the church. This undoubtedly involves a serious drawback upon the papal authority; and it may be well enough as a transition theory. But it really undermines the power of the keys, and is undoubtedly inconsistent with the past claims and acts of the papacy. But if Passaglia can persuade Catholics to embrace this view of excommunication—so much the better.

The volume which M. Guizot has published upon the same question discusses the subject, as the title indicates, from a more general point of view. It is a grave and eloquent plea for an Italian confederacy; but it shows the lack of decision,

and the inability to appreciate a real historical crisis, which have always marked the thoughts and counsels of the great *doctrinaire*. His work was occasioned by the severe criticism which assailed the intimation of his views made April 20, 1861, in an address before the Society for Primary Instruction among Protestants. The chief Protestant thinker of France then declared in favor of the inviolability of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, following the lead of Montalembert. The contrast between the timidity of the French Protestant and the boldness of the Italian Catholic is most marked. The statesman distrusts the people, liberty and the church; the theologian believes in truth and progress. In twenty-four chapters, Guizot reviews the present state of the European churches and of European society, throwing out many thoughtful and fruitful suggestions. The great evil of the day is infidelity; the great need of the day is to sustain the Christian Church. This can only be done safely, as the rights of all portions of that church are scrupulously maintained. By international law, the Pope has a right to the States of the Church. Consequently, that right must remain intact. In the growth of Sardinia he sees only a usurpation; in the Italian movement, he cannot discern any religious element; he fears the inroad of an unbridled democracy. In short, his position is this—to restrain infidelity and democracy, we must uphold the temporal sovereignty of Rome. He agrees with Professor Leo of Halle, and the ultra-Lutherans who last year had a conference with the Catholics, and adopted substantially the same position. And Hengstenberg applauds his views. But with these exceptions, the Protestant world has given unmistakable signs, that it has no sympathy with such theorising. To confound the Roman Catholic church with Christianity is bad enough; but to make the temporal sovereignty necessary to the welfare of the church, and the subjugation of infidelity, is to sanction, in theory, the most extravagant and unchristian claims of the Papacy. In fact, history shows, that the great hindrance to the growth of the church, and one of the constant sources of infidelity, is found in the despotic claims and temporal sovereignty of the papal power.

But it is time for us to hear what the German professor has to say on this crisis. Dr. Döllinger is the foremost name among the living historians and divines of the Roman Catholics of Bavaria. He is known to English readers by Cox's translation of his *Church History to the Reformation*, in 4 vols. 1848. He has also written able works on the *Reformation* (2d ed. 2 vols. 1852); on *Luther* (1851), to whom in this sketch, and in his last work, he does more justice than most Catholics; on *Hippolytus and Callistus*, 1853; on *Heathenism and Judaism*, 1857, a very able work; on *Christianity and the Church in the Period of its Formation*, 1860; besides *Addresses* at the German Diet, 1846, and a *Plea for the Freedom of the Church*, 1849. In two lectures delivered last year at Munich, he expressed himself in such terms about the temporal sovereignty, that both Protestants and Catholics were taken by surprise. He was understood to counsel the abandonment, at least in the present state of things, of the States of the Church. But at the Catholic Association he protested that his views had been misunderstood, and took occasion, as Germans are very apt to do, to publish a work on the whole subject, printing his lectures *verbatim* in the Appendix.

This volume is the ablest, historically and theologically, that has recently appeared in this controversy. It is a review of the history of the Papacy in relation to the nations. His main position is this; the church for a large part of its history (at least seven centuries) got along very well without the temporal power, and it may do so again, if compelled to this by the course of providence. The present tendency of affairs is to this consummation. "So long as the present state of Europe exists, we can discover no other means of ensuring the liberty of the papal see, and therewith the general confidence." But such a state of things, he further argues, will only be temporary. The Papacy in better times may reäsume all its prerogatives. But to save it in the present juncture, it may be necessary to give up, temporarily, its secular authority. Even if that authority should not be revived, still Providence, in ways unknown, may provide for the perpetuity and independence of the papal see. In connection with these positions, Dr. Döllinger also severely criticises the present govern-

ment of the States of the Church. "The priest is the last to be entrusted with the execution of law, for, by virtue of his office, he is the herald of mercy, while the law is the dispenser of justice." He cites among other things the Achilli case—of which no defence was ever allowed to be published in England or Rome. He condemns the use of ecclesiastics as a police, their direction of lotteries, which former popes condemned, and the like. He also animadverts strongly on an edict of the Inquisitor Airaldi in Ancona, 1856, which bound every one to denounce all offences against the church, under the severest penalties. The States of the Church, he says, ought to be the most moral, quiet and prosperous of all countries—but they are quite the reverse. Hence the necessity of a change. The work abounds in professions of faith in the papacy, and severe criticism of its present condition and prospects. It shows that liberal Catholicism still has a home in Bavaria.

One objection to the temporal power, which he strongly urges, is, that the Pope is only "an electoral prince"; and that all electoral kingdoms have no roots in the people. "From such considerations", he adds, "men, held by the church in the highest repute, like Bellarmine, came to the conclusion, that the Popes had better not occupy the twofold position of temporal prince and head of the church". "How should we in Germany put up with a bishop as governor of a province?" "Nothing arouses greater animosity than the use of political means to further religious ends."

In conclusion, he sums up the case, in five facts. 1. The Holy See existed for seven hundred years without temporal possessions, and then for seven hundred and fifty in disturbed possession of its States. The present mode of administration is really only forty-five years old. 2. Temporal Sovereignty is not necessary in itself, or at all times, to the dignity and freedom of the Pope. 3. The Italian people find in the States of the Church the great hindrance to national unity. 4. For the past forty years two large factions have labored to upset the government, and no part of the population of the States of the Church has shown real attachment to

the papal power. 5. Europe for a century has tended to a separation of the temporal from the spiritual power. In the States of the Church alone do ecclesiastics administer secular affairs. On the basis of these five facts, he proceeds to give five possibilities as to the future. 1. Austria may reconquer Lombardy, and restore the alienated States to the Church. But this would convulse the peninsula with revolutions. 2. A United Italy under Sardinia, and the secularization of the States of the Church. In this case, he thinks the Pope would be compelled to leave Rome at least for a time; but he has no faith in the permanency of the new kingdom, and thinks the result would be, that, if this contingency occurs, the Pope would after a time return to rule over a purified state. 3. A general Congress of the Catholic European powers, which might restore the States to the Church, and also purify its administration. 4. The Pope may be compelled to reside permanently in France, or some other state. 5. The States of the Church may be taken away from the papacy; and the Pope be placed under the protection and support of the Catholic powers. Towards this last solution, the arguments of Dr. Döllinger tend with great force. Amid all difficulties, however, he adds, "one thing is certain; one institution will remain erect; the Church of Christ will rise unimpaired out of the floods of revolution, because it is indestructible and immortal". And this last conclusion, interpreted of the real Church of Christ, is the best inference from this whole discussion.

Theological and Literary Intelligence.

BUNSEN doubted even the existence of the African Latin poet, Commodianus, who is usually assigned to about A.D. 270, and reported to be the author of some 80 moral precepts in verse, edited by Nic. Rigaltius, 1650. Routh defended Commodianus against Bunsen. In Pitra's *Spicilegium Solesmense* new materials are collected, and Bunsen's doubts exploded. The same collection publishes fragments of the writings of Verecundus, of whom little was previously known, excepting that he wrote in defence of the council of Chalcedon. Pitra gives his commentaries on ecclesiastical hymns, also hymns, and verses, and extracts on the Chalcedon council.

Of the first printed Bible, eighteen copies are now known to be in existence; four of which are printed on vellum. Two of these are in England; one being in the Grenville collection. One is in the Royal Library of Berlin, and one in the Royal Library of Paris. Of the fourteen remaining copies, ten are in England; there being a copy in Oxford, Edinburgh and London, and seven in the collections of different noblemen. The vellum copy has been sold as high as eight hundred dollars.

Tyndale's version of the Prophet Jonas has been discovered by Lord Arthur Hervey. It has been supposed that no copy was extant.

Traces of the Ancient Northmen. A communication from Professor Charles E. Rafn, of Copenhagen, Secretary of the Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries, to Rev. Abner Morse, of Boston, reports the discovery of ancient hearths in Denmark, like those on Cape Cod, lately reported by Mr. Morse as the work of Northmen; and adds, that it has been resolved to publish drawings of the former hearths, with descriptions of the latter, in the transactions of their society. Mr. Morse has since read a second paper before the H. G. S., describing traces of the Northmen on Nantucket and in Dedham; and also relics, not aboriginal, at different places on the natural route from Hudson to Ohio rivers; and as one class of these is identical with relics in Massachusetts, attributed to them, some evidence may exist that they removed to the West, where, seven hundred miles west of Lake Superior, "the polite and friendly Mandan Indians, with hazel, gray and blue eyes, and hair of various colors, and complexions as light as half-breeds", might, as late as 1838, have been their representatives!—*Boston Journal*.

Fac-simile of St. Matthew. The notorious Constantine Simonides has at length published this fac-simile, which he professes to have found in some papyri of Mr. Mayer's Museum in Liverpool, collected by Rev. H. Stobart. It is adorned with an authentic portrait of St. Matthew, "executed in the fifth century by Hierotheus of Thessalonica", "preserved among the frescoes of Athos". The past career of Simonides is of itself enough to throw

doubt upon any such alleged discoveries ; though he is out in his own defence in the London *Athenæum*, giving some curious details of his personal history. He claims to have a MS. of Sanchaniathen, ten books of Horus in hieroglyphics, a History of Armenia, from the times of Justinian, etc. He confidently reasserts the genuineness of the papyri of St. Matthew. Mr. Stobart also writes to the *Athenæum* expressing his astonishment at these remarkable discoveries.

G R E E C E.

The *Popular Songs* of modern Greek literature have been collected by Arn. Passow, and published by Teubner of Leipsic, in a volume of 650 pages. The work is said to be well executed, comprising historical, domestic, love, and pastoral songs. The chief object of the editor was, however, philological. Full indices, and a needed glossary, are included in the volume.

The third part of Philemon's *History of the Greek Revolution*, pp. 483, has appeared at Athens. The *Historical Sketches* of Spyridon Zampelios are edited by N. Dragumis. A *Biographical Sketch* of Rigas Pheraios of Thessaly has been published at Athens. A collection of the *Lyrics* of Karasontsas, pp. 199. Athens.

The Rev. J. T. Walters, of the Church Missionary Society, writes about Kalopathakes and his journal, *The Star of the East*, that the editor "received his education in America, and appears to be a man of knowledge and talent. His articles give no uncertain sound. The fanatical party among the Greeks are opposed to this paper, and so are the hierarchy, which he does not spare. But in spite of this opposition, the truth comes out boldly."

A novel in modern Greek by Stephanos T. Xenos, has been published in London, entitled, *The Heroine of the Greek Revolution*, or Scenes in Greece, from 1821 to 1828. The style approximates to the ancient Greek.

G E R M A N Y.

The *Studien und Kritiken*, 1862, No. 1, opens with a discussion by Dr. Bähr, of the universal priesthood (1 Pet. ii, 5, 9 ; Rev. i, 6) as the basis of the theory of church government. This was the view of Luther. Calvin, on the contrary, in discussing church government, starts from the idea of the church as the body of Christ (Ephes. iv, 4-16 : see Institutes III, 4, 1). Bähr argues acutely against the Lutheran view. Ullmann, in the second article, coincides with Bähr so far as this—that the universal priesthood cannot be made the organizing principle of church government, but contends that it must be used as a corrective, and to stimulate the activity of the laity. The third article, by Gumlich, is on the enigmas in the narrative of the Raising of Lazarus. Köster illustrates from classical writers various passages of Scripture. Krummacher, on Romans, seventh chapter, contends that Christians are the subject of the Apostle's description.

Ernest Frederick Zwirner died at Cologne on the 22d of September, aged sixty years. He was the architect under whose charge the great Cathedral of Cologne was slowly advancing to completion. He was one of the foremost architects of Europe.

The German papers have lately been publishing an inventory of all the

earthly possessions left behind him by Mozart, and of which his widow had to give account to his creditors. The list is a mournfully meagre one.

Hofrath Hantz is preparing a history of the University of Heidelberg. This University is one of the oldest in Germany. Founded in 1386, it only yields the palm of age to those of Prague and Vienna, founded 1348 and 1365 respectively.

Chevalier Bunsen's widow is preparing for publication *The Memoirs and Correspondence of her Husband*.

George William Frederic Freytag, the celebrated Oriental scholar, died on the 16th of November, at Dortendorf, near Bonn. He was the author of several Arabic works, the principal of which was his great *Lexicon Arabico-Latinum*, in four volumes.

Prof. Hagemann of Hildesheim, in the *Theologische Quartalschrift*, Heft 4, 1861, conceding that the Second Epistle of Clement of Rome is spurious, runs an interesting and new parallel between it and the Shepherd of Hermas, showing that they indicate the same general tendency. Agreeing with Uhlhorn, that the mass of the early Pseudo-Clementine literature had its origin in Syria, he finds in the above facts evidence that there was also a contemporary literature in Rome of a like character. Among the points of agreement between Hermas and the Second Epistle of Clement, is their ignoring the doctrine of the Logos, making Christ before the incarnation solely Spirit.

Ranke, in the third volume of his History of England in the 16th and 17th Centuries, does better justice to Cromwell's political sagacity and executive power than any preceding continental author. To realize the ideas of civil order and national independence, and to create a great Protestant commonwealth, were the main objects he had in view.

Among the works condemned by the Congregation of the Index, 17th August, 1861, are various dissertations of Ernest von Lasaulx on the Philosophy of History; the Theological Basis of all Systems; the Prophetic Power of the Human Soul; Life of Socrates, etc. The author, it is said, submitted to the decree before his decease. His various works show learning and penetration, and are written in an animated and eloquent style.

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM.

The Library of Jesuit authors (Bibliothèque des Ecrivains de la Compagnie de Jesus), by Augustin and Alois de Backer, has reached its 7th volume. It contains an account of all works published by members of the Order, and of all the controversial works relating to the Jesuits. Each volume runs through the entire alphabet. It is intended to be one of the most complete of bibliographical works.

The veteran Professor, W. A. Van Hengel, has published on the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, subjecting the history of the work to a new examination. J. J. Van Osterzee has completed his *Christology, or Person and Work of Christ*. Rotterdam, pp. 504. J. J. de Geer has completed his *History of the Province of Utrecht*, in one volume, with maps. A second edition of Considerant's *History of the Revolution of the 16th Century in the Low Countries*, is published at Brussels, edited by Frédéric. H. G. Moke's *History of Ancient Belgium* is published in a second, enlarged edition.

The city of Dordrecht, the birthplace of Ary Scheffer, intends to erect a statue to the artist. A grand fête will be celebrated on the occasion, for which the poet Mynheer van den Bergh, at the Hague, has been invited to write a cantata.

SCANDINAVIA.

Among the recent works are *A History of the University of Lund*, by Ahnfelt, vol. i; the fifth and last fasciculus of the *Lexicon Poeticum antiquæ Linguae Septentrionalis*, by Ergilssohn, for the Royal Society of Northern Antiquities; Helweg, *Danish Church History*; a new edition of *Livy*, by Madvig and Ussing; a new edition of Oehlenschläger's poems; a revision of Foersam and Wulf's *Translation of Shakspeare*, by Lembke.

Dr. Alexander Herzen, son of the Russian political refugee and author, is engaged on a work on the natural history of Iceland, embodying the observations of a recent exploration of that island.

RUSSIA.

The University of St. Petersburg has been dissolved; the universities at Moscow and Kazar have been closed.

There were published in St. Petersburg, during the year 1860, three hundred and ten journals, being an increase of nineteen over 1859. Of these, 230 were Russian, 28 German, 29 French, 2 Russian and French, 1 Russian, French, and English, and the rest Esthonian, Celtic, and Hebrew.

Catherine the Great, Empress of Russia, compiled a voluminous dictionary of the dialects of all nations. Professor Müller says, agreeably to her request, General Washington procured for the Empress a considerable number of specimens of the dialects of our Indian tribes.

Russian History is to be soon enriched with the second volume (treating of ethnography and statistics) of Schnitzler's "L'Empire des Tsars." The first volume was published some seven years ago.

FRANCE.

Among the recent works on theological subjects are B. Aubé, *Saint Justin, philosophe et martyr*, in one volume; J. Cohen, *Les Deicides*—an examination by a Jew, of the Divinity of Christ from the Jewish point of view; J. Collin de Plancy, *Collection of the Legends about the Old and New Testament*, and the *Commandments*, from all sources, in three volumes; F. Duilhé de St. Projet on *Religious Studies in France* in the 18th and 19th centuries; a second volume of Munk's translation of *Maimonides' Guide of the Wandering*, with the Arabic text; Abbé Flottes, *Etudes sur Saint Augustin*; Abbé Freppel, *Saint Irenée et l'Éloquence Chrétienne dans la Gaule*; Veuillot, *Le Parfum de Rome*, in two volumes, a eulogy of the saintly odor of the eternal city.

The first volume of a French translation of Herder's *Philosophy of History*, by Emile Tandel, is published by Didot.

M. Renan has been nominated for the professorship in the College of France, both by the College and by the Academy of Inscriptions. The chair is vacant by the death of Quatremère.

M. de Saulcy has published a new examination of the Campaigns of Julius Cæsar in Gaul, which excites much interest.

From the 22 vols. of Vinet's works, and from 14 periodicals, Prof. Astié of Lausanne has collected the materials for his excellent *Esprit de Vinet*, in

2 vols. Chs. Secrétan has an able review of his work in the *Revue Chrét.* December, 1861.

The Count de Gasparin, author of the remarkable work on our country, has recently published at Geneva an essay on the Prospects of the Present Times, discussing Pantheism, Deism, and the new French and German school; and suggesting the remedies in a return to the simplicity and force of the old Gospel.

A son of George Sand, who accompanied Prince Napoleon to this country, has published, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, portions of his diary made during his visit to America. He writes warmly in favor of the Northern States.

Alfred Dubois, in his recent work on the Prophets of the Cevennes (*Les Prophètes Cévenols*, Strasburg, 1861), traces the remarkable phenomena exhibited by them to magnetic causes. They began about 1688-9, and continued at intervals to 1750.

Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire continues his translation of Aristotle by the publication of the *Physica*, in two vols., with notes. This is announced as the first French version.

The *Revue Chrétienne* for January contains an article by Pastor Fisch, whose visit to this country last year is so cordially remembered. He describes in plain terms the real character of our present struggle, as the conflict of freedom and slavery. He recognises the vast influence of the separation of Church and State upon the welfare of our churches. The article breathes the warmest sympathy for our institutions and churches.

M. de Pressensé has published the second portion of his *History of the Early Christian Church*, in 2 vols., comprising the struggle against paganism, and an account of the martyrs and apologists.

M. Foucher de Careil has added another work to his valuable series on Leibnitz, viz. the Jewish Philosophy or Cabala, containing the observations of Leibnitz on Maimonides' Doctor Perplexorum.

The *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, Oct., gives in full the preface to Theiner's work on the Temporal Power—a collection of documents which is to extend to six folio volumes. The first, published at Rome, gives the documents from A.D. 736 to 1334. The other chief collections are Lunig's *Codex Italiae Diplomaticus*, Frankfort, 1726, 2 vols (a Protestant work); Abbé Cenni's *Monumenta Dominationis Pontificiae*, 2, 4to, Rome, 1760; and the *Annals of Baronius*, continued by Raynald. Theiner has made use of the Roman Registers.

ITALY.

Augusto Conti, Professor of Philosophy in the Lyceum at Lucca, has published a work in two volumes on the *Criteria of Philosophy*, particularly discussing its relations to faith. The introduction consists of a dialogue of about 200 pages, on Christian philosophy. The interlocutors are a physician, a geometrician, a jurist and a literary man, who hear the pleas of two philosophers, a traditionalist and an advocate of the spiritual school of Descartes and Kant. The aim of the book is to reconcile these two tendencies on the basis of the Christian system. Naville gives an account of it in the *Revue Chrétienne*, Nov. 1861. M. Debrit, in Oct. 1859, of the same periodical, had a sketch of the Italian philosophy.

The *Correspondance de Rome* announces fresh discoveries in the basilica of St. Clement, first opened in 1857. Among these is a fresco of St. Clem-

ent, surrounded by several figures, two of which bear the names of Sisinnus and Theodora. Another inscription gives the portraits and names of the earlier bishops of Rome in the following order: Linus, Petrus, Clemens, Cletus. These are probably from the 5th or 6th century.

It is stated that a manuscript of Galileo and an unpublished drama of Metastasio have lately been found in the Archives of Lucca, and will shortly be made public.

A pamphlet has been published containing a collection of original letters of Count Cavour, particularly during the Congress of Paris, which discuss the bases of the regeneration of Italy.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

The Spanish Universities are divided into six Faculties, viz. 1. Philosophy and Literature; 2. The Exact and Natural Sciences; 3. Pharmacy; 4. Medicine; 5. Law; 6. Theology. A decree of the minister De Fomente, Sept. 25, 1858, gives a list of the text books prescribed in the different Faculties. We copy from Gersdorf's Repertory a part of the list in Theology: On the Basis of Religion and on Infidelity, the treatises of P. A. Vasseccchi, L. Bailly, and Perrone; on Theology proper, Opstraet's *Loci Theologici*, Perrone's *Institutiones Theologicæ*; on Moral Theology, Ant. a S. Josepho, Cuniliati, and Charmes; on Exegesis, Wonters, Ticinus, and Mentius; on Hermeneutics, Janssens, Lamy, Glaire, etc.

A volume of Essays written by the late King of Portugal, treating with a liberal spirit on political topics, will soon be published in Lisbon.

In the Memoirs of Stephen Grellet, a member of the Society of Friends, 2d ed. 1861, is an interesting account of a visit, in 1819, to the *Secret Library* of the Inquisition in Rome, not described by any other traveller. Here are preserved the books put on the Index, and the records of the Inquisition. Mr. Grellet spent some hours in examining this unique collection.

GREAT BRITAIN.

The *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, Jan. 1862, is largely made up of articles reprinted from American periodicals. From the *American Theological Review* it has three articles: Prof. Lawrence on New England Theology; Rev. L. Whiting on the Old Testament in the New; and Dr. Stearns on The Moral Aspects of the Present Struggle in America. It says that it reproduces the latter article "merely to show how the American Secession is viewed and explained by an intelligent Northern writer". With such caution and reserve do some of the best men in Great Britain talk about our present condition. The attack of the *Princeton Review* on Dr. Hickok is also given, and introduced with the remark that his Rational Psychology "seems to be forming a school of American Rationalists!" We commend to the attention of the editors of the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, the article of Dr. Lewis in our January number, and that of Dr. Hickok in our present number. A criticism of Mansel, Maurice, Young, and Calderwood, strong and just against Mansel's theories, particularly showing the wide difference between his ethical theory and that of Bp. Butler; The Later Religious History of Scotland; The Protestant Church in Hungary; Discussions in France on the Supernatural (Bois and Réville); the

Pauline Doctrine of the Righteousness of Faith, interpreted as a real righteousness, viz. that of Christ in our stead; the Late Principal Cunningham—are the other articles of the number.

The British Quarterly Review for January discusses the Revision of the Liturgy, with an account of the ejection of 1662; Miss Knight's Autobiography; De Tocqueville's Memoirs; Goldwin Smith's Ireland, to which it awards the highest praise; the Fourfold Biography of the Gospels; Charles Dickens; Facts about Railways; Mormonism; the Free Churches of England. This last article shows, that while during the last fifty years the Church of England has fallen 70 per cent behind the growth of the population, Dissent has placed itself 303 per cent in advance—in the supply of church accommodations. The whole subject is fully discussed in Thos. Flint's Voluntaryism in England and Wales. The article on the Revision of the Liturgy says, that during the last twelvemonth some forty publications have appeared on this subject. One of the best of them is by John Fisher, *Liturgical Purity our Rightful Inheritance*.—The tone of English feeling toward America, even among the Independents, may be inferred from the following extract from the *Epilogue on Affairs*: "Remembering the past, we have no faith in the doctrine that the continuance of the colossal Union which has grown up over that vast territory is desirable. We feel convinced that some division, and perhaps more than one, would be favorable in many ways to the progress of international harmony, and of Christian civilization." Dread of the growing power of our republic is manifestly the deepest feeling that most Englishmen entertain toward us.

The Journal of Sacred Literature, Jan., has articles on the Mines and Metals of Antiquity; the Gospel of St. Matthew; Early Life of Bossuet; Remarks on Isaiah xviii, 1, 2; Hindu Philosophy and Indian Missions; Exegesis of Difficult Texts (John xix, 10, 11; Luke xii, 49-51; Ephes. i, 6, 22, 23—ii, 2, 21—iv, 16; Colos. ii, 19, etc.); Remarks on the Papal Canon Law—superficial; Of the Divine Nature, in relation to Christ; a translation of Hupfeld's Modern Theosophic Theology—a sharp attack on Kurtz, Hofmann, Delitzsch, etc.; the Apocalypse—advocating Desprez's view, that its prophecies were fulfilled in the Consummation of the Mosaic Economy and the Coming of the Son of Man. Dr. Hincks contributes a learned article on Arioch and Belshazzar—one of the earliest and the latest of the kings of Chaldea, both whose names he thinks are found in a cuneatic inscription, brought from the temple of *Shin* in Mugheir, and now in the British Museum.

Mr. Stewart has published a beautiful fac-simile of the *Speculum Humanæ Salvationis* (Mirror of Man's Salvation), carefully reproduced and edited by M. Berjeau, who also edited the fac-similes of the *Biblia Pauperum* and of the *Cantica Canticorum*. The Mirror is the most ancient example of xylography and typography combined. The price is four guineas; only 155 copies are printed.

An Examination of the Principles of the Scoto-Oxonian Philosophy, by Timologus, Part I, Lond. 1861 (Chapman and Hall), urges against Mansel the same line of argument presented in this REVIEW, Feb. 1860, pp. 18, 19, on the point that his positions annul the possibility of faith in, as well as a knowledge of, the Infinite and Absolute. He says that Mansel seems to have overlooked the fact, "that the conditions of consciousness" are applicable to belief, as much as to thought. "For, if that which is infinite cannot be apprehended by a finite faculty, it can neither be apprehended by a finite thought, nor by a finite belief. Our author, however, while teaching

that the Infinite Being can be apprehended by means of the organs of faith, does not pretend to assert that our faith or belief is itself infinite."

Thomas Tyler, in his work, *Jehovah the Redeemer God*, gives the future significance to Jehovah (Jahvah), "He who will be." He advocated this view in an article in the *Journal of Sacred Literature*, Jan. 1854, and complains of McWhorter and Macdonald (in his *Pentateuch*) for not acknowledging their obligations to him.

F. H. Scrivener, M.A., of Trinity College, Cambridge, is the author of a work of great value to students: *A Plain Introduction to the Criticism of the New Testament*. The first part gives a full account of the sources from which the various readings are derived—or the *External Evidence*; the second part investigates the principles on which the external evidence should be applied in the recension of the text; the third part examines all the passages on which authorities are at variance.

After an interval of six years, the second volume of Webster's and Wilkinson's *Greek Testament* is published, comprising the Epistles and the Apocalypse. It is not as critical as the work of Alford, nor is it as full in its references to English theological views as is Wordsworth; but it is a careful and laborious commentary, evangelical in spirit, and Calvinistic in doctrine.

The first volume of the writings of the late H. H. Wilson, edited by De Rost, contains a republication of his *Sketch of the Religions of the Hindus*, originally published in the *Asiatic Researches*, 1828 and 1832. A second volume of this division of his works will soon appear. Wilson was the worthy successor of Jones and Colebrooke. Forty-eight years ago he published the *Megadûta*. He was in the service of the East India Company until 1832; since then he has resided in England, pursuing his Sanskrit studies with indefatigable zeal. He died May 8, 1860.

Prof. Goldwin Smith, of Oxford, who has given such proof of his high ability by his Lectures on Ireland, which we elsewhere notice, has also come out with a work against Mansel, entitled *Rational Religion and the Rationalistic Objections of the Bampton Lectures for 1858*.—The 9th number of Tracts for Priests and People is on Dissent, by J. M. Ludlow, and on Creeds, by Rev. F. Garden.

The folio Shakspeare of 1623, first edition, is to be reprinted in fac-simile, in three parts, at 10s. 6d. each. The first part, containing the comedies, is out.

The author of the work on John Rogers, the Marian martyr, is an American gentleman, Joseph Lemuel Chester, who claims to be descended from the illustrious martyr, and visited England for the purpose of clearing up the genealogical connection.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A new and revised edition of Bp. McIlvaine's able work on Oxford Divinity is published by the Protestant Episcopal Book Society, under the title, *Righteousness by Faith*; or, *The Nature and Means of our Justification before God*.

Mr. Scribner will soon publish Stanley's *Eastern Church, and History of the Jewish Church*; Max Müller on the *Science of Language*, for \$1.25; J. W. Alexander, *Discourses on Faith*; J. Stuart Mill on *Representative Government, and on Liberty*.

The Rev. Henry Ruffner, D.D., died Dec. 17th, at his residence, in Kanawha county, Virginia, in the seventy-third year of his age. Dr. Ruffner was formerly President of Washington College, Virginia, and during his long life filled many positions of honor and usefulness. In 1850 he published the *Fathers of the Desert*, an account of Monasticism, in 2 vols. He also wrote against slavery.

President C. C. Felton, of Harvard College, died Feb. 26. He was born in 1807; became Professor of Greek Literature in Harvard, 1832. He translated Menzel's German Literature, and edited Homer, the Clouds and Birds of Aristophanes, the Panegyrics of Isocrates, the Agamemnon of Æschylus, and other works.

A new edition of *The Federalist* is in preparation by H. B. Dawson, Esq. It will be enriched by the private papers of Hamilton, which are placed at the disposal of the editor.

The Evangelical Review for January, 1862, has a translation by Prof. H. I. Schmidt, of Columbia College, of Mielziner's Essay on *Slavery Among the Hebrews*, which was also translated in our REVIEW last year. This is an additional evidence of its value. The translator says that he offered some time since the translation to several publishing houses, but that they all declined it, from "dread of giving offence to the South". Times have changed.

Mr. Brownson, in his *Review* for January, announces that he is preparing Essays on the History of the Reformation, as a world-movement, under some new points of view. He puts the error of the Reformation in the sundering of the life of humanity from "the theandric life of Christ". His *Review* shows unmistakable marks of progress. An article on the Reunion of Christians, complains of the Catholic defenders of the faith for insisting so much on the external argument from authority. It also idealizes the Romish dogmas of the Church and its infallibility in a most remarkable manner, going beyond the positions of Möhler. "No salvation out of the Church", is interpreted as meaning substantially no salvation for those not united to Christ. Infallibility is put in the Church as a whole; and even after the Church has pronounced in favor of a dogma, there still remains the question of interpretation, which "the Church does not answer, save negatively". Thus he says: "Infallibility extends only to the ideal . . . in so far as represented by language, or what we call the word spoken. It does not extend to the evolution, the appropriation, or the actualization of the ideal, by the human mind. . . . For after the Church has proclaimed to us infallibly the infallible dogma, we must still ask, what are its contents? or, what does it mean? This question the Church does not answer by her infallible authority, save negatively. . . . Beyond this there remain freedom and scope for the activity of our own minds, and the right and necessity of examination." As to the general position of this *Review*, he says it is due to "the public generally to say, that some changes in the character of the *Review*, or rather in the mode of conducting it hereafter, will be made. . . . Indeed, an effort will be made to ascertain whether it will be possible to break down the wall which now separates the Protestant and Catholic reading publics, and to some extent unite them in one republic of Letters. Heretofore, on theological questions our articles have, for the most part, been submitted to theological revision and censorship before publication; hereafter they will not be so submitted. We shall write according to our own honest convictions, and publish our articles as we write them, simply holding ourselves responsible, after publication, to the proper authorities for any abuse we may make of the freedom of the press guaranteed to us by the constitution and laws of our country."

Literary and Critical Notices of Books.

THEOLOGY.

Aids to Faith; a Series of Theological Essays. By Several Writers. Edited by WILLIAM THOMSON, D.D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. London: Murray. 1861. 8vo, pp. 469. This long-expected volume discusses in a very able manner the main topics raised by the famous *Essays and Reviews*. Not in the form of a direct reply, it will be even more convincing from the impartial and elevated tone which breathes through almost all the essays. Its spirit is both reverential and scholarly. It shows that there are men in the English Church who can investigate these high themes with learning and ability, with faith in the divine revelation, yet not relying on mere dogmatic authority. While the subjects are of such a nature, that no single volume can adequately compass them; yet, within the assigned limits the work proposed has been well done. This is undoubtedly the most valuable and satisfactory volume which this prolific controversy has thus far brought forth. The first essay, by Dr. Mansel, is on Miracles, as Evidences of Christianity. It is a careful and thorough argument. Within the same limits, we do not know where to find a more philosophical and acute statement and vindication of this vital point. It disentangles it from the web of sophistry, and puts it in just the right position in the argument. The peculiarities of Mansel's general theory of knowledge, to which we have formerly objected, hardly appear in the course of the discussion. The confusion pervading Powell's plea about the absolute uniformity of nature is admirably analyzed. Careful distinctions and a true logical method run through the whole disquisition. The second essay, by Dr. Fitzgerald, Lord Bishop of Cork, is on the Study of the Evidences of Christianity. The author is chiefly known as a writer by his tracts in *Cautions for the Times*. He has something of the keen spirit, learning, and liberality of Archbishop Whately. He reviews the various phases in the history of the Evidences during the past three centuries, and makes weighty suggestions about the mode in which modern infidelity is to be opposed, calming exaggerated fears as to its real power. Dr. A. McCaul, Prof. of Hebrew in King's College, London, contributes two essays, on Prophecy and on the Mosaic Record of Creation. Dr. Williams and Mr. Goodwin are here taken in hand. The reality of prophecy is shown by an appeal to facts; and the Mosaic Cosmogony is vindicated, on the general ground that the six days are not meant to represent six geologic periods. Ideology and Subscription are discussed by Rev. F. C. Cook, Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen, in opposition to Mr. Wilson—ideology being used as equivalent to the system and method

of Strauss. Though not a very thorough examination of the German systems, this essay offers many excellent criticisms and points of view, and defends the practical position of the English Church, and the moral obligation of subscription. Professor George Rawlinson, on the Genuineness and Authenticity of the Pentateuch, shows ample historical knowledge and decided critical skill. Dr. E. H. Browne, Norrisian Professor of Divinity in Cambridge, investigates the subject of Inspiration in a candid, though not very acute way, advocating, without any distinctive theory, the fact that the Bible is "an *infallible* depository of *religious* truth". The Editor, Bishop Thomson, writes on the Death of Christ, giving the substance of his Bampton Lectures for 1853, with additional discussions. The Scripture Doctrine, and the Doctrine of the Church, are well reviewed; the theoretical part is less elaborately worked out. The concluding essay, by Ellicott, the commentator on Scripture and its Interpretation, is one of the best of the series. Each essay is introduced by an analysis of the main points. The whole work will be welcomed, for its learning, candor, and ability, as a timely contribution to our theological literature. One additional essay, on the general principles and bearings of the whole controversy, would have made it a very complete book of its class.

Replies to "Essays and Reviews." With a Preface by the Lord Bishop of Oxford, etc. Oxford and London: Parker. 1862. 8vo, pp. 513. This is a volume of much greater pretensions, and much less real ability than the "Aids to Faith," noticed above. Unlike the latter, it is in the form of a regular reply to each of the Essays in succession. The tone is that of the High Church. Church authority seems to be the last appeal. The preface by Bishop Wilberforce is a slight and hasty affair, strongly recommending ecclesiastical censure as the best resort. Dr. Goulbourn, Chaplain to the Queen, replies to Dr. Temple on the Education of the World; but in his own study of the philosophy of history he has not got beyond a translation of Lessing's Education of the Human Race. Dr. H. J. Rose is the antagonist of Dr. Williams and Bunsen, and handles Williams very well in his own style. Dr. Heurtley, Margaret Professor of Divinity in Oxford, writes on Miracles, against Powell—the best essay in the series, though far inferior to Mansel in the "Aids to Faith." He says, in a note, quite naively: "I am not acquainted with Coleridge's works". Dr. Grant, on the Idea of the National Church, gives a good account of the history of the Anglican Church; but his principles are of the loftiest type of churchmanship, and he is a strong panegyrist of the Tracts for the Times. Rev. G. Robison on the Creation Week, has collected considerable materials. Under the title Rationalism, Rev. A. W. Haddon incidentally corrects some of Mr. Pattison's statements about the English apologists of the last century; and he finds the cure for rationalism in rituals, liturgies, ordained clergy, etc. Canon Wordsworth, on the Interpretation of Scripture, writes as if he had a personal spite against Professor Jowett. In the Appendix are Letters from Rev. Robert Main, of the Radcliffe Observatory, Oxford, on Scripture and Astronomy, and from Prof. John Phillips, Reader in Geology, Oxford, on Geology and Scripture.

Tracts for Priests and People. By Various Writers. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co. 1862. Pp. 372. Of the English edition of these Tracts we gave some account in our last number. The Boston reprint is well got up, and makes a handsome volume. Occasioned by the *Essays and Reviews*, it represents in the main the Broad Church views upon several important questions. The Tracts are seven in number (still continued in England),

viz. 1. *Religio Laici*, by Thos. Hughes, frank and manly, as the author of *Tom Brown at Rugby* always is; 2. *The Mote and the Beam*—a Clergyman's Lessons from the Present Panic, by F. D. Maurice, insisting that a revival of living faith in God and Christ is the great need of the times; 3. *The Atonement as a Fact and as a Theory*, by Rev. F. Garden—advocating the life-theory; 4. *Miracles*, by Rev. J. L. Davies—defending them by spiritualising them; 5. *Terms of Communion*, by Rev. C. K. P. and J. N. Langley; 6. *Against the Bishop of Oxford*, by J. M. Ludlow and Maurice; 7. *Two Lay Dialogues*, by J. M. Ludlow—good against the positivists. The volume is interesting as illustrating one phase of English thought in the present theological ferment.

The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural. By Rev. JAMES McCOSH, LL.D. New-York: Carters. 1862. Pp. 369. This work is divided into two Books, treating respectively of the Natural in Relation to the Supernatural, and of the Supernatural in Relation to the Natural. Incidentally it is intended to meet the objections raised by those that doubt or deny the possibility of supernatural intervention in the course of nature. The discussion is characterized by the author's well-known clearness and fluency of exposition, and natural, progressive method. The transitions and connections between the natural and supernatural are well stated. The most interesting chapter is that on the System in the Supernatural. Avoiding extreme positions, courteous in his treatment of objectors, confident in his statement of principles, and grasping the subject in many of its higher and wider aspects, Dr. McCosh will command the attention and secure the respect of thoughtful men, interested in these momentous themes. His aim is not so much to go into details, as to examine and decide the general principles involved in the controversy. Between extreme parties he occupies a cautious and tenable middle ground.

The History of the Religious Movement Called Methodism. By ABEL STEVENS, LL.D. Vol. III. From the Death of Wesley to the Centenary Jubilee. New-York: Carlton & Porter. Pp. 524. Dr. Stevens completes his proposed task with this volume, but we are glad to notice that he promises a supplement on the History of Methodism in this country. This volume is quite as able as the others, and quite as interesting. It abounds in details, biographical sketches, descriptions and incidents; but all these subserve the plan of the book, which is steadily kept in view. The labors and works of Bunting, Coke, Adam Clarke, Watson, Townley, Sutcliffe, Drew, Jackson, and many of lesser note pass in rapid, but clear review. Here is the true original of Adam Bede's Dinah, and here, too, Hester Ann Rogers is portrayed. The missionary labors and successes at home and abroad are faithfully narrated, as also the controversies and divisions, and the triumphant progress up to the Centenary Jubilee. Our ministers, and laymen too, should get and read the book. Some things they may not agree with; but in one thing they will be agreed, that it is an admirable exposition of a great religious revival.

The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Second Presbyterian Church, Newark, N. J. A Discourse by the Pastor, J. FEW SMITH, D.D. Newark. 1861. Pp. 75. This valuable commemorative sermon gives the history of a church which has had unusual prosperity and spiritual privileges under the successive ministries of Rev. Hooper Cumming; Dr. Griffin, who had been previously settled over the First Church; Dr. Hay; Rev. Eben. Cheever; Dr. Condit, now of Auburn Seminary; Dr. Prentiss for a brief period associated with Dr. Condit; and its present able and faithful pastor. It is an interesting contribution to our local church histories.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry. By ISAAC TAYLOR. With a Biographical Introduction by WILLIAM ADAMS, D.D. New-York: Carleton. 1862. 8vo, pp. 386. In this new work, Isaac Taylor appears in a new field of religious literature. Here, too, he writes with his accustomed vigor, thoughtfulness, and originality. The aim of the work is rather theological than literary—but yet, theological in the sense of Biblical Theology, as distinguished from scientific. The difference of the two, he says (p. 54), is this: that while "Scientific Theology professes to regard the Divine Nature and attributes as the centre", Biblical Theology has for its "central area", "the human spirit in its actual condition, its original powers, its necessary limitations, its ever varying consciousness, its lapses, its sorrows, its perils, its hopes, and its fears". Hebrew poetry is here viewed in respect to its specific religious use; and under this aspect it is vindicated against modern criticism. An incidental object of the work is the refutation of infidel, of pantheistic objections. The language of the Bible on divine subjects, he contends, must be figurative throughout. Hence, so large a part of the Bible is in poetry. There are both divine and human elements—the divine being the source of, and giving unity to the human. Inspiration is vindicated in a somewhat qualified sense, as compared with the mechanical theory. Under these general aspects, the subject is worked out with much ability. On every page, weighty thoughts arrest the attention. Hebrew poetry is traced from its beginning in Paradise to the prophetic consummation of the end of the world, and its contrast with all other literature is vividly portrayed. On this last point he says (p. 312): "It is not so much that we might not find in the Greek writers—Plato, for instance, or Æschylus—the rudiments of a theology, true and great as far as it goes; but in no Greek writer, in none anterior to the diffusion of the Gospel, are there to be found any rudiments whatever—any mere fragments, however small—of that LIFE OF THE SOUL TOWARD GOD, and of that DIVINE CORRESPONDENCE WITH MAN, which, in every Psalm, in every page of the Prophets, shines, burns, rules, with force—overrules Poetry—drives from its area the feeble resources of human art, and brings down upon earth those powers and those profound emotions which bespeak the nearness of the Infinite and the Eternal, when God holds communion with those that seek to live in the light of his favor." The work will be a most welcome one, not only to ministers, but also to laymen of intelligence and culture. It belongs to the elevating and not to the ephemeral class of religious publications. Dr. Adams has enriched it with an excellent account of the author and his various productions, giving many new facts from authentic sources. This edition is published by agreement with Mr. Taylor; and he is to have a handsome compensation from the liberality of the American publishers. We see that a cheap, rival edition is announced, but hope that it will find no encouragement, as it is printed with a full knowledge of the agreement made with Mr. Carleton. Mr. Carleton has published his edition in superior style, so as to make an attractive library volume.

A Commentary, Critical and Grammatical, on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians. With a revised Translation. By C. J. ELLICOTT, B.D. Andover: Draper. 1862. 8vo. Dr. Ellicott's commentaries offer many decided advantages to the student. They are concise, perspicuous, and well-arranged. They indicate familiarity with the literature of the subject, English, German, and patristic. One useful characteristic is his frequent references to the

treatises of English divines. The discussion of the text is sufficient for all ordinary purposes, though not so ample as Alford. The present volume has constant citations from nine ancient versions. The spirit of the commentary is at once scholarly, reverential, and orthodox. In doubtful cases it gives sufficient materials for a decision. The addition of the revised translation is a very welcome aid. Harless on the Ephesians, is undoubtedly the best extant commentary; and Dr. Ellicott has made good, though independent, use of his labors. His work is a compressed manual, and as such, one of the best helps to the student. On the important passage, ii, 4, his conclusion is, that while "it must fairly be said the unemphatic position of *φύσει* renders it doubtful whether there is any special contrast to *χάρτι*, or any direct assertion of the doctrine of Original Sin", yet "that the clause contains an *indirect*, and therefore even more convincing assertion of that profound truth, it seems impossible to deny".

A Translation of the Syriac Peshito Version of the Psalms of David: With Notes critical and explanatory. By Rev. ANDREW OLIVER, M.A. Boston: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1861. Pp. 331. The antiquity of the Syriac version of the Old Testament, dating probably from the second century, and the affinities of the Syriac language with the Hebrew, give a high value to this translation, the first in the English language. The translator carefully notes the deviations of the Syriac from the Hebrew, and its agreement with the Septuagint. He wisely follows, as closely as is possible, the authorized version. The Syriac division of the Psalms into Books and Grades, and the Syriac titles or contents, are also retained. Among all the ancient versions, the Syriac Peshito takes the front rank for its freedom from glosses; hence it is called the *Peshito* or the *simple*. That it was made by a Christian is evident, not merely from the titles, which might have been added, but from internal doctrinal evidence, e. g.: Psalm cx, 3: "I have begotten thee, O youth, from the beginning." Mr. Oliver deserves the thanks of Biblical students for his careful labors. They give new evidence of American zeal in exegetical studies. The volume is beautifully printed, at the Riverside press. It is for sale in New-York by John Wiley.

A Commentary on Ecclesiastes. By MOSES STUART. Edited and revised by Prof. R. D. C. ROBBINS. Andover: Draper. 1862. Pp. 346. One of the best of Prof. Stuart's commentaries is here carefully revised, with additional matter, by Prof. Robbins, who does all his work in a scholarly way. What is lost in freshness is more than made up in increased accuracy. No English commentary on the book is so good as this. It ought to be in the libraries of our pastors and students.

PRACTICAL RELIGIOUS LITERATURE.

Christian Worship, Services for the Church; with Order of Vespers and Hymns. New York: Jas. Miller, 1862. Pp. 260, 108. As might be anticipated from the learning and culture of the authors, Dr. Osgood and Dr. Farley, this manual of public worship for Unitarian Congregations is prepared with a careful selection and adaptation of materials from a great variety of sources. It is a new evidence of the growth of the liturgical sentiment among the modern Unitarians. It also indicates a tendency to reestablish public worship in all its parts, so that the sermon shall not seem to

be the main thing. Free use has been made of the Liturgy of the King's Chapel, Boston. In the old formulas of the church, alterations have of course been made, some of which grate upon the ear. Instead of the simple majestic form, "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost", we have: "Glory be to the Father, Almighty God, through Jesus Christ our Lord". Many of these alterations will rather suggest than displace the originals. In such cases, we think it would be better to make new forms, than merely to imitate, and yet change, the old hallowed words. The Vesper service is the most original portion of the work. Forms of prayer and service for all the different Ministerial acts are included. The Psalms are arranged with simplicity and accuracy for Responses. The selection of hymns is very good. We hear that Dr. Farley's church have refused to use this service; it is too much in advance of their old habits of thought. The volume is beautifully printed and bound.

Deutsches Gesangbuch. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. Pp. 620. This German Hymn Book was prepared by Dr. Schaff, for the German Reformed Church, and it is a most excellent selection, of 500 hymns, from the best sources, and exceedingly well arranged. We do not know of a better collection, and cordially commend it. It would be a good work for service in our German regiments. The only objection is the cost; but the smaller edition can be had bound for about 50 cents a copy, in quantities. It has received the highest commendations from such men as Knapp, Dörner, Krummacher, Bethmann-Hollweg, etc. The Synod of New York and New Jersey recommend it for the German congregations under their care.

Katechismus für Sonntags-Schulen. Von Dr. PHILIPP SCHAFF, Chambersburg. Pp. 80. Dr. Schaff's Catechism for Sunday Schools is a clear, simple, valuable manual. It hits the right medium between a merely historical and a merely doctrinal Catechism. It is also carefully arranged. It would be well to have a similar book prepared for the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches.

Hymns of Faith and Hope. Second Series. By H. BONAR, D.D. New York: Carters. Pp. 304. Dr. Bonar's hymns are of unequal merit. Some have the true melody and spirit of sacred song, while now and then there is one that seems to struggle hopelessly with hard and unmusical language. This collection, as a whole, is quite equal to his previous volume. Many of the hymns are of great beauty, and there is a large variety in them, both as to subjects and metre. The volume is beautifully printed and bound.

God's Way of Peace. By H. BONAR, D.D. New York: Carters, 1862. Pp. 200. To give salutary directions to an inquirer after life, is one of the most difficult tasks of a Christian pastor. He must wisely steer between too great discouragement, and encouragements upon an unreal basis. This volume of Dr. Bonar will be found a valuable help in such cases. The guilt of man, and the righteousness by grace, the obligation to immediate repentance, and the prime necessity of faith, are clearly and earnestly set forth. It is thoroughly evangelical in doctrine and spirit.

Practical Christianity. By JOHN S. C. ABBOTT. New York: Harpers. 18mo, pp. 302. This Treatise, especially designed for young men, is dedicated to the Volunteers of our National Army, and is well adapted to impress their minds, in the midst of the perils and temptations of the camp, with the serious and urgent claims of religion. It would be a good book for Chaplains to distribute.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

A Dictionary of English Etymology. By HENSLEIGH WEDGWOOD, M.A., late Fellow of Chr. Col., Cam. Vol. I, A—D. *With Notes and Additions.* By GEORGE P. MARSH. New York: Sheldon & Co., 1862. Royal octavo, double columns, pp. 247. \$3. English Etymology is yet in its rudiments, as a science, and hardly emancipated from the plausible, but insufficient theories of Horne Tooke, whom Richardson chiefly follows. It has been cultivated rather as a part of our general lexicons than as a distinct branch of investigation. The great merit of Mr. Wedgwood's learned and painstaking work, is in confining himself strictly to the derivations of words, so far as these can be traced. Its peculiarity is found in carrying out more fully than any previous writer, the theory, that language to a considerable extent starts from an imitation or representation of natural sounds—*onomatopœia*. This he illustrates in his preface by a great variety of unexpected instances, and by many transformations and changes from one language to another. The work is absolutely necessary to the philologist to fill the gaps, and quite as often to correct the errors, of our current lexicographers. The additions of Mr. Marsh, made to about two hundred and fifty words, greatly increase the value of the volume; and they are all the more valuable because derived, in most cases, from a direct reading of the earlier writers, not relying on second-hand compilations. Fine specimens of his minute and curious learning are seen in his additions to the words, *Abet*, *Anneal*, *Average*, *Awning*, *Baggage*, *Ballast*, *Canoe*, *Ceiling*, *Cheese*, etc. We notice that he discredits the connection between *atone* and *sühne*, which Coleridge favored. Theologians may be instructed by these derivations and changes of meaning. Thus the word *able*—Latin, *habilis*—meant, in the earlier usage, *convenient*, *fit*; in the later usage, it is restricted to the general sense of efficiency. To *enable* a person to do a thing, or to *disable* him, means, in old English, to render him fit or unfit for doing it. That is, it does not refer to natural capacity, but to specific adaptation. A whole controversy lies in this difference. Chaucer says: "God tokeneth and assigneth the times, *abling* hem to her proper offices". Wycliffe translates Rom. ix, 22: "That if God, willing to schewe his wrathe, and to make his power knowne, hath sufferid in grete pacience vessels of wrathe *able* unto death". The work is printed in the best style, on laid paper, tinted, from long primer types. Two more volumes will, probably, complete it. This hardly seems the time for issuing so expensive a work, which necessarily appeals to a comparatively small class: but it is one which libraries and scholars must and will have.

Permanent Documents of the Society for the Promotion of Collegiate and Theological Education at the West. 3 vols. 8vo. New York. This excellent Society, during the past eighteen years, has done a noble work in rendering needed aid to thirteen colleges in our Western States, and on the Pacific Coast. To a rare extent, it has secured the confidence of the Christian public. This has been owing, in no slight measure, to the indefatigable labors, wise counsels, and prudent management of its Secretary, Rev. Theron Baldwin, who is one of the chief benefactors of our day to the cause of a thorough Christian education. All the Colleges he has aided are monuments to his fidelity. His sixteen Annual Reports contain valuable discussions of all the leading questions connected with this great work. Each Report presents the subject under some new aspect or relation. Besides these Reports, the three volumes of Permanent Documents embrace discourses or addresses, averaging two for each year, by many of the wisest

and best ministers of the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches. In no work devoted to education, are combined more broad and philosophic views, wise suggestions, pertinent facts, and eloquent appeals, upon the true nature, methods and aims of collegiate education, under Christian auspices, in a republican country. The volumes are invaluable. They ought to be found in every public library, especially those in our Theological Seminaries and Colleges. They are well entitled *Permanent Documents*. As an indication of their value, we give a list of some of the more prominent addresses. Albert Barnes, Plea in behalf of Western Colleges—an admirable analysis of Western character and needs; Dr. Beman on Education at the West—a forcible inculcation of anti-Jesuit policy; Dr. Todd, Plain Letters on the theme, Colleges essential to the Church of God; Dr. Bacon, a comprehensive sketch of the relation of Christianity and Learning; Prof. Haddock, Collegiate Education; Dr. Condit, Education at the West in its claims on the Church; Prof. Porter, Plea for Libraries, and on the Educational System of the Puritans and Jesuits compared—a premium essay; Dr. Cox was in one of his best moods, when he gave his Address, which hardly admits of being labelled with a title; Dr. Edward Beecher, The Question at Issue; Prof. Park, The Utility of Collegiate and Professional Schools—one of his most finished productions; Dr. T. H. Skinner, Education and Evangelism; Dr. Peters, Colleges, Religious Institutions; President Hopkins—an admirable address on the idea and aims of college culture; Dr. Hall, Colleges essential to Home Missions; Addresses by President Sturtevant, Rev. J. F. Tuttle, Rev. H. Towne, Dr. Eddy, Rev. Lyman Whiting, H. W. Beecher, Prof. Tyler, H. B. Smith, Dr. Thompson; Discourses by Dr. Storrs, Dr. Kirk, Dr. Stearns, etc. We have not space to characterize all these as they fitly deserve; they present the best thoughts of some of our ablest thinkers, on a vital subject, intimately connected with the highest welfare of the American people. In reading them, we have been forcibly impressed with the fact, that there is so little of repetition, though the discourses are so numerous. This illustrates both the greatness of the theme and the ability of the men.

Ethical and Physiological Inquiries, chiefly relating to Subjects of Popular Interest. By A. H. DANA. New York: Scribner, 1862. Pp. 308. The essays contained in this thoughtful volume discuss many profitable themes. They exhibit the fruits of much reading, and of independent reflection. Topics of current interest are handled in a simple, and often forcible manner. The title might well have taken a wider range. The work belongs to that part of literature which ever has strong attractions for persons of meditative habits. Ministers, physicians, politicians, men of business, and students, will here find materials for investigation, and fruitful hints and principles to guide them in their inquiries. There is a singular freedom from one-sided and partial views, and merely theoretic schemes. Among the subjects handled in a suggestive manner are, Races of Men, Compensations of Life, Identity, Hereditary Character, Narcotic Stimulants, War, Seminaries of Learning, The Supernatural, Probation of Life, Neuromathy, Nemesis, etc.

A Strange Story. A Novel, By Sir E. BULWER LYTTON. With Illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1862. 25 cents. A fascinating, as well as strange story, wrought out with all the literary skill of Bulwer, and illustrating many wonderful facts on the "dark side" of human experience, in the mysterious realms of somnambulism and mesmerism. Learning, fancy, imagination, and all the resources of the novelist, are put in requisition, in the construction of the plot, and though a sharp key-note is struck

at first, yet the interest is kept up unflagging to the end. As a work of art, it is among the very best of the prolific author.

Pilgrims of Fashion. A Novel, By KINAHAN CORNWALLIS. New York: Harper & Brother. Pp. xvi, 337. \$1.

MISCELLANY.

Some of the Providential Lessons of 1861. How to meet the Events of 1862. Two Discourses, by Rev. GEORGE L. PRENTISS, D.D. New York, W. H. Bidwell. These two thoughtful and eloquent discourses are published by request of Dr. Prentiss's congregation, and contain Christian reflections and lessons, admirably adapted to the present juncture of our national affairs.

The Relations of Religion to the War. A Sermon, by Rev. HUGH SMITH CARPENTER. New York. This Discourse, preached in the Westminster Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, is full of vivid descriptions and earnest appeals, suggested by the crisis into which slavery has brought the republic.

"*He thanked God and took Courage.*" A Sermon for Thanksgiving Day, 1861. By Rev. MATSON MEIER SMITH, Bridgeport, Conn. The elements of the present struggle, and its high moral and religious lessons, are forcibly set forth in this patriotic discourse, delivered in the North Congregational Church, of Bridgeport, Conn.

President Tappan's Message to the Law Congress of the University of Michigan. Delivered Jan. 18, 1862. Ann Arbor. Dr. Tappan here ably reviews the constitutional questions and projects now so largely discussed, coming to the simple conclusion, that our great work at present is not to settle questions about slaves and slaveholders, but "to press on this war to its conclusion, with the utmost might and vigor".

The Habeas Corpus Act and Martial Law. By ROBERT L. BRECK. Cincinnati, 1862. This essay, severely criticising the course of the President, in respect to the points named in the title, was prepared for the Danville Quarterly Review, but excluded from it, as tending to embarrass the action of the Government.

Young Benjamin Franklin. By HENRY MAYHEW. With Illustrations by John Gilbert. New York: Harpers, 1862. 18mo, pp. 561. Mr. Mayhew, so well known for his works on social topics, here instructs the boys how to get along in life, by the example of our Franklin, supposed to be taught by his uncle, about sports, books, events, science, morals and manners. Some of the disquisitions are rather prolix, but much useful knowledge is crowded into these pages, and the incidents are varied and instructive.

Health: Five Lay Sermons to Working People. By JOHN BROWN, M.D. New York: Carters, 1862. We advise everybody, ministers and laymen, men and women, boys and girls, to read these capital lay sermons. They are full of sense and wit—good, plain talk on every-day matters, so as to interest all, with a double vein of humor and piety running through the discourse.

Statistics and News of Churches and Missions.

PRUSSIA.—*Romanism and Protestantism in Prussia.*—During the nine years from 1849 to 1858, churches and clergymen in the Evangelical and in the Roman Catholic churches of Prussia have increased in the following proportions. Not including the Dissenters, and exclusive of the little Principality of Hohenzollern and the Rhine district, the Evangelical population numbered, in 1849, 10,006,798 souls, who congregated in 5,208 mother-churches, 2,956 filial-churches, and 806 other buildings, devoted to divine service; on the whole, 8,976 places of worship. Divine service was held by 6,139 ordained clergymen. Up to the year 1858 the number of places of worship had increased by 330; and the number of ministers of the church by 281. This increase, however, stands in no proportion with the growth of the Evangelical population, which, during the indicated period, had augmented from every 1,000 to 1,084. In the Roman Catholic Church, the number of places for divine worship had also grown by 320 during the same time, and the number of the clergy by 561; the increase of the Romanist population, however, was not the same as the Protestant; it grew only from every 1,000 to 1,078. In the year 1849, there was one church to every 1,114 souls, in the Protestant provinces, and one clergyman to every 1,628 souls; while with the Romanists, there was one church to every 840

souls, and one priest to every 1,082 souls. In the year 1858 there was one church for every 1,164 Evangelical inhabitants, and one clergyman for 1,689; with the Roman Catholics in 1858 there was one church for every 867 persons, and for every 1,065 souls one priest.

SWITZERLAND.—According to the last census taken in Switzerland, the total population of the confederation in December last was 2,534,422 souls, of whom 2,204,280 were Swiss citizens, and the rest foreigners. In religion, 1,483,296 of the total were Protestants, 1,040,469 Catholics, the rest "Separatists," Jews, etc.

BULGARIA.—*Romanism in Bulgaria.*—The attempted Romish movement in Bulgaria has come to a very ridiculous termination. The bishops who promoted this movement now protest that they had been deceived. The Bishop, who was received at Rome with so much *éclat*, has recanted, and declared that he was imposed upon. Boré, the great instigator of this movement, has been banished to Cochin China in consequence of his blunder. Thus terminates the boasted conversion of a nation of some millions, which the Pope said had solaced him so much in the midst of his misfortunes.

ALGERIA.—Freedom of worship is guaranteed by the French government: congregations of 250 members

are officially recognised. When thus recognised the pastors receive from the government 2,400 francs stipend, and 1,000 francs for a dwelling. There are now in Algeria 14 evangelical clergy — 7 Lutheran and 7 Reformed; 11 churches are organized—scattered through the provinces of Algiers, Oran and Constantine. Schools are also at work in connection with these churches. An orphan-house in Dely-Ibrahim has 128 orphans.—*Neue Evang. Kirchenzeitung.*

A Secluded Missionary Station.—A letter in the *Delhi Gazette* describes a remote and almost unknown settlement of Moravian missionaries in a valley called Le Howl, about seventeen marches from Simla, and surrounded by snowy mountains more than twenty thousand feet in height. Four years ago the Moravians took up their abode among the inhabitants of this secluded spot, and the only communication they maintain with the civilised world is to send one of their number once a year to Simla, to lay in provision for a twelvemonth. They have derived their knowledge of the language from a vocabulary and a grammar published by a German, who has never been near Le Howl, and who lives in St. Petersburg.

ASIA.—Missions among the Shans.—Authentic information, says the *Rangoon Times*, has been received in town of a large emigration of Shans into British territory. They have come, it is said, from one of the adjacent states, which was nominally subject to the government of Burmah. For some reason, it appears, a Burmese force was sent against these people, probably to enforce the payment of revenue, when they attempted to resist, and coercion being employed, they abandoned their houses and lands, and fled for protection into Pegu. They are reported to number some ten thousand

souls of all ages. A *Tsaubwa*, or hereditary chief, is in company with them.

For the forty-nine years, during which missions have been in operation in the Burman empire, the Shans were wholly overlooked. Nothing was done for their moral or intellectual improvement. Just at the time, however, when the hands of the persecuting Burmese are raised against them for their oppression, the American Baptists have been adopting measures to send them the light of the Gospel by the hands of a missionary of the cross.

MADAGASCAR.—Radama II had transmitted a communication to the Governor of Mauritius, inviting a free intercourse, and the Legislative Council had dispatched a mission to congratulate his Majesty, and thank him for proposing facilities to commerce and trade. The Mauritius Society of Arts and Sciences also sent an address, soliciting the King to promote a display of some of the rich products of Madagascar at the Great International Exhibition of 1862. The King is reported to have proclaimed commercial liberty throughout his territory, with equitable customs regulations at every port, and at the same time to have intimated that he is not disposed to accept the protectorate of France or of any other Power, although he will readily listen to any friendly suggestions of the Emperor Napoleon. Meanwhile he has appointed an Englishman — Mr. Lambert, long a faithful adherent — as his Chief Minister, and has commissioned him to proceed as Ambassador to France and England, to procure a recognition of his Majesty, under the style of Radamah II, King of the Hovas. Madagascar is larger than Great Britain and Ireland; has rich mines of metals and coal; the soil is wonderfully productive, yielding valuable timber, dyewoods, and vegetable substances in endless variety; and the climate,

though bad on the coast, is healthy in the interior. Many persons, it is inferred, will settle when protection is afforded to Europeans.

Religious Liberty in Egypt.—

Some time in July last, a Syrian employé, or book-selling agent of the American Presbyterian missionaries, was cruelly bastinadoed and otherwise ill-treated by the *cadi* and other high Mohammedan functionaries of Siout, in Upper Egypt. As Siout is some hundreds of miles up the Nile, toleration has generally been thought to be out of the question there. Mr. Thayer, the consul-general of the United States at Alexandria, saw no reason for this, however, in the nature of things, and accordingly took the case up and fought it with vigor, perseverance, and success. He succeeded in having the *cadi* deposed, and thirteen of the other offenders, the wealthiest and most arrogant residents of Siout, imprisoned for one year, and ordered to pay a fine of \$5000 to Faris, the missionary agent, the amount being divided among them according to their respective degrees of culpability, and the money deposited in gold at the consulate. This is said to be the first time that religious toleration has been vindicated in Upper Egypt, and the missionaries and Christian residents are overjoyed, declaring that if the same vigorous treatment had been applied by foreign consuls at the beginning of the outrages in Syria, the massacres of Jeddah and Damascus would never have occurred.

The Samoan Mission.—Among the most remarkably successful missions of modern times, is that of the London Missionary Society to the Samoan Islands. The missionaries had the language to learn and reduce to writing, and the whole work of preparing books and of education to do. Their printing press arrived in 1839,

so recently did their work begin. In 1846 the translation of the New Testament was printed and in circulation, and in 1855 the Old Testament was finished. Attention was devoted from the first to the education of native helpers, and there are now, under the direction of the ten European missionaries, no less than 210 native preachers and other helpers. Population 34,000; churches 305; church members 2,600. They have sent home sometimes no less than \$3,000 a year to the treasury of the Society. They have bought books to the amount of more than \$10,000.

NEW SOUTH WALES has now a population of 350,553, against 251,834 for 1856, being an increase in five years of 98,719. The number of immigrants since 1851 is 147,661, of whom 71,849 were introduced at the public, and 76,012 at their own expense.

The Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa.—The South African *Advertiser* contains an account of what the Dutch Reformed Church has done in South Africa. It enumerates twenty-five churches, and about as many parsonages, beside several schools that have been built. Beside, the *Advertiser* says, "it has instituted a Theological Seminary, endowed with extensive buildings for residence of professors and accommodation of students, and a fund amounting already to at least £17,500, which continues to be swelled with additional liberal contributions. It has continued to spend at least £2,500 per annum for the education of its theological students in Europe. It has contributed for missions last year £900. It has raised a fund, already amounting to about £13,000, to provide for the widows of its clergy. It has lately contributed £1,740 for the deputation of one of its clergy, Dr. Robertson, to Europe to procure clergymen,

missionaries, and schoolmasters; and already, by that means, there have been engaged nine clergymen, two missionaries, and four schoolmasters."

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC WORLD.—The *Pontifical Calendar* for 1862 has just been published. It declares that there are 938 dioceses in the Catholic world, and that 75 episcopal sees, most of them Italian, are now vacant. It designates Cardinal Milesi as being still Legate at Bologna, and Mgr. Lasagni as being Legate at Forli; every thing is retained as if the Legations, the Marches, the Umbria, were still governed by the Holy See.

SCOTLAND.—The Presbyterian ministry of Scotland comprises, in the Established Church, 1,173; in the Free Church, 790; in the United Presbyterian Church, 526. The last of these denominations (the United Presbyterian) is in a flourishing state. The Presbytery of Edinburgh alone has fifty-four congregations, with a membership of 24,288. Three new congregations were organised in this Presbytery during the past year, and 2,776 persons were added to the membership of the churches. Besides laboring in Scotland, this Church has successful missions in the foreign field, and is exerting itself much to extend Presbyterianism in England. Rev. Drs. King and Macfarlane, well-known and able ministers, have left large and deeply attached charges in Glasgow, and accepted calls to new and promising congregations in London.

RELIGIOUS STATISTICS OF AUSTRIA.—The following religious statistics relative to Austria are extracted from a recent official return: The secular clergy consists of 55,370 members;

and among them are 1 patriarch, 4 primates, 11 archbishops, and 58 bishops. The number of monasteries is 720, and in them are 59 abbots, 45 provincials, 6,754 regular priests, 645 other priests, 240 novices, and 1,917 lay brethren. In the total, the Jesuits possess 17 houses, 2 provincials, and 188 priests. The number of convents is 298, and in them are 5,198 nuns. Of the total, 85 houses belong to Sisters of Charity, and they are occupied by 104 sisters. The revenue of ecclesiastical benefices is 8,772,984 florins, and the capital of them 99,186,000 florins. The convents have an income of 50,607,376 florins; the churches one of 6,083,281 florins, and a capital of 34,326,276 florins. The revenue of the schools is 329,252 florins, and their capital 152,233 florins; and charitable establishments have revenues of 12,033.

PROGRESS OF THE GOSPEL IN FRANCE.—A late number of the *Archives du Christianisme* gives the following view of the progress of the Gospel in France: In 1819 the Lutheran and Reformed churches had in Paris, six pastors and three places of worship. Now there are forty-eight pastors of different denominations, and thirty-one places of worship. The first Protestant Sunday-school was opened at Paris, in 1822, with from fifteen to twenty scholars. The number of Protestant Sunday-schools in Paris is now from twenty-five to thirty, with from 2,500 to 3,000 scholars. In 1807, there were, in the whole of France, 227 pastors of the Reformed Church. In 1861, the number of Reformed Church pastors amounted to 653, and of Lutheran, and other Protestant denominations, 405—making altogether, 1,058 Protestant pastors, against 451 in 1807.